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WILL CIVILISATION CRASH?

“ . . . There is a noise of war in the camp.”

Exodus xxxii. 17.

WILL CIVILISATION CRASH ?

By Lt.-Commander the Honourable

J. M. Kenworthy

*Royal Navy, Member of Parliament,
formerly Admiralty War Staff, London,
Assistant Chief of Staff, Gibraltar*

With an Introduction
by

H. G. Wells

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INTRODUCTION

COMMANDER KENWORTHY is one of the most vivid and provocative members of the House of Commons. He qualifies great abilities by a certain tactlessness which has won him an unpopularity altogether beyond his merits. The other day, for example, when he was in America, he confided to an interviewer who quoted some trivial comment I had made upon the Labour party that I had "gone gaga." In that manner he made reverence to my seniority of twenty years. He now asks me to say something for his forthcoming book, "Will Civilisation Crash?" It is, I assume, a respite from the gaga sentence, and gladly do I halt on the road to Dr. Voronoff or the crematorium to salute the still unmellowed vigour of my friend's intelligence.

He has done a very useful, very competent, very stimulating book. I am happy to recommend it. I do not think it would be easy to better his summary of the complex of forces that make for war in the world to-day. He has a good clear sense of fact and of the size of a fact and the weight of a fact, and if in his culminating chapter, "The Only Road," he does a little seem to fade, it is only where we all fade. Because although the omens of another great war are as plain now as they were in 1907, the forces to which one can turn to stem the drift seem relatively even more confused and feeble than they were in the days when King Edward the Peacemaker flitted amiably about the Continent, David Lubin made his treaties for economic controls with every country upon earth, the League of Nations Society

met thinly ever and again to hear the discreet counsels of Sir Willoughby Dickinson and Mr. Aneurin Williams, and Sir Charles Walston preached a federal constitution for Europe.

In those days one relied very much on the common sense of mankind. I will confess I was taken by surprise by the Great War. Yet I saw long ahead how it could happen, and wove fantastic stories about it; I let my imagination play about it, but at the bottom of my heart I did not feel and believe it would really be let happen. I did not suspect that Lord Grey, the German Emperor, and the rest of them were incompetent to that pitch. And when at last it did happen and that profession of ruthless, insensitive mediocrities, the military profession, was given power for four years of stupid, clumsy, and inconclusive massacre and destruction, I still clung to a delusion that at the end the common sense of mankind would say quite definitely, "never again!" to any such experience, and would be prepared to revise its ideas of nationality, empire, loyalty, race competition, and propagation, soundly and effectively as soon as it could for a moment struggle out of the mud and blood and reek in which it was entangled. Whether the phrase "the war to end war" was my contribution to the world or not, I cannot now remember. My mistake was in attributing any common sense to mankind.

SUNNY LANDSCAPE

To-day the huge majority of people in the world think no more about the prevention of war than a warren of rabbits thinks about the suppression of shotguns and ferrets. They just don't want to be bothered about it.

It is amazing how they accept the things that will presently slaughter them.

The other day my wife and I were sitting on the lawn of a pleasant seaside hotel. Charming young people in pretty wraps raced down to the water to bathe ; others came chatting from the tennis courts. The sea-front below was populous with a happy crowd ; the sands gay with children. The faint sounds of a distant band on the pier were punctuated rather quaintly by practice gunfire from a distant fort. About us, in chairs of the most comfortable sort, sat the mature and prosperous, smiling pleasantly at the three military aeroplanes that manœuvred overhead. "Wonderful !" they said.

Of the hundreds of people in sight then, many scores will certainly be killed in horrible ways if war comes in the next twenty years ; they will be suffocated by lethal gases, torn to ribbons by explosives, sent limping and crying for help with frightful mortal mutilations, buried and smashed and left to die under collapsed buildings. Many more will be crippled ; most, perhaps, impoverished. But they weren't worrying. They weren't taking life as seriously as that. Across the trim turf came a group of military officers, discussing some oafish "idea" of a landing, of "operations" and so forth, and casting no shadow at all upon the smiling people about them. Just the same fine sort of fellows, they were, agreeably dull-witted, as sent hundreds of thousands of Englishmen to cruel and useless deaths in France.

They passed, and we heard a note of anxiety from an adjacent bath chair. So after all there was someone who saw it as well as ourselves. We listened, but it was only an old gentleman worried by the morning's newspaper, vexed at the last reprieve of Sacco and Vanzetti and

troubled by another fall in the British birth-rate. He was expostulating about it to his stout and elderly wife, who assented as by habit and seemed chiefly preoccupied with her knitting.

He did not know what the world was coming to, he said. Lucky old boy ! He never may.

FEW PEOPLE INTERESTED IN DIPHENYL- CHLOROARSINE

I doubt if there was a human being in sight who was ever likely to read Commander Kenworthy's admirable chapter on the application of Science in Battle or his other on War in the Air, and learn the pleasures awaiting those whose share in the next war may include a whiff of diphenyl-chloroarsine. Perhaps they will know everything that is practically important about this delicious substance long before they know its name. They may even try to call it by some quite wrong name before they choke. It is very conveniently administered by air bomb in the form of an intensely irritating smoke which can penetrate most gas-masks yet devised. Says the 1926 *Manual of Chemical Warfare* quoted by Commander Kenworthy :

" In man slight and transitory nasal irritation is appreciable after an exposure of five minutes to as little as one part of diphenyl-chloroarsine in two hundred million parts of air, and as the concentration is increased the irritation shows itself sooner and in rapidly increasing severity. Marked symptoms are produced by exposure to one part of diphenyl-chloroarsine in fifty million parts of air, and it may be stated in general that this concentration forms the limit of tolerance of ordinary individuals for an exposure lasting five minutes. A concentration of one part in ten million will probably incapacitate a man within a minute from the pain and distress, and nausea and vomiting accompany an exposure of from two to three minutes

of this concentration. . . . These substances are generally used to cause such sensory irritation that the victim is unable to tolerate a respirator."

Then the victim tears it off, and the other gas with which the region has been soaked, the killing gas, gets him.

When the Commander raised the question of teaching the use of gas-masks to children in the infant schools during the debate on the Air Estimates in the House of Commons in 1927, he was greeted with laughter by the members present. Nothing could better illustrate the happy carelessness with which we move towards the next catastrophe. The air manœuvres over London this past summer have demonstrated clearly that it will be almost impossible to prevent the copious gassing of that great warren within a few hours of the opening of any new European conflict of first-class rank.

THE RIVALRY OF BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES

The gravest chapters in this book are not, however, the recital of the novel and enhanced horror, for civilians quite as much as for soldiers, of the next war, as the excellent and disturbing study of the gathering rivalry of the United States and Britain in naval affairs, and the discussion of the possibility of a war between these two halves of the English-speaking world. The stupid professionalism of the experts is largely to blame, and the still more stupid readiness of the present Governments in both Britain and America to follow the lead of these obsessed gentlemen. Whether a war between the United States and Great Britain is to be regarded as a tolerable possibility does not enter into the philosophy

of the naval monomaniacs on either side of the water. Their business is to make Britain "safe" from the United States and the United States "safe" from Britain, and they are quite capable of calculating upon Japan as an ally in such a war. The wholesome brotherly jealousy of our two peoples is to be fostered and inflamed in the cause of armament and preparedness to the fighting-pitch. The rivalries of industrialists and oil manipulators are to be dragged into the elaborating quarrel.

The reader must turn to Commander Kenworthy's book to realise how far this obscene foolery with human welfare has gone already and how easily it may go further. He shows how step by step the trouble may be worked up until the two great masses of English-speaking people find themselves upon different sides in the alliances of a new war that will outdo all the destructions and miseries of 1914, as that outdid the Napoleonic wars.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS A SEDATIVE DRUG

Very good and convincing, too, is the summary of the activities of the League of Nations, and the very complete demonstration that that ill-planned and ill-supported assembly has fallen back even from the poor courage of its earlier enterprises. As a means of settlement for minor international difficulties, which the states concerned want settled, it has a considerable usefulness, but as a guarantee against graver quarrels it is beneath contempt.

It is more than useless because it is dangerous; a great number of people in Europe and America are persuaded that it is a sort of war preventative, and that when they have paid their subscription to a local branch of the League of Nations Union and been to a lecture

or a garden party once a year under its auspices, they have done all that they can be reasonably required to do to secure world peace for ever. Upon many such excellent people the existence of the League of Nations acts as a mischievous opiate. They would be far more actively and intelligently at work against the warmakers if it did not exist to lull them into a false security.

BUT WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

But when I reach Chapter the Nineteenth, which is to tell us what is to be done, I find, as I have remarked already, a certain fading in the tones of our author's voice. He is for an alliance to suppress war, and he points out very clearly that the United States, Great Britain, Holland, and Switzerland could prohibit war to all the rest of the world to-morrow—if they chose. Between them they

“control the finance of the whole world. No nations breaking the peace could hope for any financial help against their combined boycott. England, America, and Holland between them control the greater part of the world's supplies of petroleum, Russia being the only large scale producer of oil in an independent position. England and Holland between them control the world's supplies of rubber. England and America between them control the greater part of the world's supplies of cotton and copper, Russia again producing comparatively small quantities of cotton and copper independently. England and France and Belgium, if she adhered, as is highly probable, control the greater part of the tropically produced edible fats. Most of the wool and jute is controlled by the British Empire.

Without money, oil, cotton, wool, rubber, copper, zinc, jute, tin, or edible fats, no war on the modern scale would be waged for very long. A very large *proportion* of the meat and wheat of the world would also be controlled by this group of peace-keepers. Do not let us involve ourselves in complications about aggressive powers or who is to blame in any war. To do so would simply be to cloud the issue.”

Let us, in short, simply put our collective foot down and say, "Stop that war!" and it will stop.

That is an excellent passage. It should be given out as a dictation lesson in every school in the English-speaking world. We, just ourselves, can stop war almost completely.

But who are "we"?

America, Britain, Holland, Belgium, and Switzerland, with France and Germany in accord, will be the reply. But in what form are they to do it? There the Commander boggles and remains vague. Because you see there is no way of getting these Powers together except by getting them together, and that means a federal merger of so much of their independent sovereignty as concerns their foreign relations. Before we can have peace these Powers must form a league to enforce peace. That means no tinpot debating society of every little state, big or little, barbaric or civilised, strong or feeble, at Geneva, with no powers worth speaking about, but a real permanent league and alliance of these, the only really war-potent states, and a *sincere surrender of independent action* on the part of all of them for the general good. Well, not one of the communities named is even slightly prepared for such a step. It would shock them more than any declaration of war could possibly do. And until the common sense of these communities can be raised to the level of realising this, they will continue to drift as they are drifting to another shattering war catastrophe.

I suspect that the author of this book before me knows that as well as I do. But there is Hull to consider. What would happen to the Commander's majority if he advocated plainly and simply putting the Empire under a greater League? I quite realise he cannot

afford to take so grave a risk of extinction and frustration.

A phrase, now popular in America, seized upon him in the ensuing hesitation and was for the moment "The Only Road." Yet it is not a road out or anything like a road. It is just another piece of empty, fruitless American "idealism" utterly worthless to the world at large. War is to be "Outlawed." A wonderful word! Senator Borah finds the phrase suit his voice, and I gather it has the approval of that champion international visitor and retriever of foreign orders and honorary degrees, President Nicholas Murray Butler. Between these gentlemen and Commander Kenworthy I note much friendliness and intimacy exists. He has been in windy, unsubstantial company, where phrases and good feeling count for more than effective action. You are to "outlaw" war. You are just to make a treaty between the Powers concerned saying as much—and there you are! You leave those Powers completely untrammelled by their declaration. Indeed, you leave everything as it was before. But you say it.

Commander Kenworthy gives a treaty projected by Mr. Houghton, "speaking in his private capacity as a citizen"—and only so far in earnest—which is probably the most vacuous treaty ever proposed. At present, peace, for an indefinite period, exists legally between all these Great Powers; nevertheless, "a hundred years' peace agreement between the United States and Great Britain and perhaps other Powers" is to be signed with much fuss and ceremony—"in the most solemn manner." I can see the impressive gatherings that could be imposed upon the affair, the parties, the megaphoned and broadcast speeches, the grip of hand and hand, the noble, rich, respectable emotions. Royalty

would have to be present, and Washington—it would surely be Washington!—would be as full of silk hats and uniforms as a Buckingham Palace garden party. No intimations of any method of settling all possible issues conclusively without war are made in this resonant phantom of a proposal. To do that would be to limit sovereignty.

I am sorry I cannot share Commander Kenworthy's faith in this magic word "outlawry" and its stately solemnisation. I accept all his premonitions of another great war; they are only too convincing; but I believe that the ending of war is a far more complex, laborious, and difficult task than such mere gesticulations as this imply. A great change is needed in the teaching of history and the training of the young citizen, a substitution of a biological for a merely economic and political conception of human life, before we can begin to hope for the secure establishment of these world controls upon which alone an enduring world peace can be sustained. In the meantime the most effective resistance to the approach of another great war lies in the expressed determination *now* of as many people as possible that they will have nothing to do with it, that they will not fight in it, work for it, nor pay taxes when it comes—whatever sort of war it is.

Pacifism is very ineffective and has an unpleasant flavour if it is adopted after war has arrived; the time for active pacifism is while peace still rules. People who have made no effort to avert war cannot very well resist and grumble when through their tacit invitation war takes hold of them. The last war was a war to end war, and the politicians and statesmen have not made good. So now is the time for a great pacifist effort. Now is the time for people who want to delay and avert a catastrophe

before the more deliberate organisation of a world peace can be achieved, to make it clear that the warmakers will have to reckon with immense defections. That is the really practicable anti-war measure to attempt now, but it is much more likely to lead to gaol than to impressive ceremonial junketings at the White House.

H. G. WELLS.

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WILL CIVILISATION CRASH?

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CHAPTER I

PEACE OR WAR?

No advance since last great war—Kaleidoscope of changing enmities and alliances—The institution of war—Cost of the last great war—Losses in war—Individuals against war—Danger of mob psychology—Susceptible to mass suggestion—Analogy of duel—And of civil war—Destruction of feudalism—Wars of Roses—Modern nationalism—Patriotism, good and bad—Political causes of war—Economic causes—Imperialistic causes—The new cause of war.

ON June 28th, 1914, a youth fired with a pistol at the Archduke Ferdinand of Austria, and on August 3rd, 1914, war broke out. In that war Russia was allied with Japan, Britain with France, Serbia with Roumania, Bulgaria with Turkey. It lasted for four years, three months, and eight days. It cost the Western allies 7,146,040 dead, 3,437,740 seriously wounded, 8,945,041 wounded, 4,653,519 missing. It cost Germany and her allies 3,651,090 dead and 8,544,428 wounded. The total direct expenditure of all the combatants was £56,086,900,000, and the property losses of the Allies alone has been calculated at £5,142,000,000.

Nine years afterwards war is still a recognised and legal institution. To-day Italy arms for fear of France; Britain builds a great naval base at Singapore in case of war with Japan; Britain, the United States of

America, and Japan build warships the one against the other ; Russia threatens Roumania. We have changed partners again.

What progress have we made ?

Is the world heading for another war ? Who will answer " No " ? .

Ask the average man or woman in any civilised country on either side of the Atlantic or Pacific whether he or she *wants* to see another war, and in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred the answer will be " No."

Before the outbreak of the last great war the peoples of the world had lived in fear of war or had experienced it. War was a recognised and legal institution. The friends of yesterday became the allies of to-day and the enemies of to-morrow.

The Fashoda incident nearly precipitated war between England and France. Japan and Russia fought one great war. During it England nearly intervened over the incident of the firing on the Hull trawlers by the Russian fleet. The seizure by Austria of the former Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina nearly caused a general European war. The visit of a small German cruiser, the *Panther*, to Agadir in Morocco nearly caused another. The Balkan States combined to fight Turkey, and then fought each other, to the great danger of world peace.

The memories of the great upheaval of the World War are still fresh. There are millions of mutilated men in the world, and millions of widows and orphans, robbed by war of their loved ones.

In the quadrangle of Edinburgh College stands a captured German field-gun. A returned student, who went through some of the fighting, could write on it several years after the Armistice :

“ On Learning’s mouth I clapped a hand,
Your sons came forth at my command,
An’ all you prayed for, preached, an’ planned,
My voice made crumble——
An’ now, nae wiser do ye stand,
An’ nae mair humble.”

War is race suicide. The flower of the nations is flung into the holocaust, and to be slaughtered is not always the worst that can happen. How many crippled, disfigured, nerve-shattered men have envied their comrades sleeping peacefully in their war graves?

By war I mean the resort to force for the settlement of disputes between two nations or groups of nations, themselves powerful, wealthy, modern, and civilised.

In these days rulers cannot make war without the consent of the ruled. Formerly, kings and princes could wage war on each other with small professional armies. But the days of the small professional armies have gone, never to return. Whole nations now fight, and if the people are not willing, war is impossible. The trouble is that too many of the people themselves are still too willing. This is partly the valour of ignorance. Centuries of propaganda for war have borne their fruit. The romantic side of war looms large to those who have not experienced its horrors or witnessed its bestialities. Also, fighting has become our second nature. Yet human nature must be subdued and restraints practised in a civilised society where the individual is concerned. So it must be with peoples, tribes, nations.

In the long, bitter struggle for life during the half a million years since man in various forms appeared on the earth’s surface, the fittest have survived. Every people in the world, with the sole exception of the Northern Eskimos, owe their very existence to their

fighting capacities. The will to fight is ingrained in human nature.

Modern civilised man as an individual is living down this combativeness. But in the mass he is still pugnacious. Perfectly peaceable individuals are apt to become pugnacious in a crowd. If any doubt this, let him attend a popular baseball match, football match, or bull-fight, and note the fighting spirit of the mob.

A nation is an organised mob. If suitable appeals are made to tune the mind of a mob for war, and if the right slogans, catchwords, and war-cries are uttered at the appropriate moment, the mob will desire to fight. And when the organised mob, which we call a nation, can be played upon emotionally by its demagogues, and when the same process on the other side of a sea or frontier is applied to another organised mob, war will result. And if the mob can be made to believe that it is fighting either for its security, which means that its sense of fear is appealed to, or for its economic interests, which means that its cupidity is aroused, or if it is invited to fight for "imperialism," which means that its desire to dominate over others is played upon, the results will be as certain as they will be disastrous. Man by himself has become, on the whole, a peaceable animal. He is prepared to work hard and to obtain by industry and thrift the good things of life. Even young men fight with their fists much more rarely than they did even twenty years ago. Only seventy years ago we were told that duelling could never be abolished, and in some countries in Europe and South America it still survives. But it is only a hundred years or so since every man went armed, and when the right to defend his "honour," or his interests, or his womenfolk, by arms was recognised as an integral part of human liberty.

Yet the duel, except as a means of advertisement for politicians and publicists in certain Latin countries, or as a mark of caste, like the wearing of armorial bearings in certain Germanic countries, has passed into the limbo of forgotten things. Public opinion made an end of duelling because so many decent young men were deprived of their lives by professional bullies. And to-day the Law Courts have taken the place of the duelling ground, and the attorney's office has replaced the "field of honour." Duelling was the prerogative of the leisured and professional classes. The manual labourer was not encouraged, or even permitted, to fight duels.

The argument is frequently used, and especially by the suffering minorities or citizens of defeated nations in Europe or elsewhere, that if war is to be abolished injustices must be remedied. This is not sound argument. There are plenty of injustices in the domestic affairs of any state, and they will remain so long as human nature is what it is and men are born unequal. There are social and economic injustices—the resentments of the exploited and the poor, the suspicions and fears of the rich. But now men do not fight about them with arms in their hands. True, there are revolutions and attempts at revolutions, and there may be more of them. And they will certainly follow in the wake of any future great war.

But armed insurrections are not considered the normal way of remedying grievances and settling disputes within a country. The difference is that there has been a change in public opinion where violence and fighting inside a country and between its own citizens are concerned. And yet only four or five hundred years ago, when Europe had advanced far on the road of civilisation and

culture, armed insurrection was looked upon as perfectly justified and understandable. The nobles and citizens of a country, when driven to a certain point of annoyance, would rise in revolt against the central government. And the leaders and followers alike suffered no stigma, though, if unsuccessful, their punishment was swift and drastic. In Germany, France, Italy, England, Russia, and, in fact, all the European countries, no social stigma attached to a powerful noble for hoisting the standard of insurrection against the central government and embarking on a civil war. And this prevailed almost up to modern times.

The community or section or class of Englishmen or Americans or Frenchmen or Germans who to-day began to arm secretly, collect artillery and aeroplanes and presently revolt against the central or federal government, would be viewed with the utmost contempt and dislike by the rest of the world. Although the domestic grievances and discontents are as great as ever they were, civilised peoples have decided that it does not pay to attempt to remedy them by force.

Why, then, should international war remain legal?

At home we spend our efforts in the Law Courts, or we attempt to convert public opinion by propaganda, or we embark on political action.

We have a lesson to learn from English history of the fourteenth and fifteenth century. The Wars of the Roses raged through England for sixty years. They were a struggle between two rival groups of feudal nobles led by the Lancastrians and Yorkists. The Red Rose of the Lancastrians and the White Rose of the Yorkists were the symbols for which men shed their blood and women lost their honour, just as they are prepared to do now for different coloured flags. These wars were

waged, nevertheless, by the retainers and feudal lieges of the opposing nobles. The prize was the Crown of England. But by this time the burghers, merchants and yeoman farmers, the artisans, and the beginnings of a middle class had become influential. So far as possible they kept clear of the fighting and went on with their ordinary business and affairs, looking upon the dynastic struggle as a terrible nuisance.

So it has been in China during recent years, when the contending militarists have fought for the control of the Customs stations and the tax-gathering machinery, and the ordinary merchants, farmers, and workmen have tried to do their work and their business as best they could.

When both sides in the Wars of the Roses had fought themselves to a standstill and were exhausted physically and financially, Henry Tudor became King of England as Henry VII. His accession was a compromise. His Tudor Rose is a combination of the opposing symbols of the Yorkists and Lancastrians.

Henry VII. received immense support from the neutral population referred to above. They were so utterly tired of the civil war, though that war was perfectly legal, that they supported the King in setting up a strong central government. He, on his part, took the necessary measures to enforce the disbandment of the feudal armies of retainers and the dismantling of the strong castles. He also made the possession of artillery a royal prerogative, to be enjoyed by no subject, however powerful. Into his hands he gathered all the cannon in England. Though the cannon were primitive, they were beginning to play a great part in the field, but, more important still, they could batter down the strongest fortified work.

The King possessed the only siege train and the only guns and the only artillery. He was in a position to dictate terms to his feudatories, especially as he was supported by the burghers and the common people. Henry VII., in fact, was the greatest autocrat who has ever governed England, as there was nobody to challenge his authority; and his son, Henry VIII., and his granddaughter Elizabeth enjoyed similar powers. Henry Tudor put an end to civil war in England and outlawed war within the realm.

He and his son and his granddaughter diverted the fervent allegiance of the retainer to his lord into loyalty to the throne, and men, for the first time, began to call themselves Englishmen and to put their country and her interests before the local loyalty they owed to their feudal master. Yet for hundreds of years the whole of the propaganda possible in those days had been devoted to inculcating loyalty to his lord into the mind of the liege. True, the lord himself swore fealty to the king, but the lord's followers swore fealty to him.

The effects of this propaganda had begun to weaken earlier. In Bernard Shaw's *Saint Joan* is shown clearly the alarm of the Earl of Warwick of the day at the preaching of Joan of Arc. She was instilling into the minds of the people the idea that they were Frenchmen and Englishmen, and not retainers or lieges of a particular military commander.

Hence the burning of Joan.

Her witchcraft consisted in the preaching of a wider patriotism than the narrow feudalism of the day. A wider patriotism took the place of feudal loyalty; and a still wider patriotism is needed to-day—a loyalty to humanity to take the place of the local parochial patriotism which, when used for purposes of war, has

been one of the greatest curses that has afflicted mankind. And if a strong central *world* government could be established and only that central government permitted to possess weapons of destruction and killing, men's minds could be turned from hatred of their neighbours to love of their kind.

But the fighting instinct remains in the minds of gentle and simple alike; and it is useful for ambitious, unscrupulous adventurers, dynasts, or politicians, to be able in certain circumstances to appeal to this fighting instinct.

If any doubt my words, let him contemplate the events since the Great War ceased to rage and destroy. There has been fighting in Central America, fighting in Russia, Poland, North Africa, Syria, China, Mesopotamia, and on the north-west frontier of India. There have been more wars in the ten years following the Armistice than in the ten years preceding it. And there would have been far more fighting still if the peoples had not been too poor and exhausted to indulge in it.

Diplomacy endeavours to gain its ends without war. But to-day in the world, in spite of the League of Nations, Arbitration Treaties, Pacts of Non-Aggression, Great Ententes, Little Ententes, the Treaty of Locarno, and the rest, the force of war is the recognised means of attempting to solve the insoluble. Is this doubted? Then why does England insist on the so-called One-Power standard for her Navy? Why does America, in her turn, insist on a Navy equal to that of any other nation? Why does France, in spite of her straitened finances, maintain the largest Air Force in the world and the most powerful Army? Why does she reinsure her position by a system of alliances and subsidise the armies of her protégés? Why does England, again, in

her turn, demand an Air Force of such strength as to make any other nation hesitate before attacking her? Why does Japan, in spite of her financial troubles, maintain a powerful Army, Navy, and Air Force? Why do the Germans chafe and agitate because by the Treaty of Versailles the German Army and Navy must be limited and war aeroplanes and submarines forbidden to her? Italy and Serbia count the rifles, bayonets, and machine-guns in their opposing armies. France and Italy, unable to afford battleships, cling to the submarine for so-called defence purposes. Above all, why do the peace societies, especially in England and America, agitate and campaign against war and in favour of disarmament? And why have all the attempts at the limitation of armaments, including the "Coolidge" Naval Conference of 1927, been abortive, with the partial exception of the Washington Naval Conference of 1921?

The answer is because aggressive nationalism is encouraged for war purposes in the minds of the peoples, and, incidentally, in the brains of the young. This patriotic nationalism may rise in a popular wave of sentimental feeling and sweep reluctant governments into war. Yet the governments of the most advanced, wealthy, and civilised nations deliberately teach and foster nationalism in spite of its dangers. We forge the weapons for our own destruction. And this because the majority of the people still ostensibly believe in war, still look upon it as legal, and even desirable in certain circumstances, and because governments feel they must rely on neighbourly fear, nationalist prejudice, jingoism, and racial hatreds to provide the driving force for the machinery of war. Examples of extreme nationalism and racial enmity combined are to be found in France and Germany, Prussia and Poland, Hungary and Roumania,

Italy and Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece. Of all the possible causes of war, this, to-day, with its resultant fears, is the most potent.

Yet patriotism, applied to peaceful ends, can be a great idealistic force making for clean government, progress, and civilisation. Love of country *by itself* is altogether admirable. But love of country interpreted as hatred of foreigners has been in the past, and may well be in the future, the cause of terrible misery and misfortune for the human race.

Then we have the political causes of war, allied sometimes to economic desires. Thus the Russian drive towards Constantinople, in order to win a port free of ice and an outlet to the Mediterranean, has led to the death of hundreds of thousands of young men and the weeping of hundreds of thousands of women. The Armenian people have been almost obliterated because of this Russian urge towards warm water; and the Turkish Empire has been impoverished and dismembered for the same reason. These purely political reasons may cause another war in our time.

Again, the Russian demand for the return of the lost province of Bessarabia and the Roumanian refusal are purely political. The fighting between the contending factions in China is a civil war for political reasons, allied to class enmities. Concurrently with the Chinese civil war is raging the nationalist demand of the Chinese for freedom from outside domination and the abolition of the foreign Treaties. Economic reasons for war I shall presently refer to. The Peruvian-Chilean quarrel over the nitrate fields of Tacna-Arica is a distinct example. If Japan embarks upon a great war in the Pacific against England or America, or both, or after a war between England and America, the reasons will be

primarily economic and originate in the desire of Japan for an outlet for her surplus population and for the control of oil, rubber, cotton, rice, and other raw materials and foodstuffs and the regions producing them.

Imperialism, again, has led to many wars in the past and may well lead to future wars. The Russian wars of aggression in Asia, leading to the conquest of Siberia and the Mahommedan States in Central Asia, are examples of Imperialistic wars. Italy's last war with Abyssinia was purely Imperialistic ; if she invades Abyssinia again, which is possible, the resulting war will be Imperialistic. Her conquest of Tripoli and war with Turkey was Imperialistic. The long drawn out war of Spain against the natives of Morocco and the Riff is a perfect example of an Imperialistic war ; and France's intervention on Spain's behalf was for Imperialistic reasons. If Italy fights France in order to win colonies in Northern Africa, or to annex Nice, such a war will be Imperialistic. Now all these causes of war, racial and nationalistic, political, economic, and Imperialist, or a combination of all of them, are familiar.

We now have a new cause of future war. Colonel J. F. C. Fuller, C.B.E., D.S.O., delivered a lecture recently at the Royal Naval College, Greenwich, on the changing conditions of war. I will quote the actual words of this distinguished Staff officer :

“ Since 1914, political conditions have completely changed, and so has the social outlook. The gross constructive materialism of the nineteenth century was badly broken by the war, and an ignorant and somewhat hysterical idealism was released. This idealism, though outwardly directed against war, for mankind is sick of slaughter, is full of the fight-

ing zeal of a new cult. In 1914 there were two great groups of antagonistic Powers in Europe, nations outside these groups being mere spectators of their quarrel. These two groups were urged into opposition through fear of each other ; now this fear is gone, and with it the stability of Europe, for the universal danger of a German hegemony having ceased to exist, all nations are free to snap, snarl, bite, and lick as they like. Fear of the German Navy consolidated the British Empire and fear of the German Army was the foundation of the Entente Cordiale. Fear having gone, the British Empire has changed, and the outlook of every other country has changed and become far more self-centred and material.

“ While interminable squabbles occupy the nations, most of whom have been attempting to revive the epoch killed by the war, a new adversary has arisen, a foe whose hostility is directed not so much against the policy of any particular nation as against the social fabric of Western civilisation. This adversary is Russia, who, for nine years, has been waging a truceless war against the rest of Europe.

“ To understand the Russian aim it is first necessary to accept the fact that ethically Russia is an Asiatic nation. Next it must be realised that the present social ferment was not originated by the war though the war released it. Its origins are to be sought in the industrial revolution of the last century. Every country now has an enemy within its frontiers, a class of society which is opposed to materialism, to majority rule, and to gross numbers generally. The ideals of this class are yet vague,

but they all tend to be antipathetic to democracy. Democratic government is, in fact, being steadily undermined, and already in half a dozen countries have dictatorships been established. The centre of gravity of all this turmoil is Russia."

In the present state of the world, the clash between two opposing economic theories is perhaps the most likely cause of a future great war. If this present world state of affairs continues, another great war is inevitable. Nothing can stop it. Because war is still regarded as an institution. And because it is regarded as an institution the nations arm, armaments breed fear, and fear breeds wars. Lord Grey of Fallodon, former Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, writing in his "Twenty-five Years," states on page 91, vol. i. :

"Fear begets suspicion and distrust and evil imaginings of all sorts, till each Government feels it would be criminal and a betrayal of its own country not to take every precaution, while every Government regards every precaution of every other Government as evidence of hostile intent."

There is only one road out. This book is an attempt to signpost that road.

CHAPTER II

SOME CAUSES OF WAR

The Balkans—Italy—Russia—Russia and China—Japan—Land hunger—Australia's position—The leadership of Asia.

THE last war was described in some circles as a war to end war. Whatever else it did the last great war did not put an end to war or diminish its future likelihood.

The Balkans are as much a cockpit of nationalist rivalries and hatreds as ever. There has been no settled peace in the Peninsula since the Turks were driven back into Asia.

However bad was the rule of the Turks, they did at least keep the peace. To-day it requires the whole efforts of the Great Powers to prevent Bulgaria and Serbia fighting, and to prevent Greece from attacking Bulgaria. Italian and Serbian nationalism glower at each other across the Adriatic. Albania and Fiume are bones of content between Serbia and Italy, yet no two countries suffered more by the Great War than these two did. Both are practically bankrupt, both are poverty-stricken and war-weary. Yet Mussolini demands even more arms and equipment for his troops.

Speaking on May 27th, 1927, the most powerful individual in Europe stated :

“ The spirit of Locarno has evaporated. Everybody is arming. Italy must arm. . . . Italy must be able to mobilise 5,000,000 men and to arm them . . . and our Air Force . . . must be so numerous that the surface of their wings must obscure the sun over the land.”

And no one thought these words extraordinary or abnormal.

Three times during the years 1926 and 1927 artillery and soldiers have been rushed up to both sides of the frontier between France and Italy. In spite of their alliance in the last war, the rivalries and suspicions between these two Latin peoples are the nightmare of all the Chancellories in Europe. France is in the position of the man in possession, the dominating Power in the Mediterranean, rich in colonies which she does not colonise. The French colonies are primarily a recruiting field for her armies, and a source of revenue for her Exchequer. Italy has no suitable colonies, and she desires them for the legitimate purpose of taking her surplus population.

The Fascists look for territory in the French possessions in Northern Africa, and particularly Tunis, and are credited with designs on Nice and Corsica. Secondly, Italy looks towards Turkey, where Southern Anatolia is rich, but sparsely populated. Italy's population is increasing, the Italians make excellent emigrants, but they do not retain their Italian nationalism when they settle in the British Dominions, in South America, or in the United States. Italy wants colonies where her people will remain Italians. Furthermore, the doors of the United States and the British Dominions are closed, or nearly closed, against Italian emigrants. Fascism must show results if it is to remain the governing power in Italy.

Here we have the demagogues playing on the atavistic sentiments of a people. The glories of the Roman Empire are to be revived. North Africa, including Egypt, Anatolia, Southern France, are all again to be Italian or Roman in the dreams of these visionaries. If

this policy is persisted in, war is probable ; and it will not be confined to any two or three nations. Greece, France, Turkey, Jugo-Slavia, Abyssinia, all look with apprehension towards Rome and speculate as to who will feel the first blow. Mussolini would deny a deliberate policy of conquest. But his attitude, his armings, his propaganda, are all dangerous to the world's peace.

Then Russia. Anything may happen in that mighty country within the next ten years. It will be a matter for congratulation, but also for surprise, if a Russian Napoleon does not emerge within our time. I myself, when in Russia six years after the Revolution, talked to young officers of the Red Army, some of them risen from the ranks, others members of ancient families of the nobility, but all with exactly the same outlook. They were not bothering about politics. Marxism, Leninism, Bolshevism, Socialism, these words meant nothing to them. They spoke only of Russia, her past triumphs and her future glories. The Cossacks, they said, had ridden to Berlin and Paris and would do so again. When I ventured to point out the transport difficulties, they said they always had their horses and the legs of their soldiers ; the distances remained the same, but the roads were better. These young officers of the Red Army were fired with the chauvinism of youth, but they are rising in their profession and they may presently find themselves with an army that will follow their lead and snap its fingers at the politicians.

Furthermore, Russia has lost certain territories which all her preachings of internationalism will not allow her to forget. I have never met a Russian of any political party, and I have met representatives of all the political parties in Russia, who could speak calmly of the loss of Bessarabia. Whether they were active or passive sup-

porters of the Communist régime in Russia herself, sulky opponents of it at home, or emigrés abroad, they all agreed on one subject—namely, that Russia would again possess Bessarabia. Yet England, France, and Italy have guaranteed Roumania's possession of this delectable province.

Poland, again, sprawls to the east, far beyond her ethnographical frontiers. We can make one prophecy with absolute certainty, and that is that the frontier lines in Eastern Europe dividing Russia from Poland and Poland from Germany, will, in ten or fifteen years' time, not be where they are to-day.

Nor does Russia stand alone.

She is half-Asiatic, and she is acquiring an increasing influence in China. For 440,000,000 Chinese will finally coalesce into a fiercely nationalistic and resentful people.

The Chinese grievances are like the Russian grievances. The peoples of Asia generally are in a turmoil, also as a result of the last war; and their awakening is a reality. Changes in China come about slowly, but the direction of change has remained the same since the revolution of 1911. For the first time for a hundred years the Mongolians have a common vernacular language, spoken and written by at least 75,000,000 of them. This Chinese vernacular language is being taught in the schools, and the number of Chinese who speak it and read it is increasing at the rate of 5,000,000 a year.

Soon the whole of the Chinese will be able to communicate with each other in speech and writing.

Before the revolution only the limited Mandarin class had a common language, a *lingua franca*, in which they could speak to each other, and in which they could pass on the written word. It was this language difficulty which kept China weak, disorganised, and easily ruled

by the Manchu Dynasty. But to-day the same feelings of nationalism, which caused so many wars in Europe during the last century, is boiling and bubbling in the Chinese caldron. And that caldron is a pot containing 440,000,000 people. They are miserably poor, but in their very numbers and the size of their territory are formidable. In alliance with Russia, they will occupy territory spreading from the Baltic to the Pacific, and from the Arctic Ocean to the Yellow Sea. The telegraph cable, the printing press, wireless, the aeroplane, motor-traction, will make it possible for this vast horde to be controlled, stimulated, aroused, and encouraged by a few master-minds.

The ex-Kaiser's nightmare of the Yellow Peril is likely to come true, after all. But he never foresaw that the greatest racial unit, the Chinese, would be in alliance with one of the European Mother Nations, the Russians, and the greatest European people, numerically, at that. Furthermore, China has more munitions and arms than at any time since the great Tartar invasion.

Yet the greatest weapon in China to-day is propaganda. The Chinese are susceptible to propaganda and the Nationalists in China adepts at its use. It is an accident that Russia is assisting this movement. Chinese Nationalism would have been aroused even if there had been no revolution in Russia. It is one of those vast, human movements which every hundred years or so convulse the world. For the rise of Chinese Nationalism means the awakening of all Asia.

And we must reckon with mob psychology where war is concerned. The more ignorant and primitive the mob, the greater the danger. And China, with her great city populations, is fertile ground for the unscrupulous demagogue to-day. Let those who wish to avoid war look for

the root causes of it. The mere piling up of armaments will be as useless as the bewailing of facts and wringing of hands. If the world wants peace, it must strive for it. And it will require all the wits, all the resources, all the strivings after better things of all right-minded people throughout the world if we are to secure it in our time in face of the Sino-Slavic menace.

What of Japan? The "awakening" of Japan commenced sixty years ago. The Japanese are of Malayan origin, warlike, intensely patriotic, hard-working, and prolific. The comparatively small, mountainous area composing the Japanese Islands does not produce enough food for the present population of Japan. Yet that population is increasing rapidly.

The Japanese Empire is ruled by the last of the autocratic monarchs. The Divine Right of Kings, especially when these kings are supposed by the common people to have descended from gods, survives in Japan. The real power is exercised by the Elder Statesmen, or Genro, recruited from the Japanese aristocracy.

An aristocracy under modern conditions in the world can retain the strings of power in its hands if it is frugal, hard-working, and self-sacrificing. These conditions were fulfilled by the Prussian aristocracy before the World War. In Japan to-day, the tradition of frugal living, hard work, and unlimited self-sacrifice is maintained by the descendants of the Japanese Samurai. There is, nevertheless, a growing democratic movement, held in check by a highly organised police system. The coming and going and intriguing of parties in the Japanese Diet serves as a safety valve for the intellectuals who strive for the votes of the working class. But the solid class-conscious aristocracy holds its own. Nevertheless, the democratic movement in Japan

threatens the political powers of the aristocracy and of the Elder Statesmen, and even the autocratic powers of the Throne. The actual autocracy of Japan will presently be tempted, as every other threatened autocracy has been tempted in the history of the world, to re-establish its position by an outside diversion : in other words, by war.

And Japan has real grievances.

She has no suitable outlet for her surplus population except Manchuria. Korea is ruled by Japan, but already has a large native peasant population, and there is little room for Japanese colonists. The Japanese make livings in Korea as officials and merchants and foremen of factories, but it is not possible for them to settle in Korea in solid blocks of country dwelling people.

Manchuria, before the coming of the Russians and the building of the great Manchurian railway system, was sparsely populated. Japan fought Russia in one great war in the early years of the present century for the domination of Manchuria. The Japanese victory was not decisive and a compromise was arrived at by which Japan obtained the whole of Korea, the Darien Peninsula, and the southern part of Manchuria, while Russia remained in occupation of the northern part of Manchuria. But the roads and the railways built and maintained by Japan and Russia attracted Chinese settlers, and the Chinese are filling up Manchuria rapidly.

Nevertheless, Manchuria does still offer a field for colonisation, and a few years ago Japan, as a deliberate act of policy, abandoned the idea of forcing her way into Northern Australia as a colonising power or on to the Pacific slopes of the United States and Canada. It was seen that peaceful penetration was impossible, and that if Japan wished to colonise these white men's

countries she would have to fight. Nor could she fight either America or England separately. If she became involved in war with England over the Australian immigration question, the demand in America to intervene would be irresistible, whether the President at Washington was a Democrat or a Republican, and whether the Senate was warlike or pacific. On the other hand, if Japan became involved in trouble with America over the immigration question into the State of California, Australia, and, to a slightly lesser degree, New Zealand would insist on intervening on the side of the United States.

If England resisted this demand for intervention, the British Empire would dissolve, and Australasia, sooner or later, would hoist the Stars and Stripes in place of the Union Jack. No British Government, whatever its complexion, would be able to resist the corresponding demand in England to come in on the side of the Australians. In two serious wars, the South African War of 1899 to 1902, and the World War of 1914 to 1918, Australia and New Zealand provided men, money, and warships for the common cause. It would be impossible for England to refuse to repay this debt when called upon. The Japanese have long realised that they would not win their way into Australia by fighting. If America and the British Empire fought each other to a standstill, Japan might keep out of the war and be so relatively strong after it as to be able to demand racial equality for her nationals. This is her only chance. A direct invasion of Australia is impracticable. The army would have to be considerable as the Australian forces are by no means negligible. It would be useless to land in the northern territories as these are not vital, and contain few resources for an army.

The would-be conqueror must attack the populous districts of the south and east of the island continent. A modern army requires an enormous equipment in the shape of motor-transport, artillery, tanks, aeroplanes, etc. And the amount of tonnage required for an army big enough to make an impression on the Australian forces would require more tonnage than Japan could possibly find, even if she pressed every merchant vessel under the Japanese flag into service. And it must be remembered that she has to keep her commerce running and to import considerable quantities of food-stuffs, iron ore, and so on. Japan, therefore, had to abandon her attempt to settle her nationals in Australia or the United States or Canada, and she turned her attention to Manchuria. But, when the Nationalist cause in China succeeds, as it will in the long run, Japan will find herself faced with new difficulties in Manchuria. For the Chinese Nationalists will not be content to liberate the Chinese territories south of the Great Wall. The millions of Chinese settlers in Manchuria are seething with Nationalism also.

In all countries the more vigorous and virile emigrate. I do not refer to those who proceed overseas as assisted emigrants with State-aided passages. They are not always the pick of the population. But the man who will proceed beyond his own borders, without official assistance or encouragement, with or without his family, and carve out a career for himself in a strange land, is the salt of a nation. And the Chinese settlers in Manchuria are the most spirited of a people who are, generally speaking, docile, peace-loving, and industrious, until roused. And these Chinese settlers in Manchuria have been roused by the same ferment of Nationalism as their compatriots south of the Great Wall.

Manchuria has been ruled for fifteen years by a Manchu "war-lord," Chan-Tso-Lin, and, in his days of power, he has been glad of Japanese help and support. It is known that, when he advanced south with his army bearing their Japanese arms to Peking and set up his government there, the Japanese advised against this move, and they have worried him to leave Peking ever since. But Chan-Tso-Lin's power is transient. The slow pressure of the Chinese hordes has always been too much for any dictator. It has only been a question of time before the alien rule has been thrown off. And, to the bulk of the Chinese, Chan-Tso-Lin is an alien ruler from beyond the Great Wall. He will be overthrown in the end like the others.

China, therefore, by copying Japan and attempting to establish herself as a modern Nationalist State, has snatched away the prize of Manchuria from the Island Empire. Manchuria, with its grain-growing plains and its open spaces suitable for Japan's immigrants, will be closed. This will not happen in a night. But the Japanese realise full well that they cannot compete on equal terms as farmers and artisans with the Chinese on the mainland of Asia, and the Japanese surplus population will not be occupied entirely as officials and traders. The Chinese are settling in Manchuria more rapidly than the Japanese and with greater success.

Japan must, therefore, look once more to fresh territories, partly for the purpose of settling her surplus population, partly in order to secure raw materials. For Japan is woefully short of certain vital raw products and minerals. She has no petroleum, very little cotton, and insufficient rice and cereals to feed her people. She has no rubber and no territory where rubber can be grown.

The Elder Statesmen of Japan, in their secret con-

claves, knowing the weakness of their country in rubber and oil and cereals, observe the British Empire with an actual surplus of all these to such an extent that during the years 1923 to 1927 the production of rubber was artificially restricted by agreement and would still be artificially restricted but for the action of the Dutch planters in refusing to participate. They see the United States suffering from an over-production both of petroleum and corn. Wealthy England groans at the maintenance of the price of oil by artificial means. Wealthy America groans at the artificially enhanced price of rubber. What of poor Japan, who has none of these products, but must pay the price and see her manufactures languish?

If Japan is to continue her progress and development and fulfil what the Japanese themselves believe to be their destiny, she must expand. She must find lands where her people can settle, and she must obtain control of territories producing the articles she lacks. Once more the eyes of her Elder Statesmen are turned to Australia, to the Philippines, to the maritime provinces of Siberia, to the Malay States, to the Dutch East Indies. And what do they see in these countries? The vast continent of Australia is inhabited by 5,558,776 white men and a few thousand black aborigines. Of these 5,558,776 whites, 3,375,547 are concentrated in the cities. The modern Australian is only too anxious to get away from the country and into the towns.

Australian labour, in order to maintain its standard of living higher than that of any country in the world, not excepting that of the United States, brings pressure to bear on the Australian Government to restrict immigration. Even poor English immigrants are discouraged, and Italians are actually forbidden to enter the Australian

Commonwealth. The north of Australia is almost empty though it is capable of supporting a great population. The northern territories are not suitable for white settlement, yet the Australians strenuously resist any attempt at Japanese immigration there. How long can this policy be pursued? For the northern territories could produce the rice and the cotton urgently required by Japan as well as providing a field of settlement for her teeming surplus millions. How long can this policy of exclusion continue? Yet all the British and all the Americans sympathise with the policy of "White Australia."

Then the maritime provinces of Siberia. These are inclement in winter and the Japanese do not thrive in cold climates. But they have minerals and oil and fisheries of great potential value to Japan. They are sparsely populated because there has not been time for the Russians to move eastward in great numbers. The great Russian trek to Siberia, gradual, like the advance of a glacier, only to be measured by the census figures every twenty years, was checked by the World War and the Revolutions. But it will begin again.

In fifty years' time the prolific Russians will have settled all Siberia. They are a peasant people, content to live on the land, and not thriving in cities. If Japan is to obtain a foothold in Eastern Siberia she must move quickly. Yet how can she do so without the risk of war? She may fight Russia again, but she can never conquer Russia. She found that out in her last war. And remember that when Japan fought Russia then, the war was intensely unpopular in Russia itself. The Russian High Command was inefficient, the autocracy had the seeds of the disease which killed it in 1917. The Russo-Japanese War was represented by the Socialists and the

Democrats in Russia as a war for the benefit of the Russian aristocracy. It was followed by the abortive revolution in Russia of 1905. But a war now between Russia and Japan would be popular amongst the Russian masses; and by popular I mean that they would look upon it as an attempt by an Imperialistic, capitalistic Power to filch away territories from a Revolutionary Power ruled by the proletariat.

I wrote above of the effect on the Russian mind of similar action by Roumania, when, taking advantage of Russia's weakness, she seized Bessarabia. Russians would look upon a Japanese attempt on the Eastern Provinces of Siberia in exactly the same way. Japan would make some headway at the start. The Japanese armies would obtain initial successes. They might even occupy the maritime province of Vladivostok and Northern Manchuria. But then the pressure would begin, and it would be a pressure of 440,000,000 Chinese allied with 140,000,000 Russians. There might even be a truce for a few years, but the truce would be broken as soon as Russia, with her Mongolian allies, was strong enough.

All this the Japanese realists understand full well. Japan will not risk a rupture with Russia. To be successful in her dream of Imperialistic expansion, she must at all costs lead a reawakened Asia. She must, therefore, occupy the position, which is, after all, natural for her, of an oppressed Eastern people, forbidden to expand by Western selfishness, and unable to maintain the means of life owing to the commercial possessiveness of England and America. Japan's only hope of success is to have the backing of the Asiatic Chinese and the semi-Asiatic Russians, with possibly the assistance, in a generation to come, of an emancipated India.

And then only if England and America are at logger-heads.

Only thus can Japan hope to be strong enough to obtain what she wants without fighting ; and what she wants is the right for her people to settle in the empty spaces of Australia, and to obtain control of the rubber, cotton, and rice-producing territories of the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, and the Malay States. If she can obtain these without fighting, well and good. But obtain them she must, or her discontented people will overthrow Throne, Genro, and aristocracy alike. For when great racial and economic questions agitate a people, all the paper agreements, all the written covenants, all the solemn treaties, will not prevent an outbursting of the war spirit. And of all the Nationalist mobs, the Japanese mob is the most easily roused, and the least sensitive to the consequences and horrors of a racial struggle.

Yet to-day Japan is weak. Her trade was never very solidly established, the World War played havoc with it, and the Chinese disorders have still further injured her. The great Japanese earthquake, devastating many of the richest silk-producing districts, was a heavy blow. She must at all costs bide her time. She must wait for the final emergence of a governing party able to form a strong central government in China. She must wait for the recovery of Russia. She must not alienate the Chinese or the Russians. The Japanese masses must be kept quiet and docile. And Japan is guided by the most astute and far-sighted statesmen of any country in the world. The ruling class in Japan is the most unselfish of any ruling class in history. Utterly selfless in war, the Japanese financial princes set an example to the world by sacrificing the whole of their posses-

sions in peace-time to re-establish the finances of their country. When the rich men of a country will sell even their homes as an example to the nation in time of trouble, what can that nation not accomplish in war? And a nation ruled by an aristocracy with a tradition of service has an advantage over any democracy with a tradition of luxury, easy wealth, and quick fortunes.

If war continues to be regarded as legitimate, Japan will prepare herself to reap what advantages she can from war or the threat of war.

CHAPTER III

THE YELLOW PERIL AGAIN

Russia—Her expansion—Her drive to the sea—The weapon of ideas—Her victory in Afghanistan—Her air service—Influence in Persia—The Russian revolutions—Russia in China—Russia and Mexico—The new Holy War—Consequences of a Czarist restoration—Bessarabia—Poland—Russia and disarmament—Locarno Powers and Russia—The nations of the world in two groups—Japan's choice.

BUT if Japan finds herself cooped in, cribbed, and confined, what of Russia? The Russians are one of the mother peoples. That is, they are a distinct racial unit with a distinct mother tongue. A mixture of Aryan and Mongolian, the Tartar strain has become rarefied, but Russia is still more of the East than of the West. Russia failed to assimilate the Poles and the Baltic peoples in the West, but she is successful in assimilating the peoples of Central Asia and Siberia. And whether Russia is ruled by a Czar, a Cabinet answering to a Parliament, or a Council of Soviets, her people will always feel the urge for outlets to the sea.

During the last three hundred years, Russia has expanded slowly towards the warm waters. She has reached the Pacific, and has well named her great fortress, harbour, and city of Vladivostok "Lord of the East." She has been forced to retreat from the Baltic temporarily, and her ice-free harbours were wrenched from her by the emergence of the little Baltic peoples and the breaking away of Finland. If Russia had remained in the war, and if her decadent aristocracy had managed to stave off the Revolution, Russian

would now be the official language in Constantinople and on the Bosphorus.

But as she recovers she will gradually move down again to the south towards India, and west again into the Baltic and towards the Vistula. The statesmen who served Queen Victoria, whatever their party, were kept awake o' nights by the spectacle of the slow, steady, irresistible advance of the Russian power towards India. Every new verst of the Central Asian railway system marked another stage in this mighty movement towards the Indian Ocean. The threat was of the countless Russian infantry battalions moving concurrently with the road-makers and the railway builders.

But the new Russian Imperialistic movement of expansion is not counted in terms of infantry soldiers. It is the much more powerful spread of ideas. The Bolshevik doctrine is spreading beyond the political borders of Russia into the bazaars of India.

Since the war Russia has won one great diplomatic victory over Britain. She has assisted the Emir of Afghanistan to throw off British suzerainty. But in throwing it off he has in reality placed himself under the tutelage of Russia. Poor backward Afghanistan is a prey to the present-day Imperialism of Russia, and Afghanistan is the key to India. The Emir has trouble with some of his remote tribal feudatories; Russia sends aeroplanes and pilots to enable him to suppress the rebellion. Sixty or seventy young Afghans go to Russia for training every year. The Emir's people are restive, and only by keeping on good terms with Russia can he insure himself against a rising and Russian intervention on behalf of the Afghan masses. There are no factories in Afghanistan and no proletariat, so Russia must move cautiously. But the advance towards the Indian Ocean

by way of Afghanistan, Persia, and Baluchistan has recommenced.

And Russia, for all her poverty and lack of skilled engineers, is developing an air service. She has not hesitated to accept German assistance here, and now the Russian Government aeroplanes fly all over Central Asia and to Kabul and Teheran.

One little straw showing which way the wind blows. A German-Russian company operates the Persian air lines. They sought permission to extend their lines of flight to Baghdad, the capital of Mesopotamia. The British objected. A British air line had just been established from Cairo in Egypt to Karachi in Western India by way of Baghdad. The first flights were made with a great flourish of trumpets; the British Air Minister and his lady wife occupied the first passenger aeroplane from Egypt to India. This was to be a great Imperial link in a route that was presently to extend from London to Australia by way of Persia and India. Then the Persian Government, which five years ago "fed out of the hands" of the British Foreign Office officials in Downing Street, and which was entirely dependent on British good will, stepped in and stopped all flying over Persian territory.

London can break off diplomatic relations with Russia and eject the Bolshevik emissaries with every mark of contumely and contempt, but Russia can delay the British air mail from flying over Persian territory into India!

Persia also announced to the world that the "capitulations" would be abolished in May, 1928. The principal privilege of foreigners under the capitulations is the right to be tried in their own consular courts. Similar rights have been abrogated by Turkey and Japan, and an attempt to cancel them has been made

by the Chinese. It is difficult to see how the Persian Government is to be resisted in this matter, especially as the Soviet Government of Russia in 1921 renounced the even more extensive rights of Russian subjects in Persia. Yet these immunities for foreigners, and especially for Christians, are of great antiquity, dating back to the thirteenth century. This is one more example of the new wine of nationalism fermenting in an old Eastern bottle. And Russia is taking every possible advantage of the fermentation. Again, the new Persia, regenerated under the rule of Rizza Khan, refuses to recognise the infant State of 'Iraq, Britain's infant. She wishes for a port at the mouth of the Tigris. A railway would then be built from Teheran, the capital, in the north, to the Persian Gulf. This Britain fears because of the eventual use that might be made of both railway and port by a hostile Russia. I refer to the better solution of this difficulty in Chapter X.

A veiled war between England and Russia has been waged ever since November, 1917. Occasionally the veil has been lifted to show active intervention by Britain and her allies, the subsidising of insurrectionaries and their equipment with munitions and weapons of war. The struggle still continues, though there was an interlude during the brief tenure of office of the Ramsay MacDonald Government in London. It is more than likely to proceed along its present lines, although England is without sure Allies in this silent though bitter contest. And if it does continue, the Russian advance to the Indian Ocean will be accelerated.

The story of the Russian Revolution and its aftermath is not yet told. To the Bolshevik his aggressive socialism is a religion. To the anti-Bolshevik the belief in capitalism and the democratic state is likewise a religion.

We have here all the elements corresponding to the causes of the great religious wars of the later Middle Ages.

Now let us revert for a moment to the French Revolution. The great sin of the Jacobins was the overthrow of the dynastic system of government. They dethroned a king. The monarchical governments of Europe and the international Royalists mobilised their forces to attack anti-Royalist France. The crowned heads assembled their armies in battle array. The French answer was to cut off the ex-king's head and throw it over the frontier; the French Revolution produced a Napoleon and an aggressive Imperialism which devastated Europe and caused a dozen ruinous wars. The Russian Revolution has not yet produced its Napoleon; but it may well do so. Peace-loving democratic nations, believing in capitalism and practising it, realising the folly of racial and nationalistic war with each other, regard with hatred and mistrust the revolutionary régime in Russia. England and her allies after the war attempted an active policy of intervention in Russia, and in their campaigns they enlisted their enemies of the day before. England alone spent £100,000,000 in Russian intervention. Intervention, having failed, was followed by the policy of segregation, isolation, and blockade, the *cordon sanitaire* of Monsieur Clemenceau. This policy was abandoned in favour of recognition, trade, and nearly normal relations. But while the Russian moderates have been working for the restoration of the economic welfare of their country, the extremists have been continuing their propaganda, and the seed has not always fallen on stony ground. Russia's chief success has been in Asia. The Chinese Nationalists, opposed by the Western Powers, accepted the eagerly proffered assistance of Bolshevik Russia.

Russian influence has progressed in Persia, Afghanistan, and other countries of Asia whose position renders them of peculiar interest to the British Empire.

But Russia was gradually re-entering the family of nations. She was represented at the Warsaw Health Conference in March, 1922, and the preliminary Naval Conference at Rome in February, 1924. The culminating point in the more normal relations of the West with Russia was reached in the spring of 1927, when Russian envoys attended an International Economic Conference at Geneva, called by the League of Nations. From that point relations have become worse. Up till the early summer of 1927 there seemed a good chance of the interminable debt controversy between France and Russia being settled. There would then have been an opportunity for a like settlement of the Russian debt question with England. But the British Government of the day, embittered by the Russian success in China and other parts of Asia, and feeling continuously the pressure of the Russian propaganda amongst her Asiatic peoples, decided on a break. The veiled war between the capitalists, and, indeed, capitalist ideas, may become open war. England cannot attack Russia, and Russia cannot attack England *at present*. The veiled war has not led to actual fighting as yet, but one of the great props of European peace has been removed. While Russia was in diplomatic relations with Britain there was some check to the more open forms of her propaganda in Asia, and especially to her direct propaganda against British possessions. But now that that check has been removed we may expect Russian intrigue and British counter-measures to fight each other more and more openly wherever the interests of the greatest land people and the greatest sea people clash. Anything may happen

in Asia as a result of the Chinese nationalistic revival. There will be much to trouble the placid waters of the world, and the Russians will be persistent fishers if the waters are troubled. There are many far-sighted students of international affairs and of world politics who have stated their belief, sometimes in private, but always with consistency, that lasting peace is impossible so long as Western capitalism survives in Europe and America, and Russian Bolshevism survives in Russia and Asia. Every insurgent people struggling against Imperialism or for national freedom can rely automatically on such help as Russia can send to them. Even certain of our English working-class strike movements can look for assistance from Moscow, and Moscow can render it. And the power of the propaganda weapon is very great when the conditions are suitable for its use.

The hand of Russia is not everywhere. Yet in England, America, France, and other countries any local troubles or any friction in their respective possessions, colonies, and protectorates are automatically traced to Russian influence. We saw an example of this in the spring of 1927, when the State Department at Washington made the preliminary moves that might have led to war with Mexico. The real trouble in Mexico was blamed upon Russia. If the factory workers in Osaka or Bombay strike for higher wages or shorter hours, or if the English miners resist wage reductions by refusing to work, Moscow's hand is traced, actually or figuratively. When the peoples of the Western nations are taught year in and year out to ascribe all misfortunes to Russian Bolshevism, the ground is being prepared for an appeal to their patriotism and the class feeling of the wealthier sections of the community for a holy war against Bolshevism in Russia.

The passions roused for and against Russia and her system of government and economics are as fierce as those roused by racial antipathies in the Balkans to-day or by religious differences in Europe in the Middle Ages. The burning of the Protestants in Spain and Catholics in England led to war between the Spanish and English peoples in the reigns of Queen Elizabeth of England and Philip of Spain. The murder of Russian diplomatic envoys by fanatics in Poland or Switzerland, or the ejection of diplomatic agents by the English police from London, are answered by the shooting of nobles and wealthy merchants in Moscow. Each side makes the most of the delinquencies of the other. Violence is answered by violence, passion by passion, hatred by hatred. The Russian peasants and workmen fear the restoration of the Romanoffs because of the White Terror that will inevitably follow it. And they believe that the Western Powers are consciously striving for that restoration. The Imperialistic Powers, on the other hand, and particularly England, fear the loss of their subject provinces in Asia and Africa through Russian machinations, as they fear revolutionary upheavals and general strikes for the same cause in their home countries.

Thus fear in Soviet and non-Soviet countries alike is allied to hatred and prejudice. The atmosphere is being prepared for war. And all the time the propaganda on both sides continues. The Western Powers are represented as aggressive Imperialists and money-grubbers intent on crushing the Russian Revolution—in cartoons, on the cinema screens, in the newspapers, from the platforms, in the schools, and by wireless—throughout Russia. In England and other European nations the same propaganda continues through the mighty power

of the Press and, in a more subtle way, through the other means of moulding public opinion. The contest of ideas between capitalism and anti-capitalism, between democracy and the dictatorship of the proletariat, may be as fruitful a cause of war on the great scale in the near future as any cause of war in the past.

The prevention of such a war and the cauterisation of the passions that demand it will tax all the wisdom, level-headedness, and finer feeling of all the leaders of decent opinion in all the countries concerned.

And if successful war against Russia had been possible, it would long ago have been embarked upon. It would have been described as "the restoration of Order." Hungarian Bolshevism was overthrown by allies and late enemies acting together after the Armistice.

England, France, America, and Japan have sent troops to China in an attempt to fight an idea with machine-guns and tanks, and the Japanese have not hesitated to invade actual Chinese territory. Russia is herself secure from direct attack because of the vastness of her territories, the self-sufficiency of her resources, and the resulting difficulty of attacking or blockading her. But as she recovers economically she may, in her turn, take the offensive, and it is easier for Russia to attack capitalist institutions, especially in Asia, and it is easier for Russia to attack certain countries on her borders in Europe than it is for the anti-Communist nations to wage war upon her. And herein lies the real danger.

Yet the overthrow of the Bolshevik régime and the restoration of the Romanoffs as rulers of Muscovy would be as great a danger to the peace of Europe. Let there be no mistake about this. The Russian Monarchists,

and even the cadets and social democrats, are all thorough-going Imperialists. And no Russian patriot will accept the permanent loss of Russia's Baltic provinces, now represented by the small independent republics of Latvia, Lithuania, and Esthonia. Nor would the Russian Monarchists and Imperialists, if restored to power, accept the present frontiers of the Poles, and it is doubtful if they would acquiesce in much of ethnographic Poland being torn away permanently from the Russian Empire. I have spoken before of the fact that no Russian, whatever his party, from extreme Monarchist to extreme Bolshevik or Anarchist, accepts the loss of Bessarabia. Treaties signed with the Czarist Government promised Constantinople to Russia. The ex-Grand Duke Cyril and his Court look upon themselves as the lineal and legal successors of the Czarist Government. They might well demand their pound of flesh—that is, the fulfilment of the promises given to Russia in the early part of the war or before it. And the Russian *émigrés* and the remaining Russian Royalists have no particular cause to love any of the Allies, and certainly no great cause to love the Nationalists of the Secession States. An independent Finland might be acquiesced in. An independent Poland, far west of her present frontiers, might be accepted. But never the loss of Bessarabia nor, in the long run, the permanent loss of Russia's Baltic ports.

The mere overthrow of the Bolshevik régime and its replacement by a Monarchy, or even by a Democratic Republic, would not by itself ensure peace. The danger of war might be even greater than before.

For when all is said and done, the Bolsheviks pose as Internationalists and rely on their propaganda and ideas more than on cannon, aeroplanes, and tanks. A

realisation of the danger of the restoration of the Romanoffs has been sensed in certain English political circles. Thus in the early years of the Coalition Government in England there was a stiff contest between the interventionists in the Cabinet, led by Mr. Winston Churchill, and the rationalisers, led by Mr. Lloyd George. Mr. Lloyd George and his Party in the Cabinet opposed the intervention and eventually succeeded in preventing further waste and expenditure, though not before the futility of intervention had been made apparent to ninety-nine out of a hundred former believers in it. Mr. Lloyd George, in fact, on one occasion went so far as to remind the British Parliament of the dangers inherent in a Monarchist Restoration in Russia. Apart from the question of a Restoration, however, the outlook where Russia was concerned was more favourable for peace in the years 1925 and 1926 and up till the spring of 1927.

The set-back given to the gradual improvement in relations between Russia and the Western Powers, for so I will refer broadly to the Powers whose Governments have taken up, at one time or another, a definitely hostile attitude to Russia, has, in any case, given an unfortunate check to the progress in the ideas of a simultaneous reduction of armaments by the principal militarist Powers by mutual agreement. The rupture of relations between the British and Russian Governments in May, 1927, marked a definite turning-point.

For some six years the machinery of the League of Nations has been hard at work in preparation for a World Conference on Disarmament. Numerous Conferences have been held, long preliminary investigations involving interminable sittings and occupying the time and energy of hundreds of experts and officials of all

the nations concerned. The United States Government sent friendly advisers, whose advice and counsel, especially behind the scenes and out of the limelight, have been of great value. The prospects of inducing Russia to attend such a Conference had become increasingly bright.

To those not fully seized of the events of the preceding years, it may sound extravagant to expect Russian attendance at a World Disarmament Conference, and even more extravagant that any good might result from such attendance. But, as a matter of fact, Russia herself has initiated several disarmament conferences with her neighbours in the north of Europe, Poland, and the three Baltic States of Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. And at these conferences the Russian attitude was stated to be strongly in favour of reductions of armaments by mutual consent. No doubt the cynics will remark again that Russia depends less for her defence on artillery, aeroplanes, and armed men than on the weapon of ideas. However this may be, the Russian Army, which at the end of the Polish campaign in 1921 numbered over 3,000,000 soldiers, had been reduced by 1926 to 500,000 soldiers. Russia has certainly been strengthening her Air Force, but she was weak in this arm in any case.

Again, the energies of Russia in aerial development, and these energies have been considerable, have been directed principally to the development of the civil side of flying. Nor is the reason for this difficult to understand. The vast flat plains of Russia are suitable for flying, while other communications are scanty and difficult. The shortage of railways and roads creates a real transport problem for those in Russia bent on the material reconstruction of their country. Furthermore,

the thrusting forward of the Russian civilian Air Service into Central Asia and China has had a political value as enhancing Russian prestige in the eyes of the backward people inhabiting those regions. As for the Russian Navy, it has been negligible since the Revolution, and little energy has been devoted to its reconstruction. Until the experiment has been tried, therefore, no one with knowledge of the subject could have prophesied exactly the effect of Russian participation in a World Disarmament Conference. Nevertheless it is certain that her non-participation would make the proceedings less valuable than with her participation. In nearly every country taking part in such a Conference there is a strong vested interest opposed to any reduction of armaments. The fact of Russia's non-participation will certainly be seized upon by the opposers, open and secret, of any limitation of armaments by agreement.

But do not let it be supposed by those reading the above lines that I am advocating disarmament or the reduction of armaments as the sole means of ensuring the future peace of the world. For the nations can disarm themselves completely as regards professional fighting men and war material, but if the will to war remains, merchant ships can be armed, mercantile aeroplanes turned into bombers and air fighters, and untrained civilians enrolled and drilled as soldiers fit for the battle-line as quickly as the munitions can be manufactured even by a modern engineering community. It is only the will to peace and the recognition of the illegality and immorality of war that will ensure peace in future.

There is a natural tendency on the part of the non-Bolshevik Powers who were also victors in the late war to draw together in mutual defence against Russia. At

one time the British Foreign Office, under Sir Austen Chamberlain, was accused of attempting to use the League of Nations for this purpose. Certain conversations took place at the Locarno Conference with a view to welding the Locarno Powers together in an alliance against Russia. In 1927 in the June meeting of the Council of the League, conversations again took place amongst the so-called Locarno Powers—England, France, Italy, and Germany—having as their object the exploration of their common policy with a view to their unity, at any rate for defence, against Russia. This policy, however, has not been successful where Germany is concerned. The German position is still too unstable, the attitude of France towards her too doubtful, for German statesmen to commit their country to any such new Holy Alliance.

But if this policy succeeded, and if, later, America were drawn into such new Holy Alliance, the result would be the division of the world into two opposing groups.

Russia and China would find themselves in alliance against the Western European Powers and the United States of America. The sympathies of other Asiatic countries would go out to China and they might throw in their lot with her. Japan, in her own interests, would avoid entanglements as long as possible, but in the end her interests would lie with the Asiatic Powers and Russia. The Nationalists of Germany would see their great opportunity. This, in fact, is the Yellow Peril brought up to date, Japan leading a Pan-Asiatic movement in alliance with Russia and Germany. And, to a greater or lesser degree, the populations of Russia, China, Japan, and Germany are increasing. Their combined man-power and natural resources would, in the

long run, be irresistible. Wise statesmanship would aim at preventing, at all costs, such a grouping, for it could only end in war on a scale surpassing anything the world has ever experienced. And the way to escape this calamity is to avoid leaving such potentially powerful peoples as the Germans, the Chinese, the Russians, and the Japanese with grievances. For if their grievances become intolerable, they will unite in their common misfortune. And it will need the united good will of all peace-lovers throughout the world and their united energies as well to prevent the nations drifting into this position.

The way of the peacemakers in the post-war world is hard ; but it must be traversed. For the penalty of failure would be terrible and fatal.

CHAPTER IV

THE NEW NATIONALISM AND THE NEW IMPERIALISM

India as the theatre of future war—Analogy with China—Basis of British power—The advance of Russia—Oriental Nationalism—Neurotic Western mentality—Airmen and international relations—Chinese Nationalism—Monroe Doctrine—Modern Imperialism—Britain and the Dominions—Egypt—Italy and the Egyptians—Canada—Land frontiers of the British Empire—Why England is in Mesopotamia—The lure of oil.

WHEN the Great War was foreshadowed England organised an Expeditionary Army based on Aldershot. To-day a war against Russia is foreshadowed. It is now proposed to organise a British Expeditionary Army in India. India appears destined once more to be the scene of a War of Peoples.

And India herself. The Indian peasants, illiterate, poor, ignorant, simple, hard-working, peace-loving, are in exactly the same position as the Chinese peasants were twenty years ago. But, just as in China the student class, acting with and through the Chinese factory workers, have been able at last to rouse even the Chinese peasantry, so in India the growing number of racially conscious students begin to operate through the likewise increasing number of ill-paid Indian factory-workers and miners, and to rouse the placid Indian ryots. India has never been a nation. She will acquire nationhood in this century after much suffering. These modern nationalistic racial movements in the East begin in a small way and their progress is gradual. But just as

China has been aroused, so will India be aroused. The British power in India has in the past rested on three factors. First, the adhesion and support of the Indian native princes. These feudatories of the British Raj have supported the Imperial power out of feelings of loyalty, but also in their own interests. But if that power is seriously threatened they will seek to reinsure their positions by making an alliance with the Swarjists, or Indian Home Rulers. They will endeavour in any case to come to an agreement with the moderate elements amongst the Indian native Liberals and Nationalists. If too much reliance is placed on the strength of the Indian native rulers they may prove a broken reed to the Imperialist power.

Secondly, the British power in India has depended on the racial and religious differences between the Mahomedans and the Hindus. *Divide et impera*. So long as the Hindus hated the Mahommedans, and *vice versa*, more than they hated the English, the English could play off one faction against the other. In times of great emotion, such religious differences are liable to be lost sight of. So it was in the years immediately after the war when the bloody events at Amritsar had roused all India. Hindus and Mahommedans sank their differences and the very power of England in the peninsula trembled. Since then the old religious feuds have recommenced. Another Ghandi may emerge to unite the two creeds.

Thirdly, the governing power of England in India has rested on the placid resignation and almost filial devotion of the mass of the illiterate Indian peasantry. But these ancient communities of land workers are becoming politically conscious.

In order to hold off the Home Rule agitation the

reforms in India were instituted. A measure of provincial self-government has been granted, and every landholder is allowed to vote for a representative in the local Councils. True, the power of these local Councils is limited; but the very fact of being invited to choose a representative has stirred the Indian peasant farmers. Millions of them even on the limited franchise are so unlettered that they have to vote by casting their papers into ballot boxes marked in different colours for the different candidates. Still, the fact that the local gentry representing various parties have had to seek their suffrages and explain what is meant by electioneering, has set these docile masses of poor peasantry thinking and talking. Also, the number of literates able to read newspapers and propaganda sheets is increasing.

We have in India, with the spread of a vernacular press and the better means of communication and transport, the beginnings of a condition of affairs similar to those ruling to-day in China. It is only a question of time before the agitation of the politically conscious students and intellectuals will bear fruit. By wise reforms and by pressing on with measures of self-government, the agitation may be diverted into useful channels. But Imperialistic Powers are not always wise. The English governing class has shown deterioration in the arts of government. The best of the English aristocracy is not entering the Indian Civil Service as it did two or three generations ago. Inferior men without the same traditions are taking its place to some extent. The Hindus, who form some seventy-five per cent. of the population, are described as effete and effeminate. It is difficult to say how much of this is due to their religion, including child marriages, and how much to their centuries of oppression under Moslem rule and before the British

conquered the country. ~~They show certainly the mentality of a people long ruled by alien governors.~~ To-day the old military virtues are of less importance than in the days of hand to hand battles and more primitive fighting. The Hindus have quick brains and will be able to manufacture poisonous gases one day. And their immense numbers make them formidable. Virgil said it matters not to the wolf how many the sheep be. But the sheep are not armed. And Hindus can drive motor-cars and fly aeroplanes.

No one can prophesy what will happen in India during the next ten or twenty years. The events in China are affecting the Indian mind profoundly. There was genuine popular indignation at the despatch of Indian native troops to Shanghai. It was supposed that these Indian troops were the spearhead of a great Expeditionary Force intended for the waging of war against the Chinese Nationalists. This revulsion of feeling in India surprised and alarmed the Indian Government, and every means was taken to suppress the news of it from reaching the outside world, especially America. It was one more pointer showing the direction of thought of the Indian people. And when these professional Indian soldiers leave the Army, they go back to their villages, in many cases receiving grants of land from the Government. They will go back with tales of an Eastern people successfully rising in insurrection against the hitherto all-powerful Western Imperialists. And to the north, beyond the mountains, and to the north-west, beyond the deserts of Baluchistan, is the Russian influence, increasing in power, penetrating, advancing, permeating, proselytising. And the Soviets can Russianise and Bolshevise with greater speed than the British can Anglicise and Democratisise.

There was a kind of truce during the period of the so-called Trade Agreement between England and Russia. By that agreement Russia undertook not to encourage any propaganda against British interests in Asia. No doubt the Left Wing of the Communist party, strongly represented in the central college of the Third International, broke that truce. But it was not broken officially, and the more moderate element in Russia has discountenanced these activities. Now England and Russia are again hostile, and the veiled war continues. Russia will therefore redouble her efforts to penetrate towards the Indian Ocean and India. She will make mistakes, and she will have set-backs, but she is acting in accordance with a racial instinct demanding an outlet to the warm waters of the world. If the old-fashioned method of taking territory by force and the ultimate arbitrament of war is to continue, the Russian advance into India by way of Persia and Afghanistan will continue also. And in the ten years since the end of the World War, Russia has prevailed against England both in Persia and Afghanistan; and she has won also, indirectly, in China. On balance, the bitter veiled struggle between England and Russia has gone in Russia's favour in Asia generally. Since the Armistice the history of Britain's relations in Asia and Asia Minor with the Oriental peoples has been one long story of disaster. Turkey, China, Afghanistan, Persia, have all been the scenes of set-backs to a Western diplomacy of which Britain has taken the lead. And this in spite of the material wealth and strength of the British Empire and its allies. Even in the commercial field Britain has received her set-backs. For after the war the English merchants, with short-sighted selfishness, persuaded their Government to cancel the concessions of the

Germans and Austrians in China. This not only drove a breach into the wall of European ascendancy and privilege in China, but it has enabled the Germans to occupy the merchanting positions held for so long and with such profit by England, the greatest trading Power in Asia.

Nationalism, as we know it to-day, is of comparatively recent origin, and was almost unknown before the French Revolution. With the exception of Japan, it was practically unknown in Asia before the war. It is a disease of democracy, enhanced by the ease of modern communications. Nations, nationalities, and racial units, not always synonymous, are liable to act as vast mobs, particularly susceptible to mass emotions. A mob of human beings can be far more cruel and more violent than any of the individuals composing it. This explosive element is one of the dangers to the world and civilisation as we know it. Every clear-headed and honest statesman who wishes and works for peace must be on his guard against it. Nor need the so-called nation be homogeneous.

The United States of America and the British Isles contain the greatest mixture of unassimilated races that the world has ever seen, owing again to the ease of modern transport and communications. Yet both these conglomerations of mixed races welded together into the modern form of a nationalist State are liable to gusts of passion and to be swept off their feet by emotional storms to an extent undreamed of in the past. For, compared to the mentality of the present-day people, the national mentality of even a generation ago was placid. At the beginning of the Great War it took several months to rouse the British people, and it took two years to bring America, farther away from the conflict, up to the point

of intervention. True, the Germans and French were swept off their feet, trampling Jaurès and a few other far-sighted counsellors under their feet. But the French and German people had been kept in a ferment of suspicion and fear of each other for twenty years. To-day the peoples are more neurotic and unbalanced. The world's nervous system is overstrung. The rush and rattle of city life, the speeding up caused by the invention of the petrol engine as applied to land and air transport, have made the city dwellers nervy. The full psychological effects of the cinematograph are not yet realised or fully understood by medical men, nerve specialists, psychologists, or politicians. But whatever the final effect on the cinema-educated, jazz-maddened proletariat, the immediate result is a jumpiness, a shallowness, and a liability to "go off at half-cock," as the soldiers say, that is a new factor altogether in international relations. And when a people in this nervous condition are subjected to Nationalist propaganda, the results are likely to be highly dangerous.

Let me remind my readers of one small incident. In the early summer of 1927, two French airmen, Captains Nungesser and Coli, set out to make the first flight across the Atlantic from mainland to mainland. Two continents were wound up to the highest pitch of interest before the flight and at its commencement. These heroic dare-devils were lost at sea. A report was spread in America that they had been seen over American soil, heading for New York. All France was roused to the highest pitch of elation. Then the news came that the reports were false and that the airmen were missing. Nearly the whole French people raised a scream of rage and disappointment, which was partly directed against America.

There has been annoyance and disappointment in French minds against America and England ever since the Treaty of Versailles, and it has been accentuated by the debts controversy. This general feeling of resentment was suddenly canalised against the United States, and Americans in Paris went through some unpleasant experiences. So fierce was the resentment and hatred that the American Ambassador in Paris went so far as to cable to Washington advising his Government to discourage any Americans from attempting to fly to France in the opposite direction. Fortunately young Lindbergh provided the great aerial feat which distracted the French mind and put the French people in a good temper again. Commander Byrd and his brave companions also elicited genuine admiration from the whole French people by their flight to France. Their great welcome from the populace was proof of a genuine improvement in Franco-American relations. It is also a proof of how easily the popular mood of a nation changes in these days. Within one month the public opinion of France changed from irritation against Americans generally to admiration for the American people as represented by American airmen.

But the incident of Nungesser and Coli shows the dangers resulting from the state of mind of a people still actually insolvent as the result of the last war, in which some of the fairest lands were devastated and the flower of the youth of France killed or ruined.

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Chinese Nationalism has been of slow growth. With the exception of India, it is the last great nationalistic movement in the world. But its very slowness in getting up speed has made the momentum of the mass irre-

sistible. It is probably true that scores of millions of Chinese have still never heard of the Chinese Revolution of 1911 and the fall of the Manchu Dynasty. It is true that scores of millions of Chinese have never heard of the almost interminable Civil War and the final Nationalist triumph. For most of the fighting takes place along the few railways. But if even 200,000,000 Chinese out of the 440,000,000 Mongols are seized of the facts, the energy of this mass when loosened is incalculable. Since King Canute thought he could prevent the advance of the incoming tide by royal command there has been nothing so pathetically ludicrous as the idea that a few hundred American Marines and a few thousand British soldiers could stem back the advancing flood of Chinese Nationalism, or, as they themselves would call it, racial patriotism. There is here a lesson plainly writ for all who care to read and learn. The days of domination by one people over another are passing.

Imperialism is a word covering a multitude of wrongs, but includes certain good features. When successful, it can be justified. The Monroe Doctrine is one form of Imperialism. In its results it has been justified. It has prevented the filibustering and the rivalries of European military states in Central and South America. Up to a point British Imperialism in India was justified. It brought peace and it kept rival religious fanatics from cutting each other's throats. British Imperialism in India brought much wealth to England and enabled a leisured, cultured class to exist, with certain advantages to the art and progress of civilisation, and it helped to raise the standard of the working people of England and thus strengthen them politically. It did not raise the standard of life of the mass of the Indian people, but it enabled

the Indian intellectuals to prepare themselves for the task of government. French Imperialism in North Africa now survives as a means of sucking revenue from lands which do not belong to France, and of sweeping Algerian, Moorish, and Arab conscripts into the French Army. British Imperialism in India still acts as a brake on the too rapid advance of a people, unfitted as yet for full self-government, along the road of democracy. But while acting as a brake on democracy, Imperialism is a spur to Nationalism. The American Imperialism of the Monroe Doctrine is in danger of becoming a real Imperialism for the weaker Latin States of Central America. For President Monroe little dreamt of the unwelcome alliance of American oil interests and big business.

Heavy as is the burden of Imperialism on the shoulders of the taxpayers and the common soldiers of the Imperial Power, it holds out prizes for a privileged few. When Germany was stripped of her colonies after the war the German people were not over-worried. They had other things to think about. But there were bitter complaints in the families of the official classes that there were now no outlets for the younger sons of the Junker houses. Imperialism in tropical countries means a sure supply of rubber, edible fats, cotton, and other necessities of modern industrialism. There is the inertia of the official system, reluctant to see changes or to surrender privileges. For when an Imperialism has outlived its usefulness and has become a danger to an empire, the Imperialists themselves cling to it like the drunkard to his alcohol.

Yet there have been shining examples of the deliberate abandonment of dominion over alien peoples. In 1897 a racial struggle in South Africa broke out between the Boers and the English. It was a mere skirmish com-

pared to the Great War, but it cost England £250,000,000 of treasure and 100,000 casualties by battle or sickness. At the end of it the Dominion of South Africa was placed under the form of rule known to Whitehall as Crown Colony Government. In the reaction following the war a Liberal and Radical Government was returned to power in 1905. And in the first flush of righteousness and idealism the hard-headed Scot who was Prime Minister and had been execrated up and down the country as a "pro-Boer" four years before, and "the friend of every country but his own," tore up the Treaty of Vereeniging forced on the defeated Boers, and granted full dominion self-government to the whole of South Africa. Incidentally, in so doing, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman won the first great victory for Britain in the coming World War. For if the Conservatives had remained in power in England and Imperialistic Government had continued to be forced upon the Boers, the whole of South Africa would have blazed up with the first exchange of shots between the British and German pickets in Flanders. The issue of the last war was in the balance for the first two years of the war, and a hostile South Africa might just have tipped the balance in Germany's favour. America is gingerly feeling her way along the same rough and narrow path in the case of the Philippines, and she has struggled some distance along it in the case of Cuba.

But in any case the British Empire is only an Empire in name where the white self-governing colonies are concerned. Outside of India the Royal House has been well described as a postage stamp monarchy. It is an intangible convention, but looms all the greater in the minds of the colonials for that very reason. It insures peace and some slight economic advantages between

the scattered lands peopled by the English. Canada had no grievance against the Russians, who were selling nothing to her, but were buying Canadian produce in great quantities. Yet when the British Government broke off relations with Russia and packed off the Russian buyers and commercial agents, Canada followed suit without hesitation.

But England cannot count too much on her white Dominions. In 1922 the British Government found itself within a short step of war with a regenerated Turkey. Our ally, France, for long doubtful of the policy pursued, stood out of the way of the expected explosion. Flamboyant cables were broadcast to the British Dominions claiming the vital interest of the British Empire in the freedom of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus to British ships and merchant shipping, and we described this narrow strait as the strip of blue salt water over which the Union Jack must for ever fly, etc. The reply was a polite but firm refusal to have anything to do with the adventure from Canada and South Africa, and a request for further information from the Australasian Dominions. Even the loyal and ~~Hindu-hating~~ Sikhs of India protested. The British Government fell, the Dardanelles are again fortified, British ships can move freely through them, so long as normal diplomatic relations prevail between Downing Street and Angora, and the Turks show the magnanimity of final victors in chivalrously tending the British graves on Gallipoli slopes.

Common interests will keep the English-speaking overseas Dominions together. Yet the World War weakened the Imperial dominion of Britain.

And Egypt. The Suez Canal has been described as the vertebral column of the British Empire. It is the

short sea route to India, and must be in British hands so long as British Imperialism rests, in the ultimate resort, on force. Until an Imperialism of the mind has replaced the Imperialism of the cannon, at all costs the Suez Canal must be secured. But the ferment of Nationalism has been working in Egypt. Before the war Egypt was, in theory, a feudatory State of the Turkish Empire, temporarily occupied and ruled by the English. In the eighties of last century, British forces were landed in Egypt as a temporary measure, or until such time as peace and good order had been restored. The original landing of the British forces was strangely reminiscent of the sending of the Shanghai Expeditionary Force. The British hold was gradually extended, and, in Upper Egypt and the Sudan, British action was fully justified by the suppression of the religious fanatics, the abolition of holy wars, and the scotching of the slave trade. Lower Egypt, after some decades of profound peace, still saw the British Residency in Cairo and the British garrison in the city and in Alexandria. So long as the present Imperialist system obtains, Britain will fight to retain her position in Egypt. It suited her for political reasons to replace the popular Egyptian ruler, who was accused of Turcophilism by the present King, whose throne was set up for the purpose.

Now the Egyptian people have marched far on the road of democracy. Egyptian Home Rule is a reality. Only in foreign affairs and questions of defence does the Imperial Power retain her right of veto. But it is just in these sentimental matters of defence and foreign relations that a people like the Egyptians is apt to be most sensitive. Britain, further, continues to govern the Sudan under the Crown Colony system, and, indeed, no other system is yet practicable. This enables us to develop

cotton-growing at great profit to certain English companies, but, more important still, to hold in our hands the very life of Egypt—namely, the waters of the Nile. So long as England remains in the Sudan she can cut off Egypt's water supply whenever it suits her to do so.

If not driven too far, the Egyptians will remain quiescent for some time yet. For the more far-sighted of the Egyptian statesmen realise clearly enough that if the English were to evacuate Egypt at the present time, the Italians would promptly step in and take their place. And little as the Egyptians love British rule, they certainly prefer it to Fascist domination. Nor would the Fascist leaders have far to look for an excuse for intervention. The Italian colonists in Egypt live cheek by jowl with the Egyptians, and, in some cases, actually undersell the Egyptians with their labour. The two races quarrel and minor racial riots are almost as common in Alexandria as in Chicago. An Italian workman and an Egyptian dock labourer have only to exchange revolver shots in a café in Port Said or Alexandria, and the Fascist Fleet and Army would mobilise for a descent upon Egypt.

But Egypt has another importance from the British point of view. The country of the Pharaohs is destined to be the junction of the great air trunk lines of the future. The aeroplane passenger and mail lines from Europe to the Cape of Good Hope and from Europe to India will exchange mails and passengers somewhere in Egypt; and air communications will presently be as vital for the British Empire in the East as sea communications are to-day.

As a reinsurance, therefore, for the Canal and for the air landing-places, the English hold Palestine. The British mandate was granted primarily in order that the

Zionists would be given a chance to fulfil their ancient dream of a re-establishment of the Jewish national home in the land of their fathers. The more far-sighted of the English statesmen, particularly Balfour and Lloyd George, realised that the foundation of this Jewish homeland will bring England the good will of the 12,000,000 intellectually powerful Jews scattered throughout the world, and all the informed British statesmen understand the extreme importance of this friendly enclave in Asia Minor. For Arab Nationalism is also a force to be reckoned with, and might develop into a threat to the British road to India. So, despite the ravings of the anti-Semites, and the petty vindictiveness of some of the English minor officials, the broad policy of establishing the Jewish national home in Palestine will be continued.

On the Canal, therefore, England is fairly secure, and there she will remain until an entirely new basis of the relations of peoples has been accepted by all the nations concerned.

But the real heel of Achilles of the British Empire lies near the fabled site of the Garden of Eden. Mesopotamia, unless England withdraws in time, will bring about the defeat of British Imperialism.

English dominion has rested on sea power since the end of the seventeenth century.

With the exception of India, it has been a deliberate part of British policy to avoid land frontiers liable to attack by a strong military Power. India has such a frontier, but it is well guarded by mountains and deserts, and in the old days of marching armies, before modern means of transport had revolutionised the art of strategy, India was safe enough. In any case, England is involved in India, and the troops guarding the northern and north-

western frontiers are paid for from India's revenues. The longest land frontier in the world—that between the United States and Canada—is in a different class altogether. It is the nearest approach to a non-political international boundary anywhere in the world.

If European conditions prevailed in North America, the Canadian frontier would be guarded by American and Canadian armies totalling anything up to 1,000,000 men, respectable fleets would be maintained on the Great Lakes, and the frontier fortresses alone would absorb the surplus revenues of Illinois and Ontario. I suppose the Washington Government would engage in secret propaganda amongst the French Canadians, and the Government at Westminster would secretly aid and abet the anti-Prohibitionists in America. Fortunately Canada has anæsthetised the infection. But so long as British sea power is supreme, or, at any rate, stronger than that of probable enemies able to strike at her Eastern and African Empires, her position is strong, except in the ancient land of the Babylonians. For by an extraordinary series of accidents and the unhappy last minute influence of the oil interests, Britain finds herself with one of the most indefensible and lengthy of land frontiers, without a loyal and dependable native population to assist in defending it, threatened to the north by the Turks, a strong and compact military people; to the east by a Persia in danger of falling under Bolshevik influence; and to the south-west by the increasingly powerful and hardy desert fanatics known as the Wahibis.

It is interesting to trace the events that have landed the cautious English in this unhappy situation. The outbreak of the Great War in 1914 was not unexpected, and we had made certain preparations for the event. A

War Book had been compiled by the Committee of Imperial Defence in consultation with the self-governing Dominions and the India Office. The only source of oil then available for the British under purely British control was the oilfield of Southern Persia, exploited by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. If Turkey threw in her lot with the Central Powers, it was necessary that this oil supply should be safeguarded. Plans, therefore, were in readiness for the occupation of the port and province of Basra, at the head of the Persian Gulf. With the entry of Turkey into the war, this plan was carried out, and a modest British force, though sufficient for the purpose, occupied the district.

With the deadlock of the trench warfare on the Western Front, something spectacular in the East was sought for. It was desired to impress the British public with some romantic victories. So the British General at Basra was encouraged to move up country. This also served as a diversion to the Turks, who were threatening Egypt and the Suez Canal. English sea communications were safer and more certain than the overland communications of the Turks, for the Baghdad Railway from Berlin via Vienna and Constantinople was not yet across the Taurus Mountains. But the British force, inadequate for its objective of Baghdad, was shut up and besieged in Kut and forced to surrender. For a British army to be beleaguered and, however gallant its defence, finally to have to lay down its arms to the Turks, was a blow to British prestige which reverberated through every bazaar in Asia. At all costs the position must be retrieved. A large, ill-spared army and flotilla were sent out, Kut was reoccupied, Baghdad taken, and then, by its very momentum, the expedition pushed far beyond the boundaries of Arabian Mesopotamia into

the Turkish vilayet of Mosul. The expedition which began as a means of safeguarding the oil supply from Southern Persia developed into a force of liberation for the Mesopotamian Arabs, who had for long suffered under Turkish misrule. True enough the Arabs wished to be quit of Turkish domination, but the last thing they wanted was British Imperialism in its stead. Then whispers of oil in Mosul began to be heard in the Allied council rooms. The fabulous value of the Mosul oilfields was trumpeted abroad by the fortunate concession holders, or would-be holders. At the time of the armistice with Turkey the whole of the oiliferous territory was not in British occupation, but this matter was soon put right. For now the Bolsheviks in Northern Persia provided a new sanction. At one time, during 1919, the British held not only all Mesopotamia, but Northern Persia, and the *Caucasian States of Georgia and Azerbaijan* as well. For in Georgia was the port of Poti and the Black Sea end of the pipe line from Baku. And in Azerbaijan were the Baku oilfields themselves, the richest petroleum region for its size in the world.

Desirable as were these regions, and many as were the justifications for their retention, the task of holding them was too much even for the British Empire. There were plenty of soldiers, but their contracts of service were over, and they were due for demobilisation. And the Treasury was painfully empty. Britain, therefore, withdrew from the Caucasus and from Northern Persia, but in a moment of temporary aberration, caused by the heady wines of victory, Mesopotamia, including the province of Mosul, remained in British occupation; and there the English have been ever since. The first attempt to rule the country as India is ruled, and, in fact, by Indian-trained British Civil Servants, had to be aban-

done. The Arabs of the Euphrates were quite content with the blessings of British rule so long as these blessings materialised in a shower of golden sovereigns. But when the army paymasters were replaced by the Indian tax-gatherers, they rose in armed revolt.

The situation was met by the installation of a Sheriffian Prince, son of the newly installed "King" of the Hedjaz, in the person of Prince Feisal. This romantic figure had been ejected from his throne at Damascus by our French allies. His agents were generally credited with being behind the Arab insurrection in Mesopotamia. But as he wanted to hold the baby, the English placed the infant in his arms and installed him on a throne in Baghdad, the upholstery of which was well stuffed with British bank-notes. But though King Feisal holds the Mesopotamian baby, the nursery must be guarded by British forces. This is being done cheaply enough to-day by a powerful British air force. Turkey, having made good her claim to the province of Mosul before the League of Nations, but finding herself in a weakened condition after continuous fighting since 1910, abandoned her claims for the time being, and left England in possession. And there England finds herself, attempting to guard an ungardonable frontier, hundreds of miles in extent, on the wrong side of the mountain ranges, with a turbulent and litigious people in the rear, and with the sure knowledge that, should she be involved in another war, at least a division of troops must be earmarked to hold Mesopotamia in case her difficulties provide Turkey's opportunity to regain her lost province.

And not a barrel of petroleum has been extracted.

CHAPTER V

IMPERIALISM IN AFRICA

Abyssinia—Britain and cotton—France and arms—Italy and railways—The Lake Tsana Barrage—Abyssinia and the League of Nations—Straits of Gibraltar—Tangier—The Riffs—Italy and Tangier—Gibraltar and Ceuta.

CERTAIN anthropologists claim that the human race originated, not in the Garden of Eden, but in the Dark Continent, Africa. That suffering continent has been the scene of more human misery than any other. In the African bushmen there survives probably the most primitive human stock, with the possible exception of the Australian aborigines. Her peoples range from the various families of negroes, of which the most advanced are the Bantus, up to the white Berbers of Morocco and the Jews of Mogador, these two latter stocks taking rank amongst the highest developments of the human race. There are relics of ancient civilisations in the centre of Africa, long since swamped by the negro hordes.

The negroes themselves have practised Imperialism as they have suffered under it, and were passing through the Imperialistic stage in South Africa under the great Kaffir chiefs when the British, Boer, and German settlers conquered and dominated them in their turn. The vast continent has seen more suffering from disease and famine and from the ravages of wars and the slave raids than any other part of the globe. To-day the whole of this vast continent of Africa, with its uncounted millions of inhabitants, has passed entirely under Euro-

pean domination, with the exception of two independent native States—Abyssinia and Liberia. Only the hitherto unconquered Berbers of the Riff attempt to retain a last vestige of independence in their mountain fastnesses in the north-west.

By a curious series of accidents, Abyssinia has been able to resist partition and beat off would-be white conquerors. The ancient kingdom of Ethiopia was converted to Christianity early in the Christian era, about the year 330. Their profession of Christianity has served the Abyssinians in good stead in this world below. When British, French, Belgians, Italians, and Germans were racing each other to carve out their Colonial Empires in Africa in the middle and latter part of the nineteenth century, there was some hesitation about conquering a professedly Christian people. The heathen could be dominated and ruled over for his own good, but some further sanction had to be sought in the case of Abyssinia, especially as her people are doughty fighters, well versed in the military arts and possessed of modern weapons. When the inevitable war was fought between England and Abyssinia it cost us nine millions of money, and that was a large sum in 1868. England decided, glutted as she was with vast territories in Africa inhabited by more primitive or docile peoples, that the independence of Abyssinia had better be respected. To Italy, who made a late start in the African scramble, the country offered, and offers to-day, a rich prize. The French also had designs on the legendary homeland of the Queen of Sheba.

The British rôle was not discreditable up to 1906. We were too occupied in Egypt and the Sudan to pay much attention to Abyssinian affairs until Lancashire's cotton hunger forced us into cotton cultivation in the

Sudan and it became obvious that fresh supplies of water for both the Sudan and Egypt could most easily be assured by barrage works on the Blue Nile, rising in Lake Tsana and flowing for many miles through Abyssinian territory.

A diplomatic duel was waged for many years between Italy and France, with England acting between them as the honest broker. England has certain legitimate interests. The Blue Nile rises in Abyssinian territory, and this vital water supply for Egypt must at all costs be guarded. But there British interests have ended.

Not so the Italians. Whenever the Italian Imperialists have been in the ascendant, a forward policy has been pursued towards Abyssinia. And this in spite of the setback to Italian ambitions by the overwhelming defeat of the Italian armies at Adowa in 1896. In 1906, however, three of the four Powers concerned entered into their now notorious "Agreement," virtually partitioning Abyssinia. The methods employed were jointly to press the Government at Addis Ababa to grant concessions to the nationals of one of them in turn. The combined pressure of England, France, and Italy was sufficient to override the diplomatic influence of little Belgium, whose merchants have been active in the country, and the occasional diplomatic assistance given to the Abyssinians by Russia prior to the war.

Up till the present no oil has been discovered anywhere in Abyssinia, so American susceptibilities were not aroused. The 1906 Agreement was in the tradition of the old diplomacy, and the signatory Powers bound themselves to maintain intact the sovereign independence of Abyssinia. These words are always inserted by strong Powers in their agreements dividing up the property of weak Powers, whether the Powers are

England, France, and Spain partitioning Morocco, England and Russia partitioning Persia, or Japan and Russia partitioning Korea and Manchuria. France was the only one of the three Powers concerned to take full advantage of the 1906 Agreement by completing her railway from Jubiti to the capital, and the important coffee trade is largely in her hands. The valuable traffic in arms is also in French hands, and the principal imports into Abyssinia to balance the export of coffee are rifles, ammunition, and machine-guns. Slavery is still rife, and Abyssinian slavers occasionally raid into the Sudan.

But for the action of the French on hearing of the 1925 Agreement between England and Italy, the slavery question would have been taken as a *casus belli* at the most convenient moment and a justification for benevolent British neutrality when the next invasion of Abyssinia by Italy was undertaken.

The details of the Anglo-Italian Treaty of December, 1925, in which, *inter alia*, we recognised "the exclusive character of Italian economic influence in the west of Abyssinia," should have remained secret. Sufficient news of it, however, leaked out to alarm the French. A violent campaign commenced in the French newspapers. Pressed by questions in the British Parliament, the Foreign Secretary admitted that the Italian-British Agreement had been concluded without consultation with the Abyssinian Government or the French Government, but declared that the Note was to be communicated both to Paris and Addis Ababa. Sir Austen Chamberlain hinted in Parliament that nothing would be done without Abyssinia's consent, and that no difficulty was anticipated.

Why has this barrage on Lake Tsana not been com-

menced years ago, together with its motor-road connecting with the Sudan? The reason is that we have tried to get something for nothing. The Abyssinians are suspicious of concessionnaires and economic penetration with the example of the whole of the rest of Africa before their eyes.

There are also religious reasons. On the islands in Lake Tsana are ancient shrines, looked upon by the Abyssinian tribes in the neighbourhood as Holy Places. The barrage would raise the level of the lake and submerge these islands, Holy Places included. This difficulty could probably be got over if the British would promise support to the Abyssinian Government in obtaining for the Abyssinian Church the former church lands in Palestine. These were taken from Abyssinia by chicanery, but the ancient Christian Church of Ethiopia has never lost the hope of regaining them.

In the meantime, largely as the result of French influence, Abyssinia was admitted to the League of Nations. This will be of some advantage to the Abyssinians; though a little thing like that would not check the Italians in their present mood but for the formidable nature of the country and the fighting qualities of the Abyssinian natives. Albania is a member of the League of Nations; so is Greece; but both have felt the Fascist fist in recent years. Italy is bent on absorbing Abyssinia as soon as she conveniently can and feels the necessary strength.

To understand Italian policy it must be remembered that in 1889 Italy, with the tacit consent of France and England, actually declared a Protectorate. This the Abyssinians resented. The result was the Italian defeat at Adowa in 1896. But there were no aeroplanes in that year, and no petrol-driven transport. Italy, therefore,

has military advantages that she did not possess thirty years ago. The projected railway across Abyssinia to be built by Italy will provide all the necessary pretexts for penetration and presently hostilities, wars, and, so the Italians dream, conquest and annexation.

I do not believe the railway between Eritrea and Italian Somaliland will ever be built. It would pass through difficult country and would never be an economic proposition. The railway is but a weapon in the hands of Italian Imperialism. The only proper policy for the British Government to pursue is, after due notice, to abrogate the "Agreement" with Italy of December, 1925, admit the justice of Abyssinian contentions before the League, and to negotiate for the irrigation works openly and in the light of day. We shall have to pay for the right of barraging Lake Tsana and damming the Blue Nile in Abyssinian territory, but there is no reason why we should not do so, and not much cash need pass in the transaction. The Italians can exploit the minerals in the Abyssinian mountains, and even the oil—should it be found—by agreement with the local Rassas, and the payment of a royalty to the Abyssinian Government as in the case of the oilfields in Southern Persia exploited by a British company.

One thing certain, however, is that Lancashire will get not one extra bale of Sudanese cotton through the policy hitherto pursued by Britain. And it is doubtful if Italy will get an ounce of gold or silver from the Abyssinian mountains by the parallel policy hitherto pursued by Signor Mussolini. Yet so long as Fascism seeks for prizes to dangle before the eyes of the Italian people, and so long as our present-day economic Imperialists think they can win profits and pay dividends by force of arms, the last independent state in Africa

will be threatened, League of Nations or no League of Nations.

Now let us turn to the north-west corner of Africa. The Straits of Gibraltar have long been one of the great strategical points of the world, and especially of the British Imperial system. On the northern side glowers the great rock fortress of Gibraltar, once considered impregnable, now peculiarly vulnerable to modern artillery. On the southern shores of the Straits is the port of Tangier, with great latent commercial possibilities, languishing under a ridiculous system of international control. Further to the east is the ancient Spanish fortress of Ceuta, which again should be the port of a wealthy hinterland, but whose trade has languished through the long years of struggle between the Spanish and the native Moroccans. The Riff mountaineers, possessed of many primitive virtues and endowed with great gallantry, have survived centuries of attempts at absorption by successive invaders. Probably without French help Spain would have been forced to relinquish her grip on the Northern Morocco territories. But French assistance from the south and the power of modern artillery and aircraft allied with hunger and the sufferings of the women and children has brought about the final defeat of the mountaineers. These simple Mahommedans have committed no sin, they have threatened nobody. They suffer because their mountains are supposed to contain mineral wealth. The right to exploit these mountain minerals by the Spanish has been recognised by certain other Powers. And Christian, democratic, "peace-loving" Europe looks on with hypocritical complacency.

But there are certain complications.

It has for long been obvious to students of inter-

national affairs that the revolt of the Riff tribes in the mountains in Morocco, and the intervention of the French in this struggle between the natives and the Spaniards, would raise the old problem of Morocco once more. British interests are closely concerned. A Treaty exists between the Italian Fascist Government and the Spanish near-Fascist Directorate. All the terms of the Treaty are not known to the world, but it will not be surprising to find that the Italians are prepared to support Spain's claim to Tangier. Fascist Italy has long been pressing for a recognition of her position as a great Mediterranean Power; and as the future sovereignty over Tangier affect all the Powers with an interest in the Mediterranean, the Italian attitude will be of very great importance. Italy will have received certain guarantees from Spain as to neutrality in certain eventualities.

The Italians were very resentful at being left out of the Conference before the war, when, at Algeciras, the rival claims of Spain, France, and Germany in Morocco were adjusted. Great Britain was represented, but not Italy. A further Conference will become necessary, sooner or later; at this Conference Germany will have no seat and Italy will occupy the vacant place. British policy is clear. The British are interested, firstly, in maintaining some form of international régime in Tangier and the neutral zone; and, secondly, in insuring that the north-west corner of Morocco, including the neutral zone of Tangier, and especially that part of it which forms the southern shores of the Straits of Gibraltar, shall not be in the hands of a strong naval and military Power. This is very ancient and well-tried British policy, and no British Government is likely to recede from it. The southern shores of the Straits of Gibraltar in Spanish

hands satisfies British requirements. If in French hands, British policy would not be satisfied. Our terms of friendship with Spain, and Spain's lack of a powerful fleet, together insure us against any menace from that quarter.

But, to speak quite plainly, every British Government, whatever its complexion, would be strongly opposed to French predominance at Tangier, or to French naval and military establishments on the southern shores of the Straits of Gibraltar. However friendly our relations with France, and however unlikely the event of a quarrel with the French Republic, we can never forget that our sea route to India and Australia lies through the Straits of Gibraltar, and the freedom of the Straits of Gibraltar to our shipping, both war vessels and merchantmen, is a vital necessity to us. That is, so long as force is recognised as the ultimate arbitrament, and war remains the legal and normal method of settling disputes between nations.

With the development of modern artillery, Gibraltar is within easy gun-range of the Moroccan coast on the other side of the Straits of Gibraltar ; its dockyard could be rendered untenable by heavy guns of position emplaced in the hills to the west of Ceuta. Ceuta is the easternmost point of the southern shores of the Straits of Gibraltar, and the Tangier zone forms the western portion of this vital area. There was another British interest involved, and that was complete freedom for our traders in the whole of Morocco. But we have found it politic to abandon this particular claim in exchange for a recognition by the French of our predominating position in Egypt. So strongly have we always felt about Tangier that we actually held the port and garrisoned it for a number of years in the beginning of the seventeenth century. And, although we were forced to aban-

don it by the pressure of the tribes and the great expense involved, we have not tolerated the presence of any other single Power in Tangier.

Now as to the French point of view. The forward school amongst the French colonisers in Morocco has for long cherished the ambition to control Tangier. The port could be greatly improved and its commercial importance increased. It also has attractions as an embarkation port for the French troops in Morocco to be sent to France, in case of need, by way of the Atlantic. It is not known what arrangements were come to between the Spanish and French Governments when they decided upon common action against the revolting tribesmen during the recent hostilities. That the Spaniards gave no assurances with regard to Tangier may be taken as certain; if any one Power is to control Tangier, Spain would always press her claim to do so. But it is known that influential circles in France are in favour of obtaining the right to build a railway from Tasa, in the French sphere of influence in Morocco, down to the Riff shores of the Mediterranean. There are several positions along this shore where a suitable harbour could be constructed. Such a project, however, would cut deeply into Spanish sovereignty in the sphere of influence allotted to Spain at the Algeciras Conference, to which arrangement ourselves, France, and Spain are all signatories. The construction of such a port, which would, by its very nature, be a naval port, would be opposed by the British Government as constituting an extra menace to the shipping route through the Straits of Gibraltar.

Nominally, Tangier is still under the sovereignty of the Sultan of Morocco. The actual government is exercised by an international body on which the Sultan and the French, Spanish, and British Governments are all

represented. It is not pretended that this international régime has been very successful. There is a suspicion that certain interested parties have not done their best to make it a success.

If Spain insists on reopening the question of the government of Tangier, and is supported by Italy, there will be four alternatives. The first would be to continue the international régime; and if the whole Moroccan question were once more examined, and finally settled, there is no reason why its international control should not be made a success, with patience and good will on all sides.

The second would be to look upon the international zone of Tangier as a mandated area under the control of, and subject to inspection by, the League of Nations. A mandatory area, however, requires a mandatory Power. Spain is sure to press for the mandate, and this solution need not necessarily be opposed by the British Government, though it is not likely to satisfy the French Government.

The third solution would be to appoint some other Power as mandatory. Neither France, Italy, nor any other Mediterranean Power would be suitable from the international point of view, and it is doubtful if any disinterested Power, such as Sweden, could be induced to undertake the responsibility.

The fourth alternative would be for the League of Nations itself to administer Tangier, as is done to-day quite successfully in the very similar case of Danzig. Danzig is administered by a High Commissioner, appointed by the League, and as the port is a bone of contention between Germany and Poland, the High Commissioner is always a native of some other and disinterested Power. This last solution would probably be

the most satisfactory from the British point of view ; and Italy would, no doubt, also be favourable. But it reopens the whole question of the government of Tangier, and the natural tendency of any British Government would be to preserve the existing state of affairs and try to improve it.

I must now refer to a very old British project, and that is the exchange of Gibraltar for Ceuta, almost opposite the great fortress to the south. Gibraltar is a veritable symbol of British power, and is bound up with the last 200 years of British naval and military history. But with modern artillery it is vulnerable, and its retention in case of a hostile Spain in the unhappy event of a future war would be very difficult and costly. Furthermore, Gibraltar has never developed a trade with its Spanish hinterland. It is a constant source of humiliation to Spanish pride which time has not removed and never will remove. It is as if the Spanish, for example, held the fortress and port of Dover, or the Mexicans held New Orleans. Ceuta, on the other hand, while an ancient Spanish possession, is less vulnerable, could be developed into an excellent commercial harbour, and would be sure to attract a large trade with the rich Moroccan country which forms its hinterland. Nor need England press inland from Ceuta. The port would content her. But sentiment has been too strong for this project to be proceeded with, and it must be ruled out of practical politics for some time to come.

But the Moroccan question generally, and that of Tangier and its neutral zone in particular, is of great importance to the peace of the world. The very air of Morocco reeks with the smell of the old-time secret diplomacy. In a sane world the Straits of Gibraltar would be as free as the Atlantic Ocean or the Great

Lakes of Canada. Yet to-day the problem of Morocco and the Straits of Gibraltar contains the seeds of war for three peoples—the English, the French, and the Spanish—not to mention the possibilities of future revolts by the unfortunate native possessors of the soil of North Africa. Not until the very idea of domination by one people of another people is abandoned will the Straits of Gibraltar and the north-west corner of Africa be free of the war terror.

CHAPTER VI

THE AMERICAN CONTINENT AND WAR

Canada and the United States of America solve the problem—
Canada a nation—The Dominions and foreign policy—
Their position in former wars—Canada in an Anglo-
American war—Central America—American Imperialism—
Mexico—Oil kings and cardinals—Japan and Mexico—
Chile and Argentina—Tacna-Arica—The equilibrium of
peace.

THE American Continent divides itself naturally, for political purposes, into North, Central, and South America. The two most powerful countries in the Americas, Canada and the United States, have discovered the means of avoiding the catastrophe of war. Here are two peoples, powerful enough, wealthy enough, and proud enough (for behind Canada stands the British Empire) to engage in war on the unlimited scale. Between them is the longest and most vulnerable land frontier in the world. Yet in spite of some minor friction and the occasional irritations of tariff wars, not to mention the alarm of some good Canadians at the growing influence of American capital in the Dominion, war, arising out of a quarrel between Canada and the United States, is accepted as impossible. Along that vast frontier the only armed men are the anti-rum-running police.

In a later chapter I endeavour to show that those who think, in the present state of the world, that war is for ever impossible between the United States and Britain are living in a fool's paradise. It is shutting one's eyes to facts to take it as axiomatic that such a war is im-

possible. But it is foolish to take it for granted that in the terrible event of a struggle between the two great English-speaking democracies Canada would automatically throw in her lot with the British Empire.

I hope I am not offending the susceptibilities of patriotic Canadians in saying that one result of the World War was to erect Canada into an individual nation, maintaining her own Ambassador at Washington and receiving an American Ambassador at Ottawa. Canada signed the peace treaties following the World War as an independent nation. When the League of Nations was established there was some very natural apprehension on the part of the other states members at the fact that the British Dominions, Canada, Newfoundland, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa each ranked as full members and sent their own delegates. Quite excusably, the representatives of other nations thought that this would give the British Empire five additional votes as a matter of course and automatically. Such, however, has not proved the case, and the Dominion representatives at Geneva have shown and exercised a great deal of healthy independence.

As an example, the attitude of the South African Government towards the Mandates Commission, and its interpretation of the rights of the mandatory Power and the rights of interference of the League on the question of the former German South-West Africa, has been diametrically opposed to the views publicly expressed by the British delegates. Again, the Dominions have differed from each other. India ranks as a Dominion for League purposes, and the Indian Government has long been at loggerheads with the South African Government over the Indian racial question. The rela-

tions between Downing Street and the Dominion Governments have been in a state of flux for thirty years.

At the outbreak of the South African War, Mr. Laurier, afterwards Sir Wilfrid Laurier, was Prime Minister of Canada. The rupture came rather suddenly. Downing Street had omitted to keep the Dominion Governments informed as to the course of events. Laurier was visiting the United States at the time of the outbreak, and, when interviewed by American Press representatives, he stated quite clearly that the attitude of Canada in the war must not be taken for granted, and he would have to consult his Cabinet and the Dominion Parliament before reaching any decision. And Laurier was one of the most astute and far-sighted statesmen Canada has ever produced. In the event a wave of patriotic feeling swept over Canada, although her interests were in no way affected. The natural racial feeling of Canadians of British descent asserted itself, nor were the "French Canadians" to be outdone by the "British Canadians." So strong was the outburst of popular emotion in favour of intervention that almost simultaneously with his return to Canada, Mr. Laurier was taking the lead in offering soldiers and money to the Imperial Government.

The outbreak of the Great War found the Dominion Governments better informed by Downing Street. They acted, indeed, according to plan. Nevertheless, although war was ostensibly declared against Germany on account of Belgium, and France was represented as the aggrieved Power, the French Canadians were a little slow in springing to arms in defence of Catholic Frenchmen and Belgians. When the conscription law was passed, the French Canadians, after resisting it constitutionally, played their part loyally, and all went well from the

Imperial point of view. But when, four years after the Armistice, England found herself faced with the serious danger of a recrudescence of war with Turkey, the Canadian Government followed the example of the Governments of other British Dominions in declaring bluntly for peace, and, in case of war, for neutrality. Ask to-day ten Canadians, of all classes and origins, what would be the attitude of their country in the event of war between England and the United States, and, if they answered sincerely, ten different answers would be given. It is, of course, impossible to prophesy in such matters. A great deal would depend on the propaganda that had gone before on the alleged causes of a war and on the real reasons for it. No man can say that Canada would come in wholeheartedly, or partially, or declare for absolute neutrality. Nor can Canada be accused of any lack of loyalty to the British Commonwealth. But one thing is certain, and that is that Canada has the right to be neutral, however unpalatable this truth may be to British Imperialists and Canadian Jingoists.

Now let us glance at Central America. The American interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine and the strategical and commercial interest of the United States in the Panama Canal has meant a virtual American protectorate over the smaller Central American States. This is the American version of present-day Imperialism.

In Mexico the position is somewhat different. Here we have two opposing civilisations and social systems bordering on each other. There are plenty of influential Americans who for years have urged that their country should undertake a moral crusade for the "cleaning up" of Mexico. This feeling is perfectly sincere and is an expression of the kind of self-righteousness which

both English and Americans are prone to, and which accounts for the undoubted unpopularity in the mass of both Englishmen and Americans in Mexico, in Central and South America, and in most other parts of the world. The Latins, and, to a less degree, the Slavs, do not understand, and fiercely resent, this assumption of superiority by Anglo-Saxons, Americans of Anglo-Saxon descent, and the other citizens of the United States who have become Americanised.

The Calles Government of Mexico, furthermore, has given cause for offence to two very powerful influences in the United States of America, and, in fact, in the world. These are firstly, and by far the most important, the Roman Catholic Church, whose devout members have been outraged by the suppression of religious establishments in Mexico. Secondly, the Calles Government's attitude towards foreign concession-holders has earned the undying enmity of the oil interests. But for the revulsion of feeling after the World War and the real desire for peace of the bulk of the American people, it is hard to resist the conclusion that these two means of moulding public opinion—namely, the Catholic Church and the oil interests—would in combination have forced American intervention in Mexico. I apologise to my Catholic friends for bracketing them with the oil companies, but common misfortune brings strange bed-fellows, and both the Catholic Churches and the oil companies have long memories. If Mexico continues to offend these two powerful bodies and a younger generation of Americans proves itself less peaceable than the present generation, we may yet see the invasion of Mexico by the United States. The result would be a long drawn out guerilla campaign, probably lasting five years, and certainly costing the American people

4,000,000,000 dollars and perhaps 50,000 American lives. At the end of it the Northern States of Mexico would be incorporated in the Union, the southern provinces of Mexico allowed to govern themselves under a form of protectorate, the oil wells would have been wrecked, the country districts and cities of Mexico devastated, perhaps 300,000 Mexicans slaughtered, and half a million Mexican women and children killed by starvation.

I was in America at the beginning of the year 1927 when the Department of State at Washington made the timely discovery of Bolshevik plots in Mexico. In the present-day conditions of the world, the inevitable preliminary to any war is the discovery of Bolshevik plots. America's troubles in Nicaragua were traced to Mexico, but behind Mexico was seen the Red menace of Moscow.

There followed an extraordinary and hopeful example of public opinion killing a war in its initial stages.

In January, 1927, the American people were determined not to have war with Mexico or with any other country in the world, no matter what the provocation. It is incidents like these which confound the cynics and strengthen the faith of those who believe that the human race at bottom is good. And the public instinct was right. Such a war would have been a terrible set-back to the World Peace Movement. Nor would there be any certainty of confining the horrible struggle to the United States and Mexico. Russia would be incapable of intervention, and no other country in Europe would attempt it directly ; but Japan's attitude could not be counted on with certainty.

Earlier in this book I have referred to Japan's bitter economic needs, to her dearth of raw materials and her

restlessness at the restrictions placed upon the expansion of her people. I showed how Japan's dreams of colonising Manchuria on a large scale must remain dreams owing to the insurgence of Chinese Nationalism. Lower California would be as suitable for close Japanese colonisation as the northern territories of Australia. Into neither can Japan force her way without combat both with the British Empire, fighting on behalf of Australia, and the American people. But, with America thoroughly involved in Mexico, with certain of the States of South America sulky and apprehensive, Japan might think her chance had come, especially if she could take the lead of insurgent Asia and rebellious Russia.

Who would have dreamt in June, 1914, that the firing of a revolver at an Austrian Archduke in an obscure Balkan town would bring the American people with nearly their whole force and soul into a world war against Germany and her allies? Who can say that, even after the lessons of the World War, an American crusade against Mexico, for so it would be represented, would not start a world conflagration on an even worse scale? For the States of South America, or some of them at any rate, would be sympathetic to Mexico. It would be represented to them that their turn would come next, that Uncle Sam intended to dominate completely—politically, economically, and financially—the whole of the two American continents. Japan might feel herself at liberty to supply arms, or, at any rate, to endeavour to continue to trade with the Mexicans. There would be friction caused by the action of the American blockading cruisers against Japanese gun-runners or even ordinary merchantmen. The Japanese Elder Statesmen in secret conclave might decide that Japan's hour of destiny had struck. But before any overt move, the sup-

port of China and Russia would have been made certain. A Russian mobilisation would be answered by a mobilisation in Poland, Roumania, and, in fact, by all Russia's neighbours. There are plenty of discontented people in Europe, and two of them, at any rate, have, in the past, been warlike and are still proud and resentful—I refer to Germany and Hungary. Before the five years were up, which at the very least would be required to pacify all Mexico, the whole world might be in a blaze again.

Now turn for a moment to the Continent of South America. There is one very happy situation. Chile and the Argentine, after many wars, have decided that there is a better means of settling disputes than by force of arms. The dividing line of the Andes is nearly as peaceable to-day and as unlikely to see the march of contending armies or hear the whir of bombarding aeroplanes as the American-Canadian frontier. The great Statue of the Christ of the Andes has been erected to testify to the sanity of at least two Latin-American nations.

Chile is not so happy in her relations with Peru. The Tacna-Arica nitrate-bearing region has been a cause of quarrel between Chile and Peru for over forty years. The League of Nations, the President of the United States, direct negotiations, have alike failed to settle this pitiful squabble. Actual economic desires are added to all the appeals to national "honour," "prestige," "patriotism," "sacred rights," and flag-worship generally. The Chileans and Peruvians are similar in race, and they speak the same language. But both are so susceptible on this question that they will not even allow Bolivia to pay handsomely for the area and thus obtain her much desired access to the sea. If the

American continent can remain in peaceful equilibrium, actual fighting over its area may be avoided. But if the equilibrium of peace is upset by, for example, an American crusade into Mexico, Chile and Peru would very probably be at each other's throats in a fortnight, Bolivia standing by to intervene on the side of whichever of the two nations would offer her sufficient of the territory of the other to enable her to reach the, hitherto misnamed, Pacific Ocean. On the other hand, a war between Chile and Peru, or a three-cornered fight between Chile and Peru and Bolivia, might be isolated as a leprosy-stricken district of India is sometimes isolated. But we can hardly expect Chile and Peru to listen to reason over this matter when they see the prospect of a new race in naval shipbuilding between Japan, America, and England ; when they observe more armed men in barracks in Europe than before the war, and when they hear of Signor Mussolini demanding five million Italian soldiers and sufficient war aeroplanes to darken the sun ! Only pressure of world resolution for peace can keep the peace in South America ; and that world resolution, if it exists, is not at present articulate.

CHAPTER VII

WHY AN ANGLO-AMERICAN WAR IS POSSIBLE

Approach to a state of war always gradual—The example of England and Germany—Anti-British feeling in America—The “unthinkable” war—The “war to end war” and the aftermath—Superiority and inferiority complexes—Attitude of “the City”—The British working classes—The illusion of a common language—Position of the British Admiralty—Economic war—Propaganda for war.

THE key to world peace is friendship between Great Britain and the United States of America. Will this friendship be endangered? And how can it be preserved?

War between two great civilised nations does not break out suddenly. It is the result of a state of nervous tension, irritation, and fear in the minds of the inhabitants of the potential enemy nations. First there is a growing accumulation of fear and resentment, the atmosphere becomes explosive and a tiny spark explodes it. The last Great War, so far as France and Germany were concerned, was one of the periodic explosions of enmity between the two neighbours on each side of the Rhine. England's irritation with Germany can be traced to about the year 1897, and probably began with Germany's openly expressed sympathy with the Boers during the Boer War. Then there was Germany's demand for expansion, a demand for a front place in the ranks of the very foremost Powers of the world; and, above all, the building up of her navy.

By 1912 the situation was ripe for war between England and Germany. By great efforts the explosion was averted until 1914. The first steps in the working

up of a similar state of feeling between England and America commenced soon after the Armistice. It was checked by the Washington Naval Convention of 1921, but the feeling between the two great English-speaking democracies began to worsen again after the partial failure of the Geneva Naval Disarmament Conference of 1927.

And behind the creation of this international feeling leading to the outbreak of war lies ever one emotion—fear. Fear of what? Fear of war. If we were all afraid of being murdered in civil life we should all carry revolvers, and sooner or later we should draw them and shoot.

Anglo-American friendship has formed the subject of innumerable perorations, especially in London. At the unveiling of memorial stones on the legendary sites of the emigration of the Pilgrim Fathers, or the uncovering of statues in England to American statesmen, or on the visits of parties of lawyers or medical students or hotel-keepers from the United States to England, and at banquets attended by the American Ambassador, high-flown sentiments about blood being thicker than water, hands across the Atlantic, and so on, are given vent to.

In eastern cities of the United States, the visits of British notables, or minor royalties, are made the occasion for corresponding effusions. The realist will admit that more of it is heard in England than in America. There is a good deal of hostile feeling, the one people for the other, in each country. In the Middle West suspicion of England can still be made an election issue. A popular and energetic Mayor of Chicago is credited with having received his majority in the election in the spring of 1927 by denouncing the King of England and assuring the citizens that he, the would-be mayor, would

never be King George's lackey. English and American statesmen of the highest ranks are never tired of proclaiming to the world that war between England and America is unthinkable, and would mean the death-blow of civilisation. They are right as to the effects, but it would be foolish to suppose that they are absolutely right about the unthinkability of war between the two English-speaking democracies.

Fifteen years ago, German and American statesmen were able to say that war between the two peoples would be unthinkable. But, after America had done some thinking about war with Germany, she intervened in the struggle against the Central Powers to some purpose, and fought Germany as hard as she could in spite of the formidable difficulties of transporting her armies to Europe. The gusto with which the American people threw themselves into that war was a delightful surprise for the Allies, and a less pleasant surprise for the enemy. This in spite of the millions of Americans of pure German descent, scores of thousands of whom could not even speak the English language.

Students of international affairs should take note of the ease with which a modern democracy can be stamped into the state of mind that sets it shouting for war. Furthermore, America was too late in the war to suffer very materially. Her actual losses in men killed and wounded were comparatively light. There has, fortunately, been a great revulsion of feeling against war in the United States, and a shrinking from further embroilment in the affairs of Europe.

The great majority of the American people believed that their participation in the World War was a crusade against war itself. This belief was the compensation for the excesses and brutalities of the war itself.

If the American statesmen, headed by the late President Wilson, who attended the Peace Conference had been able to bring about a lasting peace, and the general disarmament, actual and spiritual, of the world, the cost would have been counted light. But after the sacrifices, material and moral, the pouring out of American treasure, and the squandering of her resources, Europe is seen again as an armed camp with more soldiers actually in uniform in the year 1927 than in the year 1913.

The new States relieved from subjugation by Germany, Austria, and Russia are more bellicose, more nationalistic, more selfish, than the Powers from whom they have broken away. The old Austro-Hungarian Empire had, at any rate, certain advantages. It comprised a great area inhabited by widely differing races where there was complete freedom of trade and communications between the component parts. Now artificial tariff walls are erected between Hungary and Austria, between Czecho-Slovakia and the former Austrian territories incorporated in the State of Yugoslavia. The old game of alliances and counter-alliances, ententes and little ententes, secret diplomacy, balance of power, espionage, and preparations for war goes merrily on. Impoverished nations, unable to pay their debts, overtaxed, bitter and suspicious, maintain armies, navies, and air forces far beyond their means, and erect fiscal impediments in the way of normal and honest trade. All this is noted in America, as is the persecution of racial and religious minorities and the general bestiality of the European reaction.

America, therefore, feels a general disgust at the welter of European Nationalism, and demands repayment of the moneys lent—amongst other reasons, in order

that surplus revenues shall not be spent on still more armaments.

The European nations, on the other hand, resent the supposed superiority complex of the United States, hate her for demanding repayment of the debts, and are jealous of her wealth and material prosperity. Is what I say doubted? Ask any American tourist or business man who knows Europe. If events move in the next ten years as they have moved in the last nine years, England will stand at the head of an unofficial European federation, a federation only of mutual mistrust and disappointment with America. The British official attitude towards America is not only correct; it is almost sycophantic. To please America, England renounced her treaty with Japan, a treaty which had stood her in good stead and had proved of great value. England pays her £33,000,000 a year in cash to America as interest and amortisation on the debt, but privately, and sometimes publicly, resents the payment, in spite of the good effect on her credit. England, in all her acts, whether in China, Egypt, or Mesopotamia, keeps an eye on American public opinion. The official Press messages are addressed as much to the American public as to the British public.

In the pathetic attempt made by the British Conservative Government to stem back the tide of Chinese Nationalism by the despatch of a couple of divisions of troops, strenuous efforts were made to involve the United States. This attempt to carry America with her in China is only another expression of a policy which, for quite worthy motives, aimed at inducing America to become a member of the League of Nations. When the English newspaper, with the largest circulation and probably the greatest individual influence, began to attack America in its columns, just as it had attacked Germany before the

war, and France at the beginning of the century, official influence was brought to bear on its owner, who, hurriedly, over his own signature, wrote an article in another of his newspapers denouncing the criticism and praising the United States. The successful Editor, with great prestige in British journalism, who had initiated the attacks on America, was dismissed, and it was hoped the incident was forgotten. But now the attacks have begun again. "Let the eagle scream," say the hack writers in London, and are answered by their brothers of the pen in the States.

Let me analyse one section of public opinion in England towards America. The "City," the former financial centre of the world, sees the lead taken by Wall Street. It is a bitter blow to the pride of the formerly all-powerful British financial interests when the British colonial Governments go to New York to raise money by loans on excellent security at a good rate of interest. It was a terrible experience to make every effort and sacrifice to bring the British pound sterling to parity with the dollar. The nation which has been a creditor finds it hard to occupy the rôle of debtor. It is just as if one of the great English territorial families, whose wealth and influence in a county has been unquestioned, finds itself overshadowed and its pride of place humbled by a wealthier newcomer into the district. I am here describing the real feelings towards America of many of the English financiers, stockbrokers, company promoters, and business men generally.

Does anyone doubt? Let me instance the profound satisfaction in certain circles at the resentment in America at the artificial raising of the price of raw rubber by the restriction policy. Some Englishmen went about rubbing their hands, quoting the American protests, and boasting

that the tribute we were extracting through our control of the rubber supplies more than paid a year's instalment on the debt.

And the British working classes. These, at the present time, are the most pacifist in Europe. They are thoroughly disillusioned with war for the time being, and until a new generation has grown up that knows not its disgust and horror the mass of the people will not be easily stampeded into another one.

But they are being subjected to a continual propaganda in favour of war as an institution and under certain circumstances. This propaganda is not specially directed against the United States—as yet. Though there are hints of it already.

England's financial position was terribly shaken when America intervened. Her people were becoming war-weary, her losses had been terrific, and she was experiencing great difficulties caused by the German submarine campaign. It is true that the highest point of losses by German submarine action had been reached and passed before the American effort was felt. It is true that the British counter-submarine measures had achieved a large degree of success, and that we were able to hold the German campaign in check. But the losses of ships and the cargoes they carried had been so terrific that even a continuance of the reduced sinkings by mine and torpedo would have crippled our efforts without some outside assistance.

I am speaking here from exact knowledge, as one who played some part in the conduct of the anti-submarine campaign, and who was in the inner councils of the Admiralty War Staff when the first American assistance was offered and sent. If America had finally decided against intervention, the prospects before all

the warring peoples of a long-drawn-out, interminable struggle would have made the movement for an agreed peace irresistible. There would have been no "throwing up the sponge" on either side. But the unofficial peace pourparlers, which continued intermittently right through 1915 and 1916, would have continued steadily with eventual success. And the curious thing about warring nations is that, while immediately grateful for allied assistance, they presently resent it. England's assistance to France, for example, was acclaimed with joy by all Frenchmen at the time, but afterwards became such a sense of grievance that at the end of the war the actual relations between the French and British soldiers and the French and British peoples were strained.

Frenchmen to-day, observing the havoc in their country, blame England for not having made clear her position before the outbreak of the war and for not being in a state of preparedness to send a great army immediately. In exactly the same way many in England blame America for not having intervened sooner and before so much damage was caused. And all history shows that the alliance or association in war of any two nations does not seal their friendship for ever. On the whole it tends to cause future enmity.

The feelings of hostility or mistrust or fear or jealousy between the British and American peoples is latent and only consciously felt by a minority in each country. Given the appropriate atmosphere and, following some years of naval rivalry and bickerings about debts and reparations, these feelings of hostility will become active and will spread. And this in spite of the common sense of the great mass of the British and American publics and the desire of the best of their leaders to maintain the friendliest of relations. Of this we may be sure : in the present state

of world opinion about war as a legality it would be foolish to rely on sentiment alone to keep the peace for ever between the British Empire and the United States of America. Any such ostrich-like policy would be a disservice to the great cause of world peace. The proceedings of the first month of the Geneva Naval Conference in June, 1927, should alone be sufficient warning.

"Ah," it will be said, "but what about the tie of a common language?" Unfortunately the Esperantists and other propagandists of a universal language are "ahead of the band." In the present stage of development of the human mind, the speaking of a common language does not necessarily mean a common friendship. The Spanish spoken in Chile and the Spanish spoken in Peru and the Argentine differ less from each other than the English spoken in the stockyards of Chicago and the English spoken in the East End of London. But the Chileans, the Argentines, and the Peruvians have not been prevented from fighting each other at intervals by the fact that they speak the same language. The Prussians and Austrians speak German. But Prussia fought and defeated Austria in 1866, and the story is told that when in 1914 the aged Emperor of Austria had the news broken to him about a fortnight after mobilisation that his country was at war, he answered, "Oh yes, I know all about it"; and when the ministers charged with the duty of breaking the news to His Apostolic Majesty continued, "Yes, sire, but do you know whom we are fighting?" the old Imperialist answered: "Of course; we are fighting those dirty Prussians." And the petty feudal states of Europe fought each other through the centuries, though the official and ecclesiastic language of spoken Latin

was the common means of communication between them.

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Now a word as to the British Admiralty. It is necessary to understand the position of this powerful and deeply entrenched Government department. The Board of Admiralty fulfils the functions in commission of the Lord High Admiral of England. For three hundred years the English people have been schooled by a ceaseless propaganda into believing that their future lies upon the waters, that their bread and butter depends upon sea power, and that only by an overwhelming Navy can the prosperity, the power, and the very existence of the British Empire be maintained. So long as war is a legal process and the ultimate means of settling disputes between peoples, this doctrine is sound. Any nation threatening British hegemony at sea has incurred the hostility of the British ruling class, and their lead has been followed by the British people. Spain, Holland, France, Germany, each in turn threatened British sea power, and each in turn was fought and overthrown.

In the periods of reaction after every war the Admiralty has been hard put to it to extract the necessary money from a depleted Treasury to maintain an overwhelmingly strong Navy. In order to wring credits from Parliament, it has been necessary to point to a bogey, a menace to Britain's sea power. At the beginning of this century, France ; yesterday, Germany ; to-day, whom ?

In the years immediately following the Armistice the British Admiralty automatically indicated America, the next strongest sea Power, as the potential enemy, just as they tend to indicate America again to-day. Now,

the policy of the British Admiralty is simplicity itself. It is to maintain a Navy, with the requisite fortified harbours and bases, of such strength as to be able to overbear any rival. The corporative mind of the Board of Admiralty chose America to fill the rôle of sea rival. But the more complex corporate mentality of the Council of the Empire as a whole overbore the Board of Admiralty, and the soft pedal was applied to the Admiralty propaganda. It needed the whole efforts, nevertheless, of the British Government of the day to force the Admiralty to attend at all at the Washington Conference of 1921. It must be realised that the Board of Admiralty is normally able to force its will upon any British Government. In recent years it forced its own shipbuilding policy upon the reluctant Government of Ramsay MacDonald, the first Socialist Government in England. The Board of Admiralty knows not party politics, and when an overwhelming Conservative majority, under Mr. Baldwin, took the place of the Labour Government, it coerced that Government in council and inflicted a defeat on the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Winston Churchill, the most powerful individual Minister in British political life, in the Cabinet councils.

After a bitter struggle the British Board of Admiralty forced a shipbuilding programme on the strongest Conservative Government in history, costing a sum of money which the Exchequer could not afford and the taxpayers resented. America was not openly paraded as the naval bogey until the abortive Naval Conference at Geneva in 1927. Japan was made to fill the rôle. The Washington Conference in 1921 was successful in limiting the building of battleships. In any case, there was a growing school in every navy doubtful of the useful-

ness of the modern great battleship. But the admirals retained a free hand in cruiser building. And the modern 10,000-ton cruiser, of great speed, and with a powerful armament, has become the new standard warship. Naval strength to-day is measured in terms of modern cruisers. And the British naval shipbuilding programme of cruisers was raising the British Fleet to its old position of predominance. The American people, for the first time in their history, are demanding a Navy equal to that of any other Power. As the British governing class is determined that the British Fleet shall be predominant, we have here the seeds of a new race in naval armaments. And nothing is so pregnant with bitterness, suspicion, and presently the atmosphere in which war is born than naval shipbuilding rivalry. Already British "navalism" after the last war is being compared to German militarism before it.

And the economic war goes on continuously. Britain's monopoly of rubber and, to a certain extent, of edible fats from the tropics, is balanced by American predominance in oil. The American Government, despite the avowed policy of the American people of a return to isolation, insisted on a participation in the supposed oil reserves of Mesopotamia. The recent outcry in England against American cinematograph films is another symptom. The Federation of British Industries, an extremely powerful unofficial corporation of manufacturers and financiers, complains bitterly that American films spread American ideas, and therefore the demand for American goods, in the British colonies, and demands reprisals and the fostering of a British film industry to take the place of the American film monopoly.

The subtle propaganda and suggestion in favour of war continues in both countries. Not a propaganda for

war against each other at this stage, but a glorification of war as war, and of militarism as militarism. The school-books in England and America both teach history in terms of glorious victories on the field or at sea. That this school-teaching bears fruit, the Mayor of Chicago's election is proof positive. Military tournaments, naval reviews, parades of troops, are becoming popular again in England. The annual Aerial Pageant, staged by the Air Force, near London, is becoming a great national festival. It always winds up with a mimic battle in which dummy towns are blown to pieces by real bombs dropped by war aeroplanes. This part of the spectacle is the most popular with the crowd. True, there have been a few cinematograph films showing the horrors of war; and one film advertising the League of Nations. But they are not so popular as frankly propagandist films produced in England with the assistance of the British War Office and Admiralty glorifying war. Whilst British statesmen prate of peace, £115,000,000 a year, far more than the taxpayers can afford, is spent on armaments.

I have only touched the fringe of the subject in this chapter; but can any fair-minded person, viewing the facts of the situation calmly and clearly, dare to prophesy that another great war is impossible or even improbable? There are only three nations *to-day* in a position to wage war on the grand scale, and these three nations are the British Empire, the United States of America, and the Japanese Empire. And by far the most powerful are the British Empire and the United States of America. And because of their wealth, their power, and their pride, and because of the insatiable appetite of their industries for the limited raw materials of the world, there would be danger of war between them in any case in the present state of society.

Both peoples are suffering from war-weariness and the disillusionment of war, but these feelings are passing; and all the time the propaganda and suggestion glorifying and praising war continues. The school-books, newspapers, the cinematographs, the more irresponsible of the politicians on both sides of the Atlantic, all help to prepare the coming generation for another struggle. If the strong peace parties, which undoubtedly exist in the two countries, were in a majority they would be able to reverse the direction of the general propaganda in favour of peace. The danger of war is so great and the cost of it so devastating, that all the efforts of all the publicists and leaders, priests and educationalists, playwrights and journalists in the two countries, should be devoted to preaching peace. For there is room in the world for two great peoples.

Peace is not being preached. War is being glorified and its legality and justification accepted as a matter of course. And until the very idea of war is regarded with the same horror as murder or rape, the danger of its outbreak, even between the two most advanced and powerful nations in the world, will be with us.

And yet in the mass the British and American peoples do not want war with anyone, least of all with each other. The private citizens in both the great democracies wish to be left alone to get on with their daily business. They want to see their respective countries great and powerful—but powerful for good. Has not the hour arrived in which to mobilise these two great masses of harmless, peace-loving opinion for the securing of a permanent peace between the two English-speaking peoples? And such peace would ensure the peace of all other nations.

CHAPTER VIII

THE UNITED STATES *VERSUS* THE BRITISH EMPIRE : PROBABLE COURSE OF A WAR

The search for allies—Naval bases—Canada's attitude—Singapore and Jamaica—The Panama Canal—An Anglo-Japanese alliance—Overseas invasions—Attacks on trade—The Philippines—Coastal bombardments—Gas attacks—Mines—Unlikelihood of battle fleet action—When will the people awake?

LET me describe the probable course of a war between the British Empire and the United States of America. I admit such a war is less likely than many other probable wars of the future. But I explained its possibilities in the last chapter.

British diplomacy would be greatly at fault if Britain had no allies either in the West or the East. On the other hand, and this is all to the good, there are no signs of America's allies as yet. *Also, as yet, and this is why there is hope for the world, there are no visible signs of real preparations on either side of the Atlantic for war.* If the British Empire and America were each preparing for war *à outrance*, there would be certain definite signs. Thus, America would be seeking allies on the Continent of Europe at all costs, for to defeat Britain thoroughly at sea she would need bases in Europe; and I acquit American diplomacy of any such preparations.

Britain would take some steps to bring up to date and to fortify her American bases. I am not a member of the Committee of Imperial Defence, but I doubt very

much if plans for war between Britain and the United States have ever been seriously discussed by that ponderous body. Nor am I now a member of the Admiralty War Staff. But I know many of its present members, and the staff would be failing in its duty if it did not thoroughly examine the plans of campaign for an Anglo-American war. That is its business. It is absurd for the British Admiralty to be spending £60,000,000 a year on a Navy unless it is prepared with plans for its use, even against improbable enemies. The abstract art of strategy knows no politics; it would demand certain preparations. It would be good strategy, for example, not to take any means of defence for the Canadian border because of the answering preparations that would be made on the American side. Also such preparations might be taken as a *casus belli*. The same applies to the British bases on the American side of the Atlantic.

What would be the attitude of Canada in the event of an Anglo-American contest it is useless to attempt to prophesy, in spite of the bellowings of the Jingoës. Canada would serve humanity and the British Empire alike by trying to stop it. But Great Britain has minor bases, established during the French wars and inherited from the reign of Queen Victoria the Good, on the American continent. On the west coast of Canada is the small naval dockyard of Vancouver. On the east are Halifax (Nova Scotia), Bermuda, and Jamaica. Vancouver, Halifax, and Bermuda serve the needs of the present small cruiser forces employed in showing the flag and in carrying out the very pleasant and largely social duties of the British Navy in peace time on such stations. Jamaica has been dismantled.

If all agreement for the limitation of naval armaments breaks down, if the Washington Agreement is

not renewed, if a naval shipbuilding race commences between the British and American Navies, it would be perfectly logical, and there would be no just grounds for complaint, if Jamaica were re-established as a great naval dockyard and arsenal. Yet it is so far inside the orbit of the American Navy that it could only be held at very great cost. Halifax and Bermuda would be more defensible; but Halifax, as well as Bermuda, if prepared for modern naval needs would cause the Canadian people to think very furiously. The fortification of Jamaica and its preparation to receive a British battle fleet would set public opinion in America ablaze. For a strong British naval force at Jamaica is a real threat to the Panama Canal.

Yet why should the American people complain? Let us be honest with each other.

The great British *place d'armes* of Singapore is being enlarged, modernised, and provided with docks designed to receive the largest battleships and battle cruisers under the British flag. Its final cost will be £7,000,000, apart from the expenditure by the War Office in providing barracks for more soldiers and batteries of artillery for the land defences, and the expenditure of the Air Force in providing the usual aerial equipment of a modern fortress. This grandiose project is to serve one purpose only; it is to accommodate a British battle fleet for the eventuality of war against Japan. This the Japanese understand, the Americans understand, and all the world realises quite clearly. The Japanese people are furious and fearful at the same time. The work was commenced by the Conservative Government which sat in power at Westminster from 1922 to 1923. On a Labour Government assuming office the following year, the work was stopped. There was much Conservative

indignation, and a hot debate in Parliament, but Labour, supported by the Liberals, persisted in this reversal of policy. The Labour Government having fallen, the Conservative Government took office in the winter of 1924 and immediately recommenced this work at Singapore.

The British Admiralty would be equally justified in asking for £10,000,000 of credits to recondition the Jamaica dockyard, and enlarge it for the accommodation of a British battle fleet in the eventuality of war between England and America. The Americans would, of course, object.

Yet we have as much right to modernise Jamaica as to enlarge Singapore. The United States are bound to Britain by no closer ties than Japan. Japan was Britain's ally in the war. America was Britain's associate. Japan is a member of the League of Nations. America is not. Taking the purely logical standpoint there is no reason why Britain should fear a war with either Japan or America. If the civilised peoples were logical, war would have been abolished long ago with duelling, the vendetta, and the feudal system. But the British people are told by their rulers to fear American naval parity or superiority at sea. And the British spend £7,000,000 or more on Singapore in case of a Pacific war.

If after 1931 there is no renewal of the Washington Treaty of 1921, the world will accept the possibility of an Anglo-American war.

In the event of such a war, the attitude of Japan would be doubtful. A successful descent on the Panama Canal would destroy the mobility of the American fleet. Attacked on the east by Britain and threatened on the west by the Japanese, the American strategical position would be hazardous.

The State Department at Washington would be per-

fectly justified from its own point of view in addressing the strongest diplomatic protest against British action at Jamaica similar to British action at Singapore. What representations have been made privately by the Japanese Government to the British Government on the question of Singapore, I do not pretend to know. But there is no doubt at all about Japanese national feeling on the matter. The Japanese argument is that Japan was quite faithful to the Anglo-Japanese alliance while it lasted and entered the war against Germany, though Japan had no direct quarrel with the German people. The Japanese rendered very great services to the British Empire during the war, their whole attitude since has been perfectly friendly, they have deliberately abandoned their demands for the admission of Japanese nationals to the Australian continent, they have been quite correct in all their proceedings in Asia where Britain is concerned, and yet the British answer is to spend between £7,000,000 and £8,000,000 on the Singapore base out of an original estimate of £11,000,000 for naval work alone.

At Geneva in the summer of 1927 the question of naval bases was not allowed to appear on the agenda. Singapore was not discussed. Where England and America are concerned, the question of Jamaica is not different in its nature to the building up of the British Fleet itself. If agreement for future ratios of naval strength between Britain and America is not reached, and if the Washington Treaty of 1921 is not renewed in 1932, the American people would have no logical reason to complain if the British Admiralty succeeded in extracting credits from the British Government for warlike preparations at Kingston, Jamaica.

Jamaica has been British territory since 1655. We

have every right to do what we like on our own territory. Under the Washington Treaty, limits were set to the establishment of new fortified bases in certain areas. But Jamaica is not a new base. It and Halifax have come down to us from the Napoleonic wars. We should have as much right to bring them up to date as we have to install the latest geared turbine engines or internal combustion machinery in our new cruisers.

The public of the countries concerned, and the politicians they elect, refuse to face naked facts. The nations go on arming, but they will not face the ultimate results if the arming continues. We muddle and drift and blunder on and hope for the best. We shall get the worst.

Let us face the recognisable possibility of an Anglo-American struggle. The object of Washington and London alike would be to bring such pressure to bear on the opposing Government as to compel it to sue for peace. The loss of the whole of Canada would not bring such pressure to bear upon the British people. Nor would the loss of the British West Indian possessions inflict any vital injury to the British Empire. On the other hand, successful British naval action in the Caribbean and the destruction of the Panama Canal would inflict a heavy blow at the American strategical position and might decide the attitude of Japan.

It is awful to think of an Anglo-Japanese alliance against America, but we *must* think about it. If the British Empire was fighting with its back to the wall, it would welcome allies in any part of the world. Racial prejudice would not make us hesitate for a moment. Has not France her negro battalions on the Rhine in 1927?

The Paris *Temps* is supposed to represent the official view of the French Foreign Office. On July 18th, 1927,

during the "Coolidge" Naval Conference, the *Temps* commented as follows :

"We are justified in thinking that Geneva has completely reversed the situation created at Washington in 1921, and that the first signs are now perceptible of a political *rapprochement* between England and Japan. At the Washington Conference of 1921, Great Britain acted with the United States against Japan and made a sacrifice of the Anglo-Japanese alliance to enter upon more friendly relations with the United States. To-day Great Britain and Japan are found side by side in an agreement which is opposed by the United States, and in conditions which can easily be recognised as the first symptoms of an Anglo-Japanese political *rapprochement*."

These opinions of the *Temps* were printed in the British newspapers without protest or comment, with the exception of a disclaimer two days later by the Liberal *Manchester Guardian*. Alliances, ententes, *rapprochements*, are, unfortunately, in the present state of the world, aimed against someone. There is little doubt as to the third party in this case.

England and Japan between them could inflict a defeat on the American Navy and occupy the canal zone, could institute a distant blockade of the American coasts, and hold up all American commerce. America would retaliate by getting as many of her cruisers and her submarines on to the trade routes as possible. If Canada were willing, Britain and Japan could send large armies to be landed on Canadian soil to invade the Union. Such would be, very briefly, the course of a war

in which Japan and England were allied against America. That war would spread to half the world. It would mean the end of civilisation and the ruin of human culture.

Civilisation, as we know it, would crash.

But to return to a campaign between America and the British Empire alone. The invasion of Canada by America, or the alternative of a declaration of neutrality by the Canadian Dominion would not, I repeat, inflict vital injury on Britain. The raising, equipping, and landing of a great British army in Canada for the invasion of the Union would be such a lengthy process, and the limitations of shipping so definite, even with the complete defeat of the American Navy, that the American people could put a greater force into the field than any British land force brought against her by way of Canada. We may rule out, therefore, the invasion of the United States by land, *unless Britain has powerful military allies*. The equipment of a modern army is so great, and the tonnage required so immense, that we may also rule out the sending of an American Expeditionary Force to land in the British Isles. Air attacks from Canada may be expected by the citizens of all the northern states of the Union.

Landings of modern armies on hostile territory where they can be opposed by present-day artillery and aircraft can be written off altogether. I refer to attempted invasions of thickly populated and highly organised modern states from the sea.

If the American Expeditionary Force against Germany had had the task of landing on German soil in face of active opposing forces, it would never have been sent. I am not speaking of mere raids. Decisions in war are reached by large-scale invasions, including air invasions, or by blockade.

Therefore we should have the curious position of neither side being able to take effective military action against the other. The British possessions in America would fall or resist ineffectually by waging guerilla warfare, or secede from the Empire. Britain might make a successful descent on the Philippine Islands or Hawaii. But the campaign would be decided by fighting at sea. For if the British Navy were totally defeated, Britain could be blockaded and brought to her knees in the end.

Failing such defeat and given an ascendancy, the course open to the British General Staff would be the suppression of American seaborne trade at sea and a long-drawn-out war of attrition. I am presuming a war between the British and American peoples, neither having active allies. A purely naval war between Britain and America has been fought before. Let us suppose that, perhaps by mutual consent, Canada kept out of it. With the two navies approximately equal, Britain could hardly hope to retain her West Indian bases as points of assembly for her battle fleet. But the power of defence against a fleet has increased in recent years. In the Russo-Japanese War at the beginning of the present century the Russian fortress of Port Arthur was reduced after a long and costly siege from the land side. In the last war a direct attack by the British Fleet on the Dardanelles was ineffective, and a large army had to be landed to reduce the Turkish forts. No attempt was made by the overwhelmingly strong Allied navies, even after the intervention of America had vastly increased their naval strength, to attack Heligoland, the Kiel Canal, or any of the German coast towns or ports. Navies alone can do little by direct attack. Some sporadic bombardment was done by means of aeroplanes, and there were a few bombardments by the German

battle cruisers of minor fortified positions on the East Coast of England. But warships are outmatched by strong land batteries. Kingston, Jamaica, if scientifically defended by minefields, an active local defence force, by long-range artillery and aeroplanes, could hold out for some time. America would be bound to undertake its reduction, as otherwise it would serve as an important cruiser base from which the British submarines and even the fast surface cruisers could operate to harass American shipping in the Caribbean. Furthermore, in case the battle fleets fought an action and the British obtained the advantage, giving them effective command of the sea, Jamaica could then be used as a jumping-off place from which to attack the Panama Canal. Jamaica would therefore first be masked and presently reduced. The only result of previous fortification and preparation of the defence would be to delay the fall of the island and to inflict losses on the attackers.

The British would retaliate by an attack on the Philippines. For this purpose, supposing that the British naval dispositions were approximately as they are now, the English Mediterranean Fleet would be moved east to Singapore, and, presently picking up troops from India and Hong-Kong, would attempt an invasion of the Philippines. Hong Kong would be the main base for such an expedition, and a subsidiary base would be established in British North Borneo.

The American Naval Department would then be faced with the following problem : an American battle fleet of such strength as to be able to defeat the British invading force could pass through the Panama Canal and proceed by way of Honolulu and Guam to the Philippines. If it arrived before the British Expeditionary Force, it would make invasion impossible. In fact, a fleet in being, not

necessarily so strong as the British Mediterranean Fleet, based on Manila, could prevent the subjection of the Philippine Archipelago so long as it remained undefeated. But this would mean a division of forces and weaken the American fleet in the Atlantic. Yet it is the American Atlantic Fleet which will be required to reduce Jamaica and the other British West Indian islands.

Sound strategy would be to leave the defence of the Philippines to a powerful flotilla of destroyers and submarines aided by aircraft, in the same way as the British would leave Jamaica to be defended by similar weapons. The American flotilla would cause great loss to the British, and would at any rate delay the fall of the Philippines for some time. And the loss of the Philippines, temporarily, at any rate, would not strike a vital blow at America or even at her prestige. The Philippines, in a purely maritime war of the United States against the British Empire, would be most useful as a base for commerce raiders, surface and submarine. The American battle fleet could not, on the other hand, accomplish much by demonstrations against the British Islands themselves. An American invasion, overseas, of England is quite out of the question under modern conditions, and so, as I have mentioned above, is an invasion of the American seaboard by the English alone.

There would be plenty of raiding and bombardments of coast towns. The modern submarines, for example, can even now carry twelve-inch guns, firing a shell of 900 pounds' weight a distance of fifteen miles. New York, Baltimore, Boston, Charleston, Portland, Atlantic City, etc., could be shelled from the sea. Such bombardments would cause heavy loss of life, destruction of property, and dislocation of business. For the shells would contain poison gases. There are, of course, inter-

national conventions against the bombardment of open towns, but New York and Boston are technically fortified, and, once war has started, treaties and conventions are torn up, as the events of 1914 to 1918 showed plainly enough. The American Pacific coast would be free from such visitations, supposing always that neither Mexico nor Canada were available to provide British naval bases.

We also have submarine mine-layers, and they were used freely in the last war. These can proceed at night and sow their moored mines under water off enemy ports, and whatever strikes them, whether warship or peaceable merchantman, and whatever flag the vessel is sailing under, will explode them.

Again, submarines can be fitted with cylinders carrying poison gas to be released in death-dealing clouds a few miles from shore, with the wind blowing from the sea towards the coast. Such action would bring reprisals, and no sooner had the inhabitants of Liverpool ceased to rejoice because perhaps 30,000 people were suffocated in their sleep on Manhattan Island than they would be favoured with a similar visitation, poison gases from the American submarines being blown into the Mersey and killing them in their beds.

Gas attacks on coast towns by submarines would be very terrible, but the only departure from the present practice of war would be in their novelty. For it is no more immoral to discharge gas clouds from submarines than to drop high-explosive bombs by aeroplanes or throw high-explosive shells from the cannon of warships. In the last war the Germans employed these two latter methods against great cities, and so did the Allies against the Germans whenever and wherever they could. If the war had lasted a few months longer, great air raids

would have taken place on Berlin. The plans were all cut and dried and the material prepared. American pilots would have taken part in them, and a large proportion of the aeroplanes would have been driven by American Liberty engines. Gas shells and bombs will be used if they promise greater damage than high explosives. High explosive and poison gas are both products of the chemist's brain. The mother whose baby is killed by poison gases will be as much to be pitied, whether the gas is from the shell of a warship, the bomb of an aeroplane, or the cylinder of the submarine.

Such attacks will have no real effect on the course of the war, owing to the great area of the United States and her distance from a possible enemy of like power. Germany, France, Italy, England, could be brought to their knees, according to Marshal Foch, by air attack on their civil population. Not so America in the present stage of development of war and air technique. However terrible the sufferings of the coastal dwellers of the Union, the blow struck would not be vital. The sinking of the *Lusitania* was a terrible event, but it did not strike terror into the hearts of the English or American people. It only spurred them to greater efforts, and was one of the acts that brought America into the war. The war would be less intensive but of longer duration and the cumulative loss and damage crippling.

It is extremely unlikely that the opposing battle fleets would ever meet. The modern battleship is so costly, and yet so vulnerable in face of the weapons that can be used against her, that the tendency is to keep her in cotton-wool. If the American battleships and the British battleships could meet by pre-arrangement in the middle of the Atlantic and fight a pitched battle, a speedier conclusion would be reached, though the attacks on

trade would continue. That is not the way war is conducted. And it would be altogether against strategical experience and the teaching of recent history if such a battle took place.

Both sides would desire to preserve their battle fleets, hoping for the intervention of allies or for the transformation of the campaign in such a way that they could be used effectively. The British Dreadnoughts would remain at Plymouth, the American Dreadnoughts at an Atlantic port. The British Mediterranean Fleet, transported to Chinese waters and making use of British bases in the Far East, would do what damage it could to the Philippines. The American Atlantic Fleet would keep the ring for the American cruisers and flotillas setting about the reduction of Jamaica. The British Battle Fleet at Plymouth would act as a backing for the British cruisers, surface and submarine, on the Atlantic trade routes.

The real campaign of the war would resolve itself into mutual attacks on shipping. I am still discussing such a war with Canada neutral. Both nations would build feverishly; but it takes two and a half years at least to complete a battleship or battle cruiser, eighteen months to build a fast light cruiser, and a year or more to build a submarine. The Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean would be the only seas in which British merchant ships could ply their trade without fear of cruiser attack. Hawaii could be used by the Americans as a cruiser base from which to attack British trade in the South Pacific, and Guam would be used, together with Manila, for attack on the British trade in the China Seas. The British trade with Canada would be conducted by convoys, and the convoys would be liable to attack from the naval bases on the American-Atlantic

seaboard. If the two great English-speaking peoples alone remained as combatants, the naval war would drag on with immense losses of shipping and the general hampering of the commerce of both combatants. And during such a long campaign of exhaustion many things could happen, including the intervention of other Powers. If half the world was not fighting before a year was out, it would be a miracle.

I have already referred to the position of Canada in the terrible event of an Anglo-American war. Canada, for all practical purposes, is an independent nation, and would not be bound to intervene. She certainly would not throw in her lot automatically ; and every responsible Canadian would insist on Canada's action, whatever it was, being taken of her own free will.

So strong a part does sentiment play in such matters that the great majority of Canadians would probably decide for immediate intervention on the side of the Mother Country.

Yet this would mean a terrible war on Canadian soil. Automatically the Americans would invade Canada, and Britain, fighting in both the Pacific and Atlantic, would forego other naval campaigns, including colonial raids and trade attacks, so as to permit the throwing of as many British troops and aeroplanes from all parts of the Empire on to Canadian soil in as short a time as possible.

Yet without the assistance of Japan a counter-invasion of the United States would be impracticable owing to the strength, resources, and population of the Union. With Japanese assistance it could be done, and Japan taking part in the war would mean that Indian troops could be used as well. For Britain could point to one Asiatic Power as her ally and need have no scruples or

doubts about using Indian soldiers also. But with or without the intervention of Japan, if Canada were invaded, a long-drawn-out and bloody land and aerial war would follow to add to the horrors of the naval campaigns. If the British and American peoples so far took leave of their senses as to support their Governments in making war on each other, the best thing that could happen would be to end such a war at the earliest possible moment. It would be better, therefore, for the fighting, if possible, to be confined to the navies and the colonies. For the benefit of humanity and the good of the peoples concerned, it would, on the whole, be better if Canada declared for neutrality. Such a declaration would limit the area of the struggle and make an earlier ending to it easier. Once Canada were in, the most appalling war in history would have commenced, beside which the World War of 1914 to 1918 would be far surpassed in moral horror, material loss, and human misery. The first reactions of the British or Canadian patriot would be for a war *à outrance*, all the British standing shoulder to shoulder as they did in the two last wars in which Britain was engaged. And whatever the result of such a war, it would be followed by a series of others as soon as new forces could be gathered together.

But there is something greater than nationalist patriotism ; and taking a long view, which is also a more humane view, it would, I repeat, be better for Canada to keep out. An Anglo-American war is terrible enough to think about. But we must think of it and face the fact of its possibility. For if this possibility does not exist, why compare the respective navies of America and Britain? What does it matter to Congressmen and Senators at Washington, and American publicists and political leaders generally, what size fleet the British

can dispose of? What does it matter to London, and to British Members of Parliament, hereditary Peers, Civil Servants, admirals, and journalists, how big a navy America has? Yet on both sides of the Atlantic the cries for "parity," "safety," "security," and "preparedness" rise to Heaven.

The reason is that war is still considered a legal and, in some circumstances, an unavoidable necessity. So long as that belief is allowed to remain unchallenged, and so long as war is represented as something glorious instead of what it is—unlimited murder—the British Empire and the United States of America, because of their potential strength, their wealth, and their pride, must face the possibility of a war to the death between them and the end of civilisation as both peoples know it.

I have said enough to give some forecast of the nightmare.

There is absolutely no single cause for difficulties or friction between the two great English-speaking peoples. But once the advocates of naval armaments begin talking on either side of the Atlantic of national prestige, national safety, and all the rest of it, anything may happen. There is nothing easier than to raise a scare about the Navy, either in Britain or in America. The greatest armies in the world have never scared either the British or the American peoples. Armies have to be transported, and in any case they are looked upon as the exclusive affair of nations on the mainland of Europe. True, when a Napoleon or a Kaiser or a Louis XIV. has grasped at European hegemony, the English, and, in the Kaiser's case, both the English and the American peoples, have beaten the Continental nations at raising field armies.

But both the British and American peoples refuse to

take armies seriously, *unless they are linked up with naval power.*

It is easy for self-appointed naval critics and soi-disant naval experts, who would be thoroughly seasick if they actually went to sea, to count ships, guns, torpedo tubes, and enlisted men, and to draw up comparative tables of naval strength. Not much impression is made by counting up regiments of infantrymen, battalions of tanks, batteries of artillery, or squadrons of cavalry. Nor are the numbers of armies so easily available. But to be able to point out that Britain has forty-nine modern cruisers as against fifteen owned by the United States, or that the guns in the British Dreadnought battleships shoot farther than the guns of their corresponding sisters in the American Fleet, is very effective.

When I joined the British Navy, France was our potential enemy. The first war scare I remember was raised against France as the ally of Russia. But things began to happen in England when the German Kaiser spoke of grasping the trident of Neptune, of challenging British sea power, and described himself as the "Admiral of the Atlantic." When Wilhelm II. told his people that their future lay upon the water, the whole British people woke up with a start. An entente followed with France, a political and military understanding with Russia, a new alliance was fixed up with Japan, the British fleets were recalled from the farther parts of the seas, naval bases were built to dominate the North Sea between Britain and Germany, feeling was embittered, and in 1914 the Great War came to plague all mankind.

The world has by no means recovered from the evil effects of that war. Yet with the streets of nearly every European capital filled with war cripples, and every belligerent, except America, burdened with debt, poli-

ticians in Washington urge the building of a great fleet against Britain, and politicians at Westminster quote their speeches, point to the American Naval Appropriations, and urge the building of yet more ships by the British.

The comparative failure of the Geneva Naval Conference of 1927 should startle all the peoples out of their slumber. Yet it was almost bound to fail. And that because it tried to tackle the problem of war from the wrong angle. Outlaw war, and the difficulties of Geneva, 1927, will solve themselves.

CHAPTER IX

THE ANCIENT FEUD ON THE RHINE

The ancient quarrel—Irritation of armies of occupation—No lasting enmity between British and Germans—Attempted alliance with Germany against Bolsheviks—The Treaty of Versailles—Election pledges—Fruits of war propaganda—England's difficult task—Weakness of Britain *vis-à-vis* France—Failure to keep evacuation promises—Business co-operation between France and Germany and other countries—French fear of German numbers—Position of Poland—German air service and chemical industries—Locarno—German colonies—Poincaré's Luneville speech—Germany's Eastern fortresses—The Polish Corridor—Anschluss—Position of Austria—Artificial barriers to trade—Weakness of League of Nations—Impossibility of confining outbreak of war—Or of Britain's neutrality.

FOR a thousand years the valley of the Rhine has been the rough dividing line between the Germanic tribes, unconquered, and therefore uninfluenced, by Rome, and the Gauls, who early came under Roman influence and were thoroughly Latinised. For more than a thousand years Gauls and Teutons have lived in a state of armed hostility towards each other. And every fifty or a hundred years during that long period war on a great scale has broken out between them. The Franco-German racial feud is the most ancient, tenacious, and damaging of all the tribal quarrels and rivalries that have distracted, and still distract, the Continent of Europe. It is unnecessary to go further into ancient history. The times we live in are tragic enough.

Germany, conquered by revolutionary France, had her revenge on the downfall of Napoleon. Germany fought and thoroughly defeated France in 1870, and

again overran the north of France in 1914. France, with the aid of England, America, Italy, Japan, and a number of small allies, defeated Germany and her associates at the end of the war, and France has been satiating herself with vengeance ever since.

All invading armies commit wrongs, and these wrongs are bitterly resented, whether they are the more violent acts of the occupying troops during a war, or the less violent, but nevertheless wounding, affronts put upon the civilian population by occupying troops in peace-time.

The English have never had any permanent racial hatred for Germany. Briton and Teuton are too much alike. And it is more satisfactory to do business with Germans than with most other foreigners. True, the civil population of England reacted to the war-time propaganda and emotions of the struggle, the air raids were a novel and terrifying experience, and the German threat to English sea power before, and, for that matter, during, the war, roused very deep passions and fears in the breasts of the British people. The soldiers at the Front and the sailors actually at sea felt no real resentment towards the Germans. The civilians thought and talked of the enemy as "Huns"; the Staff officers thought and talked of the enemy as "the Boche"; but the soldiers thought and talked of him as "Jerry," and the sailors as "Fritz." As for the English governing class, it was not worried as much by the Germans as by the French during the war, and especially in its later years; and the party favourable to armed intervention in Russia eagerly sought a form of alliance immediately after the Armistice with their nominal enemy, Germany, for the purpose of getting her assistance in a holy war against Bolshevism. Hardly had the rumbles of the last artillery salvoes died away in France than in the Black

Sea the British Navy was co-operating with the German armies of occupation in the Ukraine against the Bolsheviks, and the same uneasy alliance held between the unofficial armies of the German Baltic barons and the British naval forces in the Baltic against the new enemy, Russia. Germany herself formed an important link in the *cordon sanitaire* against Russia—Monsieur Clemenceau's chief contribution to the resettlement of Europe.

The more far-sighted English leaders tried to stem the tide of popular feeling against Germany directly after the Armistice. Mr. Lloyd George had played the most vigorous individual part in the prosecution of the war, and had raised himself to a personal position greater than that held by any previous Prime Minister, not excepting that of the younger Pitt. And after the Armistice, Lloyd George and the Conservative Elder Statesmen, and particularly the late Mr. Bonar Law, Lord Balfour, and, last but not least, Mr. Winston Churchill, endeavoured to bring about peace terms which would give a respite to Europe and enable the wounds of the war to heal. The influence of Buckingham Palace was exercised in the same direction.

But the times were hard. A General Election was held in England after the Armistice, the dissolved Parliament having lasted since the autumn of 1910. In that election the Labour party, which had become more and more pacifist as the war continued, outbid the members of Mr. Lloyd George's Coalition in their programme for a statesmanlike and moderate peace. As it was necessary for political reasons to defeat the Labour party, the Coalition peace programme had to be hardened, while the more irresponsible of the anti-Labour demagogues, headed by Mr. Bottomley, whipped up the popular passions and egged on the demands of the

people for unlimited reparations, indemnities, the hanging of the Kaiser, the punishment of the "war criminals," and, in fact, a peace of vengeance.

Four years of intensive war propaganda by the Press, the platform, the cinema, the pulpit, and every other means of inflaming popular passions now bore its ripe fruits. The Coalition leaders had to bend to the popular demand or be swept aside in favour of more unscrupulous and less responsible personages. So, although the General Election of 1918 returned Mr. Lloyd George to power with an overwhelming majority, it committed him to certain peace terms contrary in spirit to the terms on which the Germans had laid down their arms, and alien to the programme outlined in President Wilson's Fourteen Points. As for France, the combined fear and hatred of Germany felt by the mass of the people was irresistible. Whatever that wise old statesman, Clemenceau, knew to be possible or politic in the peace settlement he took good care to keep silent where doubts were concerned, and he functioned only as a gramophone to play the records that suited the French popular demand. This was the atmosphere, therefore, in which the Peace Conference opened. And as the British hatred and suspicion of Germany, at any rate amongst the civilian population, lasted for two or three years afterwards and died away very gradually, and as the French fears and loathings for the Teutons have continued to this day, there was little chance for the still small voice of reason or the counsels of statesmanship, whether advanced by Americans or Englishmen, at Versailles.

It is unnecessary to detain ourselves here with details of the Treaty of Versailles. True, the Treaty contains the Covenant of the League of Nations and binds the

victorious Allies themselves to reduce their armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety. But the League of Nations has lived in a state of suspended animation and the only partially successful effort to limit armaments by agreement was accomplished at Washington and had nothing to do with the League of Nations or the Treaty of Versailles. That its provisions were mutually destructive, and that they were impossible of fulfilment, many people knew at the time and everyone recognises now. Volumes have been written about it, the condemnation has been overwhelming, and the case for the Treaty of Versailles has gone by default. It is unfair to criticise only the signatories. The people in all the allied countries accepted the Treaty, some with a shrug of the shoulders. I myself moved a reasoned amendment to reject it in the House of Commons and could not find a seconder. The Third Reading was voted against on the motion of the Irish Nationalists, but only as a protest on behalf of the Irish nation, still baulked of self-government.

Wilson fell, the Americans evacuated Europe as soon as possible, the Senate refused to ratify the Treaty, and America has ever since been loth to mix herself in European affairs.

The way for England was not so simple. However unpleasant it may be for the British people, England is to-day part of the Continent of Europe. Our trade, our strategical position, the new air arm, the presence of our armies of occupation on the Rhine, all alike preclude a return to the traditional British policy of splendid isolation. So making the best of a bad job, every successive British Government and every British Foreign Minister, from the late Marquis Curzon to Mr. Ramsay MacDonald and Sir Austen Chamberlain, have

been pursuing a policy of seizing on to France's coat-tails, holding her back, preventing undue humiliations of the defeated Germany, and modifying the penal clauses of the Treaty of Versailles as occasions arise.

The British task has been difficult. The normal state of Anglo-French relations ever since the Armistice has been one of acute strain, and an open rupture has been imminent again and again. At the time of the French invasion of the Ruhr, Franco-British diplomatic and official relations were worse than they had been for a hundred years. In the years following the Armistice, France worked against England in Turkey and in every other part of the world where their interests clashed, or even impinged. Slowly England has succeeded in dragging France along the road of sanity. But she has had to apply the pressure with great caution. The actual French military threat to Britain herself is not to be despised. France has the greatest military force in the world at her disposal on land, and has fortified her position by the same bad old system of alliances. Her satellite states dot the map of Europe. She possesses the greatest Air Force in the world within easy striking range of London. And London is not only the capital of England; it is the very centre of the British Imperial system, the governing brain of the Empire and the financial metropolis. *Vis-à-vis* France and the French Air Force, Britain has never been in such a vulnerable position. For her capital could be devastated without one of her soldiers discharging a rifle or one of her warships bringing a cannon into action. French Governments have fallen because they have yielded to British importunities where Germany was concerned. Yet the reparations payments in material have damaged Britain's trade, and the cost of the

British Armies of Occupation has eaten up the greater part of her share of the reparations. And all this while Britain's feelings towards Germany have become more friendly.

The English race is subject to violent passions and sudden hostilities; but when left alone and in peace and not subjected to official propaganda it does not nurture enmities for long. And the whole official propaganda, cautiously applied, as it had to be at first, has been in the direction of restoring the old friendship between the English and Germans, only once broken by the last Great War. Germany committed the unforgivable sin, in British eyes, of threatening British sea power, she paid the penalty, her fleet has disappeared as a factor in world politics, and England now counts upon her as a future ally should the need arise.

The weak spot in this policy is the German attitude to Russia. Germany, treated as a pariah under the Treaty of Versailles, with its crushing and insulting clauses forced upon her, has struck up an uneasy alliance with Russia. And this very fact has increased French fears and suspicions. The Locarnos, the Genoas, the Genevas, the innumerable conferences, the scaling down of reparations, the adoption of the Dawes scheme for their payment, the admission of Germany herself as a full member of the Council of the League, all these have only brought Germany and France to the position they should have occupied after the Armistice. The agreement between the Allies and Germany to put the Dawes Committee proposals into operation superseded the financial section of the Treaty of Versailles. But the decision of the French and British Governments not to leave Cologne on the date fixed for its evacuation in the Treaty destroyed the moral

basis of the portions of the Treaty designed to bring about the resettlement of Europe. A *sine qua non* of the Dawes Scheme was that, subject to the control laid down, the German Government and people should be given the greatest economic freedom possible to enable them to meet their heavy liabilities for reparations. If Wiesbaden, the Saar, and the Rhinelands are to remain in Allied occupation indefinitely, it is obvious that their liabilities cannot be met. The financial situation in Germany has been serious and may well be so again. All industry is short of working capital, the cost of living is higher than in any other country in Europe, and is still rising. The condition of the working and middle classes is bad.

Far-seeing statesmanship would encourage the Germans to put forward their best efforts to bring order out of chaos and to earn money to pay their debts; and, further, would actively assist in every possible way. Without a fair chance of economic development and expansion, the loans made to Germany to enable her to set up in business again as a solvent state will have been wasted. Furthermore, suspicion of bad faith on the part of the Allies towards Germany plays right into the hands of the Nationalists, Junkers, and Militarists in that country, and still further adds to the difficulties of any Republican Government. We may be faced with a Government of the Extreme Right in Germany, or there may be adopted a policy of sabotage and "ca' canny" towards the Dawes Settlement. In any case the full payments will be difficult. We may then whistle for full reparations as we have during the last five years. To give Germany her due, all classes of Germans are working hard to restore the prosperity of the country and to fulfil its obligations.

It was laid down under the Treaty of Versailles that the Cologne zone was to have been evacuated in January, 1925. That date not having been strictly adhered to, why should the Saar Valley be evacuated in fifteen years from the signature of the Treaty of Versailles? And if the Treaty is not to be carried out when it is to the advantage of Germany, by what right can we insist on those portions of it being carried out which are to the disadvantage of Germany? And what are the reasons given for the non-evacuation of German territory? One is that the military clauses with regard to disarmament have not been fulfilled by Germany. But we were never allowed to see the report of the Inter-Allied Commission set up to supervise this disarmament. It has been freely stated that a report favourable to Germany was actually presented by the Inter-Allied Commission, but was sent back to be altered in accordance with French requirements.

Another reason given is that the occupation is to continue as a security for reparation payments.

The Inter-Allied Commission of Control has now been withdrawn. The German forts in the east are at last dismantled. But the French, British, and Belgian troops remain in occupation of German territory and the irritation continues. The French have used large numbers of coloured troops in the Army of Occupation. This long-continued occupation of German territory in peace time is the compound interest of French resentment at the occupation of French soil by Prussian troops after the war of 1870 to 1871. That war ended in 1871. By 1873 the bulk of the German Armies of Occupation had been withdrawn. By 1874 the last German soldier had crossed the frontier.

Nine years after the Armistice which ended the

Great War, 60,000 Allied soldiers remain on German soil.

The efforts of the German people themselves to win back by work what they lost by arms has been assisted by American faith in Germany's future prosperity as exemplified in the heavy investments of surplus American capital in German industries. English business men are beginning to co-operate with German business men in their mutual interests and to invest money in Germany. The French and German steel and coal interests and the heavy industries generally, in spite of the bitter feelings between France and Germany, are co-operating freely together. But these better signs are, unfortunately, only superficial. Certain territorial clauses of the Treaty of Versailles cannot possibly stand. They will be modified peaceably by agreement, or violently by war. In addition there are the reparation payments, the justice of which has never been admitted by any considerable section of the German people.

The idea that a generation of Germans, unborn to-day, will be paying reparations at the high rate demanded, in sixty years' time, is ridiculous.

Thus Keynes, the author of "The Economic Consequences of the Peace," and the expert at the Peace Conference who went on strike, writing in the *London Nation and Athenæum* in July, 1927, referred to the Dawes payments as follows :

"In order to cover the 1928-1929 annuity in full without recourse to foreign loans German exports must now take a great leap forward and increase by some 36 per cent., or, allowing for the imports of raw materials embodied in the exports, between 40 and 50 per cent. Some further im-

provement we may reasonably anticipate. But is so great a transformation feasible in two or three years? Considering that more than a third of Germany's exports consist of coal, iron and steel, and textiles—and if we add in chemicals and machinery considerably more than half—would any of her industrial competitors welcome it? Remember, too, that this great expansion will only occur if Germany's chief industrial competitors put overwhelming pressure on her to knock them out of their own existing markets. Does anyone—does M. Poincaré—think this probable? There is, indeed, nothing new in all this. Nothing new—except that time passes and that dates which were distant creep nearer. The Dawes Scheme will break down in accordance with plan."

Yet there are the agreements, signed and witnessed, looked upon by France as her sacred right and as a reinsurance against another invasion; Monsieur Poincaré and those who think like him are still talking of enforcing the full payments by arms! And the tragedy is that at the close of the fighting of the war, the German people turned their faces away from militarism and Imperialism. The soldiers tore off their uniforms and destroyed their decorations. The revulsion against war and force was real, genuine, and deep-felt. The royal dynasties toppled over like houses of cards, and Germany became a Republic in spirit as well as in name. The military ambition of the Junkers remained, sure enough, but without the mass of the people at their backs they would have been helpless.

But the very penalties of the Peace Treaty, the insults and the indignities heaped upon Germany during

the occupation, the invasion of the Ruhr, the sadism of the French, following on the fears and emotions of the war, have all helped to turn the German people once more to thoughts of vengeance. It pays Germany to sit at the Council Table of Europe and to have an opportunity of re-establishing her material prosperity. But while certain inhibitions remain, and while certain territorial injustices exist, there will always be a danger of a recrudescence of war on the most terrible scale in Europe. This the French understand, and for this very reason desire to continue the hampering and crippling of Germany. And because the French desire this, German hatred flares up again, and the vicious circle is complete. Germany could have stomached the loss of Alsace and Lorraine, and even of the Saar Valley; but the refusal to allow the Austrians to join the German Reich, and the placing of purely German territory under Polish rule in the east, will never be acquiesced in.

The population of France is about 40,000,000, the population of Germany is over 60,000,000. Germany's numbers are increasing, France's are falling. In ordeal by battle, the German numbers are bound to prevail over the French. And it is an illuminating commentary on the possibilities of world peace that the disparity in numbers between the potential French infantrymen and the potential German infantrymen is the greatest cause of worry to French statesmen and leaders of all parties. France hopes to make up in part for this lack of numbers by excellence of equipment, but German engineering, and, above all, chemical engineering, is likely in the future to furnish greater means of munitionment than France's. Again, by conscripting negro, Moorish, and Arab soldiers, France hopes for something

to balance her numbers. But these colonial armies are becoming an uncertain factor. France may have trouble in her colonies, and, in any case, these colonial armies are separated from her soil by the Mediterranean.

Before the overthrow of the Government of the Czar, Russia was the counterpoise to Germany. Poland to-day has taken the place of Russia in French eyes. And right through the years following the Armistice, France's deliberate policy has been the aggrandisement and strengthening of Poland in every possible way. Embarrassed as French finances have been, she has always been able to find loans to Poland for military purposes. She has equipped the Polish armies with munitions and trained them under French officers. And by the territorial clauses of the Treaty of Versailles a German *irridenta* has been deliberately created under Polish rule. No one in his senses supposes that the Prussians, of all people, will acquiesce for ever in East Prussia being cut off from West Prussia by the Polish Corridor. Nor will Germany ever forgive or forget the wrenching away of half German Upper Silesia in order that the Polish mineral resources should be augmented. And because the Polish situation is unpleasant, placed as she is between a hostile Germany and an unfriendly Russia, she must lean on France. And because France is frightened of Germany and does not believe in the future peace of the world, she must support Poland. If the French had had their way, the port of Danzig as well as Memel would have been given to Poland. And the purely German territory placed under Polish rule would have been greater in area. Wilson and Lloyd George forced a compromise upon her in making Danzig an international free port. But the loss of Danzig is still unpalatable to Germany.

To understand the true German feelings on this subject it must be realised that the Germans, rightly or wrongly, look down on the Poles. The Poles are good soldiers, fine artists, and ardent Catholics. But they are not good organisers; and organisation is the god of modern Germany. The average German despises the romantic, easy-going, muddling Pole accordingly. We have the same phenomenon in Ireland, where the hard-headed, orderly, tough northern Ulstermen despise the artistic, volatile, easy-going, happy-go-lucky, gallant southern Irish. The Poles reciprocate where Germany is concerned; these racial feelings go deep. Probably the German description of Poland as a *Jahrestaat*, or Seasonal State, is an exaggeration. *But there is one absolutely safe prophecy in Europe, and that is that the present Polish frontiers will not be maintained.* They can be altered peacefully, or by fighting. France, in her present state of mind, will never acquiesce in the betrayal of Poland, for so the loss of a square mile of nominally Polish territory would be represented. And as there is little opportunity of a change of attitude on the part of France, this Polish-Russo-German question makes war absolutely inevitable in Europe unless some high judicial authority can be found to adjudicate. Under the Covenant of the League of Nations, Germany has the absolute right to-day to bring forward in the Council proposals for the modification of her eastern frontiers. To do so would be to split the League asunder, France and her allies hiving off in one direction, Germany and her friends—amongst whom can be counted Britain—in another. The British statesmen realise this, and are playing for time; in other words, we are *drifting*. But as the people forget the horrors of war and a new generation grows up in Europe that has never known

them, and as the glorification of militarism and the recognition of war as a perfectly justifiable undertaking continues, the atmosphere will become more and more explosive. And unless something is done about it, the explosion will occur in five, ten, or fifteen years. The complacent will retort that Germany is virtually disarmed and therefore helpless. So Napoleon thought after utterly defeating Prussia in 1807. He placed severe restrictions on Prussia's armed forces. They were circumvented ; and six years later Napoleon was defeated by the secretly trained German army at the Battle of Leipzig.

To-day Germany has the finest commercial air service in Europe. It operates regularly over 12,762 miles of route, compared to France's 6,290 miles and England's 904 miles. This German air service and the German chemical industry are the nucleus on which a modern fighting force could be rapidly built up. The will to war will lead to war in the present stage of our social development.

It may be said that by the Treaty of Locarno in 1925 Germany gave a solemn pledge not to attempt to bring about a rectification of her frontiers by war. This was hailed, and rightly so, as a great step forward in the work of the appeasement and resettlement of Europe. The Foreign Secretaries of France and Germany, Briand and Stresemann, figuratively and actually embraced ; they and Sir Austen Chamberlain drank out of the same loving-cup, hats were thrown into the air, and all well-meaning people cheered loudly. But with this declaration of Herr Stresemann's were to have gone certain advantages and concessions for Germany. True, she was admitted to full membership of the Council of the League of Nations, but this only after a great deal of log-rolling

and wire-pulling. For France even at the last moment witnessed her Government again under the old influences and making an attempt to pack the Council so as to give a permanent majority against Germany. Still, Germany was admitted to the League, which carried with it in practice the more important privilege of sitting at the secret inner councils of the Great Powers on those occasions when the formal meetings of the League furnished the opportunity ; but Locarno was supposed to usher in a new order in Europe.

There was a tacit understanding that the theory of Germany's sole responsibility for the war would be modified. No educated person in Europe or America accepts this theory now ; yet for political purposes French statesmen, nearly ten years after the end of the war, and their imitators in the minor Secession States and in Poland, still harp on it. Germany was assured that the evacuation of her territory by foreign troops would be accelerated. She was given private assurances as to the probability of her receiving a mandate for one of her former colonies. I will refer to the German colonial question in some detail later, but this must not be overlooked, and from the German point of view it is not only an economic question, but a moral and sentimental question. For the colonies were taken from Germany on the plea that she was not fitted to have tutelage over backward peoples, and all good Germans feel that this stigma should be removed. Generally, Germany was promised that if she behaved herself she would be treated for the first time since the end of the war on terms of equality.

The better atmosphere of Locarno did not long. Chamberlain's promise to Germany with regard to her colonies, for example, was not kept because he was

thrown over by the Die-Hard element of the British Cabinet, led by the Colonial Minister, Mr. Amery. No sooner had the news reached England of Chamberlain's undertaking, private though it was, than the Colonial Minister hastened to proclaim to the world that in no circumstances would an inch of former German territory in the possession of Britain be handed back. So with the armies of occupation, so with the general treatment of Germany. By the summer of 1927 Monsieur Poincaré had almost completely reverted to his attitude at the time of the invasion of the Ruhr. During most of 1922 and 1923, Monsieur Poincaré took the occasion of the unveiling of some war memorial to deliver a weekly address on nearly every Sunday afternoon. His utterances breathed fire and brimstone, and the orations might have been made during the worst period of slaughter during the Great War. And, in spite of Locarno, by the summer of 1927, Monsieur Poincaré was again making similar speeches. His Sunday speech at Luneville on June 20th, 1927, marked a definite turning-point in Franco-German relations. The next crisis of the League of Nations was the French demand for the further dismantling of Germany's eastern fortresses. These old-fashioned forts are no threat to Poland. But they might hold up the advance of Polish armies invading Germany to assist France. France's demand for their destruction (now carried out) is the symptom of a disease still active—the disease of war fever.

If these relations continue between Germany and France, of what value is the Locarno Pact? If the Allied side of the bargain is not kept, how can Germany be expected to keep her side of it? The German Nationalists are continually on the flank of the more moderate parties in Germany, and Stresemann's period of office has been

one long struggle for existence against these tough elements in the German national composition. So long as war is recognised as the normal outcome of strained relations, and so long as strained relations and a bad atmosphere prevail in Europe, the explosion will occur, somewhere, some time, inevitably. And once the unstable equilibrium of Europe is upset by active war breaking out anywhere, the whole Locarno structure will topple like a house of cards. As Germany's power grows and she gradually recovers, demands for the rectification of her frontiers will become stronger. With the present political outlook in Europe, such demands will only lead to a stiffening of the French attitude. And when once the delicate balance of Europe's equilibrium is upset, Germany will feel herself at liberty to demand the rectification of her eastern frontiers. If this can be done peaceably and by negotiation, so much the better. If the demand is not met it will mean more fighting in the end. Germany will not directly act as an aggressor, and will be at great pains to observe the letter of the Locarno Agreement. But if that Agreement does not live in spirit, there are many ways in which Germany can make her growing power felt for the attainment of her ends—ends which the great majority of the German people believe to be just—even at the risk of war. Yet if only Europeans generally would abandon the idea of ever again fighting, this question would settle itself. I make no excuse for dwelling on the inconveniences and the irritation to Germany of the Polish Corridor. Suppose a strip of Mexican or Russian occupied territory ran from Boston to Buffalo City through New York State, dividing part of that State and Vermont and New Hampshire from the other part of New York State and from Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and the states to their south. Supposing

along both sides of the corridor Customs and passport stations were established, and Mexican passport officers examined the belongings and papers of every American citizen and every foreigner passing through it on his lawful occasions. How long would the American people tolerate it, especially if it was imposed upon them after they had laid down their arms while their armies were still in being and their fleet still a formidable force, on the expressed understanding that future territorial adjustments would be in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants?

Again, supposing in England a corridor ran from Liverpool on the west to Hull on the east, cutting half of Yorkshire, Lancashire, and the northern English counties off from the south, and the same formalities and annoyances of Customs and passport examinations had to be gone through for every train and motor-car that passed.

France suffers no such territorial injustices. Her dislike, fear, and sense of injury against Germany is powerful enough, but it is sentimental, intangible, a matter of the soul and the spirit. The German irritation and annoyance over the Polish Corridor is material and physical in addition to being intangible, as are the French sentiments. Therefore the German irritation and bitterness will last and will become intensified with the passage of the years. French feeling, on the other hand, will diminish with the fading of memories. If war is considered the normal means of settling such a dispute, it will be difficult to have the matter of the Polish Corridor adjusted without fighting. But if war is recognised, as it must be, as the bankruptcy of statesmanship and the negation of civilisation, such a question will be solved peaceably by arbitration and bargaining alone.

And there is another danger spot where Germany is concerned. "Anschluss," or the political economic junction of Germany and Austria, is a live question to-day, and will remain alive. The Union of Germany and Austria was vetoed in the peace treaties after the war. Now that Germany is a member of the League of Nations, the question will presently become a League matter, whether taken by itself or as a proposed modification of the peace treaties as allowed for in the treaties themselves.

Anschluss is a leading question to-day in informed circles in France, Germany, Austria, and the Secession States—Roumania, Hungary, Czecho-Slovakia, and Yugo-Slavia. By the break-up of the Austrian Empire, Austria proper was left with a total population of 6,100,000 inhabitants, with a capital city—Vienna—of nearly 2,000,000 out of these. Vienna was the business, cultural, and political centre of a vast empire. Its industries served this empire; roads, railways, and canals converged upon the city. As all the world knows, the cutting off the provinces of the old Austria-Hungary has inflicted the greatest hardships upon Vienna.

Austria as a separate state is an anomaly. And yet the Secession States are not happy. *The Austrians are a Germanic people, isolated in the midst of Slavs and Roumanians, and facing the still latent hostility of their old enemy, Italy. They naturally look to the German race as a whole for salvation and succour.* The three leading parties in Austria, the Christian Socialists, the Pan-Germans, and the Social Democrats, all place Anschluss, or union with Germany, in the forefront of their programmes. The Christian Socialists, as the governing party, do not talk too openly of it, as they fear to incur the hostility of France, Italy, and Czecho-

Slovakia. The Pan-Germans naturally are favourable to Anschluss, as their very name indicates. The Social Democrats are actuated by two main objects in pushing this policy. The first is to enter into the German Zollverein, or Customs Union, for the benefit of Austria's industries and to reduce unemployment. Secondly, they are republicans, and feel that union with the German Reich would buttress and support the Austrian Republic. In the old days there was hostility in Austria to the Prussians, though there has always been good feeling between Austria and the southern Germans, particularly the Bavarians.

Common misfortune brings great changes of feeling. The Prussians are chastened, the Austrians not quite so fastidious. In Germany there is general agreement with the Anschluss policy, the lead being taken by the Pan-Germans and the Nationalists. There is some fear amongst the other parties that the Centre party and Socialists in Germany would be unduly strengthened by the adhesion of another Catholic community and by the Socialists of Vienna; and in certain industrial circles there is fear of Austrian competition. But on the whole the particular industries of Vienna, mostly of an artistic nature, do not compete with the main German industries, while the Vienna factories, at work once more, would buy steel and partly finished products from Germany, as in the old days.

The objection to the proposed union on the part of the Secession States is a desire to keep Austria weak, and a lingering fear of the old Imperial power. This is dying away, and there is another motive causing these States to look with more friendliness on the proposal, the reason for which I will touch on later.

France, of course, fears any addition to the potential

power of Germany. The addition of 6,000,000 Austrians, generally speaking a peaceable and likeable people, would not make very much difference if the future of France is to depend solely on counting the number of possible soldiers that could be put into the field against her.

But the Anschluss movement would have an importance as setting a valuable example to the other states of Eastern Europe. Napoleon is reported to have said that if the Austrian Empire had not existed it would have had to be specially created. The principal cause of the depression of trade and the suffering of the people in Eastern and Central Europe is the ridiculous artificial barriers to commerce. At every frontier the tariffs are raised ever higher, the passport restrictions made more severe, the obstacles to free transit and transport increased. The Economic Conference of the League of Nations in 1927 was emphatic enough on this evil. The breaking down of one of these artificial and harmful barriers between Germany and Austria would result in greater freedom of trade between these two countries, to the general advantage of both. After a little time such an example would be noted by the workmen and the employers alike in Yugo-Slavia, Roumania, Hungary, Czecho-Slovakia, and the rest.

The carrying out of the Anschluss programme might well be the beginning of a great movement to throw down the artificial barriers to trade and free communications in Europe.

Austria has important natural resources, especially her forests and her water-power, but there is great lack of capital. With the stabilisation of the mark, the balancing of the Budget, and the regularising of her finances generally, Germany will eventually become an investing

country again. If German capital could be made available for the development of Austrian industries and agriculture, nothing but good would result. But while fear of Germany rules at the Quai d'Orsay, France will continue to veto the desire for self-determination of the Austrians. And the veto will remain until ended by war, or until war itself is outlawed and the fear of it removed.

Nor could the outbreak of such a war be isolated. The equilibrium in Europe is so unstable that if any of the two larger nations commenced hostilities, or even mobilised, there would be a general mobilisation through most of Central and Eastern Europe. If Germany fights France over the Polish frontiers, France will be joined by Poland, and Germany by Russia. Roumania is sure to interfere, and Hungary, of whom more anon, will seize the opportunity to attack Roumania. Only a miracle could prevent all these nations mobilising and fighting. Such a miracle might be successful intervention by the League, though its past history does not warrant too much belief in this miracle. For the League has never yet succeeded in checking the designs of any single one of the Great Powers. It proved a broken reed where China was concerned, failed miserably over the Italian attack on Greece in the Corfu incident in 1923, and utterly failed to prevent what, in normal conditions, would have been a declaration of war when the French armies entered the Ruhr. The machinery for enforcing peace exists in the League. But without the spirit for peace amongst the most powerful of its members the machinery cannot function.

Although the attitude of Italy might be doubtful and her action might be delayed until she saw which way the fighting was going, Britain would be bound to intervene. The Covenant of the League of Nations lays it

down that the country adjudged to be suffering from aggression must be succoured and supported by other signatory members. For this purpose the Council must be unanimous. By the Treaty of Locarno, Britain is almost bound to be dragged in, Covenant or no Covenant. The Treaty of Locarno was necessary from the British point of view, as an attempt to assist in the pacification of Europe. The attempt has not proved very successful. Yet it absolutely commits England to intervention on the side either of Germany or France, whichever is judged to be the aggressor, difficult as the definition of aggression always is. It would be practically impossible for the British Empire to keep out for long. Certain of the self-governing Dominions might exercise their rights of non-intervention, but the British Crown Colonies and India would immediately be involved. This would be Turkey's opportunity and the opportunity for half a dozen subject peoples waiting the occasion to revolt. No limits could be placed to the conflagration that would ensue. The valley of the Rhine remains the dividing line between two hostile, suspicious, and resentful peoples, both inclined to be pugnacious, though both have suffered terribly from war and its evils. The Locarno policy of the British Government can succeed only if it is followed by the reduction of armaments by agreement, and, above all, by the outlawing of war. And of neither is there any present likelihood unless Britain and America save the world by their example, as they tried during the last war to save it by their sacrifices and endeavours.

CHAPTER X

DANGERS TO WORLD PEACE

Hungary—The Transylvanian danger—Restoration of the Hapsburgs—Little Entente—Bulgaria and Macedonia—A Balkan Zollverein—Italy, Serbia, and Albania—Turkey—Colonel Amery—'Iraq and Mosul.

THE Hungarians are a people of Asiatic origin akin to the Turanians. The Magyar inhabitants of the great Hungarian plain are, perhaps, the proudest stock in Europe. The feudal aristocratic tradition still prevails in Hungary. It is almost its last refuge. Hungary was treated even worse than Germany in the peace treaties. Some of her fairest lands, inhabited by over a million Magyars, were placed under Czech, Roumanian, and Serb rule. These three peoples had been subject races of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire, in which the Magyars held an ascendancy. The loss of Transylvania to Roumania in particular has been the greatest humiliation to Hungary. The contempt felt by the Germans for the Poles is as nothing compared to the contempt felt by the warlike, aristocratic, and proud Magyars for the Roumanians. Roumanian rule in Transylvania has been inefficient, cruel, and spiteful. An *irridenta* has been created in Transylvania, and lesser *irridentas* in the territories wrenched from Hungary to be given to Serbia and Czecho-Slovakia. They will be a permanent source of friction and irritation so long as the present frontiers remain.

The Hungarian farmers and landowners, whose property was confiscated, appealed, as they were entitled to, to the League of Nations in 1927 for adjudication

by a mixed arbitral tribunal. When the case was to be referred to the League of Nations Court the Roumanian Government recalled its representatives and refused to abide by the Court's findings, defying the League of Nations.

Hungary will presently restore the monarchy. This has hitherto been prevented by the action of the Great Powers of Europe. As their influence declines, as it must do, the restoration of the Hapsburgs will be in sight. This very restoration might well form a *casus belli* for the Austrian Secession States. Roumania, Czecho-Slovakia, and Serbia form the Little Entente. The real object of the Little Entente is to preserve the Treaty of Trianon. If the general peace of Europe can be preserved there will be a chance in the future of a peaceable readjustment of these frontiers. This is allowed for by Masaryk, President of Czecho-Slovakia, in his book "The New Europe." If they are not readjusted, Hungary, as soon as she is strong enough, with or without allies, will attempt to recover her lost territories by force. She will certainly try if opportunity comes, such as an outbreak of war between France and Germany or between Roumania and Russia. As I explained earlier, the retention by Roumania of the Russian province of Bessarabia forms the most likely cause of war in Europe to-day.

Farther south, another defeated ally of Germany, Bulgaria, has been deprived of important territories. The chief of these is Macedonia. A majority of Macedonians are claimed as kinsmen by the Bulgarians. Bulgaria seeks an outlet to the Mediterranean. She was promised one at the Peace Conference. So far the promise has not been kept. I attempt no opinion on the justice of the claim; but it must be noted.

In order to obtain Macedonia, Bulgaria has fought three wars—one against Turkey, one against Serbia, and a third when she threw in her lot with Germany in the World War. Greece and Serbia possess Macedonia between them, and will fight to retain it. The Balkans have been the scene of perpetual unrest since they wrenched themselves free from Ottoman rule. Again and again, even since the Armistice, sporadic frontier fighting and, in one case, an actual attack on Bulgaria by Greece, has been checked by the combined efforts of all the principal Powers of Europe.

These Great Powers have not forgotten that murder at Serajevo which set light to the European powder magazine. The least hint of trouble in the Balkans to-day, and the Great Powers with one accord rush to stamp out the flames. The attitude of the inhabitants of the Balkan States is that of the chieftain in days gone by. Visited by an angel, he was offered any gift or blessing for his people on the condition that his neighbours over the mountains should receive the same gift or blessing or mark of divine favour in double measure. After profound thought, the Balkan chief replied that he wished all his people to lose the sight of one eye.

The only way to secure permanent peace in the Balkans is by the establishment of a Zollverein, an over-riding federal authority, and, in short, a United States of the Balkans. If this could be extended into a United States of Europe, or even if the Austrian Empire itself could be reconstituted as a federal free trade unit, the world would be the better for it. But these backward, pugnacious peoples will always be a menace to world peace so long as dynastic, religious, political, and fiscal frontiers divide them. And the situation is made worse by the intrigues of France and Italy and their competition

for the favours of this and that Balkan state. Yet if the major Powers remain in agreement, trouble in the Balkans can be checked ; the less hangs upon the greater. If there is the will to peace in the world, a little occasional blood-letting in the Balkan Peninsula harms only the Balkan people themselves ; but without the will to peace in the world this same blood-letting may have the same results as the assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand at Serajevo. If once the idea is accepted that war is definitely illegal and as blameworthy as capital crime in a civilised state, even the impoverished and war-weary Macedonians, Serbs, Bulgarians, and Greeks may come into line. If not, combined financial and economic pressure may make them see reason. These minor predatory states are, fortunately, not self-supporting where munitions of war are concerned. If there were not a strong case already for the prohibition of the private manufacture and traffic in arms, the Balkans would provide it.

I have referred already to the Serb-Italian quarrel. Since the Armistice, Italy and Serbia have twice been on the very edge of war. The first occasion was the Italian seizure of Fiume. The second was the trouble over Albania in 1927. The underlying causes of trouble remain in both cases. Serbia was Russia's protégé. The new Jugo-Slavia is now France's ally. An Italian-Serbian quarrel would endanger the peace of Europe and the peace of the whole world. And there is real danger of such a quarrel leading to war on the grand scale. Such a war would be confined to Italy and Jugo-Slavia only by a miracle.

Turkey used to be known as the "sick man of Europe." The decay of the Turkish Empire threatened the peace of Europe and kept all the Chancellories in

a flutter during the greater part of the nineteenth century. The British Gladstonian policy was simplicity itself. It was hoped that by clearing the Turks out of Europe, bag and baggage, peace would be preserved for all time. To-day Turkey has not only lost her European Empire, save for a small corner up to the Holy City of Adrianople, but her suzerainty over the Arabs of Arabia and Mesopotamia and over the Egyptians has gone. Even the remnants of the Armenian race have found sanctuary in the Soviet Republic of Erivan.

Conservative Governments in England were glad to use Turkey as a buffer state. It was felt that if the bag and baggage policy was pursued too precipitately Russia would occupy Constantinople. The holding by Russia of the Straits of the Dardanelles and the maintenance by Russia of a powerful fleet in the Black Sea, able to emerge through the Dardanelles into the Mediterranean, was a threat to British sea power in the Mediterranean. The urge of the Russian people for warm water ports found expression in continual intrigues in the Balkans against Turkey, and in Turkey's eastern provinces of Asia Minor. So, despite Mr. Gladstone, the Turks looked with a friendly eye upon England for fear of Russia. Furthermore, the Sultan of Turkey was the Caliph, or Commander of the Faithful, and was venerated as the supreme head of the Moslems by the Mahommedan inhabitants of India. And as these Indian Mahommedans supported the British Raj against the Hindus, the British felt justified in bolstering up Turkey again and again. The Crimean War was fought for this and no other purpose. Yet, in the secret Treaties between England, France, and Russia, exposed to the world by the Bolsheviks, Russia was promised Constantinople and the Dardanelles. Still, these Treaties

were signed in the early days of the war. What really broke the friendship between England and Turkey was England's attitude to Germany and the reorientation of her policy towards France and Russia.

When the Entente with France was followed by a virtual alliance with Russia, we lost the friendship of Turkey. Germany had been penetrating Turkey commercially and diplomatically. The original project of the Baghdad Railway, the short overland route to India, was conceived by British engineers and financiers. But timidity and inaction lost us a great opportunity. The German banking houses stepped into the gap and succeeded in building the important Anatolian railways and commencing their extension to the head of the Persian Gulf in face of diplomatic obstacles by the British. The best diplomatists in the German service, at a period when that service had thrown up some extremely able men, were sent to Constantinople. German diplomacy completely outclassed British diplomacy in Turkey in the years preceding the war. A blunder of naval strategy and the hesitation of the British Admiral in the Mediterranean permitted the German battle-cruiser *Goeben* to reach Constantinople and add a powerful argument to the blandishments of the German diplomats. And, extraordinary as it may sound, there was a certain school of thought in British governing circles which found itself not unduly distressed at the abandonment by Turkey of her old friend and the throwing in of her lot with the Central Powers.

A defeat of the Central Powers, with Turkey as their ally, meant rich spoils for the conquerors. The secret Treaties, entered into during the war, and, no doubt, discussed before its outbreak, and the actual terms of the defunct Treaty of Sèvres, indicate the extent of

these spoils. And to-day, even after a successful revolt by the Turkish Nationalists, Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia are in Allied occupation. Italy retains her hold on the Turkish islands, and, up till the signing of the Anglo-Turkish Treaty, was not unhopeful of obtaining a large slice of Turkish territory in Asia Minor. Had things been otherwise, we could have brought Turkey in on our side. The war would have been over two years sooner, the Russian collapse would not have occurred, and a million Allied dead would be alive to-day.

After sixteen years we have a fresh opportunity of regaining the friendship of the Ottoman race. The principal external danger to the infant State of 'Iraq has been removed, and if the Arab races inhabiting Mesopotamia can learn how to govern themselves, 'Iraq may continue an independent and prosperous existence without too great a drain on the British Treasury. If there is oil in payable quantities in Mosul it will be exploited, and corn and cotton will be grown in an irrigated and fertilised Garden of Eden. With a friendly Turkey and Persia and the end of Imperialistic adventures, the railway system from Europe to India could be completed. It is possible to travel in the same railway coach from Calais to Angora now. The completion of the Mesopotamian and Persian links would enable continuous railway transport from Calais to Calcutta. Railway development in Persia has been hampered by the pre-war rivalries and jealousies of Russia and Britain. They have led to this important country being left in a back-water, with the greatest lack of transport of any country in the world.

What of the future of Turkey herself? The Turkish Republic occupies a compact territory, rich in minerals,

and capable of producing valuable crops. This territory is inhabited by a sturdy, industrious peasantry, better educated than the peasantry of India, and with a ruling class more capable of governing than any other race in the Middle East. Great military and secular progress is being made ; and, though the Turks have abandoned the rôle of Defender of the Faithful for their President, women have been emancipated, customs Westernised, and a real start made with the modernisation of Turkey as an efficient state. The Turkish oil rights over Mesopotamia will be bought out by the British taxpayer for £500,000, the transaction being decently camouflaged in the form of a loan to the Turkish Government.

The great weakness of the Turkish people in the past was in the attempt to govern alien peoples. The holding down by force of Syria, Arabia, Mesopotamia, and those portions of the Balkans still under Ottoman rule was a great drain on the treasury and man-power of the Turks. This weakness exists no longer. There is no reason why a prosperous future should not lie ahead of the Turkish Republic. The English might well take the place of Germany as a constructor of railways in Asia Minor while regaining her old commercial leadership in the Turkish markets. The completion of the great Baghdad Railway should now be pushed on with in any case.

Nor is friendship with the Turkish Republic to be despised. It makes our relations easier with our ² 200,000,000 of fellow Moslem subjects in India. If a steady policy of friendship is pursued by Britain towards Turkey and the Turks reciprocate, as they very well may, she will prove a valuable friend and ally. As 'Iraq is promised British support in her application for membership of the League of Nations, the next step should be

to hold out inducements to the Government of Angora to apply for membership also.

The signature of the Anglo-Turkish Treaty is, however, a set-back to the ambitions of two other nations. Mussolini's dream of a great Italian colony in Asia Minor under the Italian flag must now remain a dream ; while Russia can no longer count upon Turkey as one of her satellites. The great need of the Turks is for peace. They have been continuously at war since the Italian invasion of Tripoli. This was followed by the first and second Balkan Wars, with risings in Arabia, followed by the Great War, and then the war against the Greeks following on the successful rebellion of the Kemalists who now rule Turkey. The Turks have just escaped a further war with England, in which Italian intervention would have been almost certain.

No country is in greater need of peace, reconstruction, and recovery than Turkey. The British have everything to gain and nothing to lose by assisting this process. Nevertheless, Turkey, when she has recovered, if still unsatisfied, may become a menace, particularly to the British Empire. Turkey was worsted in 1926 at Geneva by the British Colonial Minister, Colonel Amery. This tough little man, with no great Parliamentary or oratorical gifts, is the strongest individual in the present British Cabinet. He knows exactly what he wants, sticks to his line, and usually gets it. He will risk everything for the furtherance of a theory ; he once destroyed a Conservative Government because he believed, and still believes, in Tariff Reform, and he would cheerfully face the risk of a war for the sake of a few square miles of desolate territory and to maintain "prestige." He is the exact type of the men who waged the great religious wars of the Middle Ages ; and he is as sincere as they were.

So Turkey finds herself deprived of the Province of Mosul. Every Turk looks upon Mosul as an integral part of the Turkish homelands. Nor has our support of Greece against Turkey and our encouragement of the Greek invasion of Anatolia been forgotten. Failing a real peace between the British and the Turks a threat exists. If ever the British Empire is involved in hostilities on a great scale with any other Power or group of Powers, the temptation to descend into the Province of Mosul and reconquer it will be almost irresistible to the Government at Angora. And if oil should have been discovered there, the bait will be all the more tempting.

Turkey will never challenge the might of England alone. But she is fully aware of the weakness of the British military position in Mesopotamia. England should have withdrawn to Basra after the war, and the late Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, the Chief of the General Staff, urged this. Such a course may be advisable in the near future, especially if done peaceably and in agreement with Turkey. The northern part of the Mosul Province, which is ethnographically Turkish, could then revert to Turkish rule, and, by agreement, the semi-independent State of 'Iraq could be guaranteed by Turkey and Britain alike. The British position would be far stronger strategically, and certainly stronger morally. Nor would British prestige suffer by a peaceful withdrawal, whereas a retreat under threat would strike it a terrible blow.

The danger to peace from a resurgent Turkey can be removed. But it will need all the efforts of the more powerful nations to preserve peace in the Balkans and on the borders of Hungary. They can only do it by keeping the peace themselves.

CHAPTER XI

THE DISEASE OF WAR

The causes of the disease—The last remaining wars of religion—
Ibn Sa-ud and his neighbours—Modern Nationalism—
Patriotism—National anthems—National war songs—Naval
and military displays—Institution of monarchy not to blame
—Tattoos—Royal Air Force display—School-children and
war—War films.

I HAVE now referred to certain of the danger spots to the peace of the world. These are the infected areas, infected by the disease of war. What are the causes of the disease? War has been recognised as a curse, ever since organised armies of men began to fight. Cræsus strove for peace 2,500 years ago. The historian Herodotus describes how, after blundering into a war, Cræsus was taken prisoner by Cyrus and condemned to the stake. When the fire had been kindled, Cyrus relented, and Cræsus was released. Cyrus then asked him why he had gone to war, and Cræsus said it was because he had been directed to do so by the oracle. "For," he said, "no man is so foolish as to desire a war rather than peace; for in peace sons bury their fathers, and in war fathers bury their sons."

The Trojan women revolted against war, but not before Andromache had seen the death of young Hector, son of Priam, with whom, as she said, perished "father, mother, brethren, all."

The Imperialist wars of Rome were followed by the barbarian invasions of Europe and the downfall of the Roman Empire. The petty feudal states then fought their predatory or dynastic wars through the centuries

of the Middle Ages. The Renaissance, and afterwards the Reformation, led to the great wars of religion. The Thirty Years' War devastated all Germany, and set back the progress of Europe for many years. Men do not fight for religion alone to-day. Some brave efforts were made by the Pope to stop the World War, but, generally speaking, the prelates and ecclesiastics adopted a Nationalist attitude. Protestant clergy in England and Germany alike preached a holy war to their respective flocks, and both invoked the name of the same Prince of Peace and God of Battles. Religious riots still take place in India, and, until the rising Indian Nationalism swamps this ecclesiastic pugnacity, they will continue. But the only real wars of religion are fought by rival dynasts in the deserts of Arabia. England, in fact, tried at one time to exploit the fanaticism of the inhabitants of Arabia by an attempt to intrigue the head of the Sheriffian House, who had been proclaimed King of the Hedjaz, into the vacant position of Caliph, or Commander of the Mahommedan Faithful. This was a Foreign Office intrigue, undertaken by amateur statesmen in the Arab Bureau in Cairo, whom war had clothed in a little brief authority; and it failed miserably. It was partly defeated, though quite innocently, by the Government of India. Working in its secret, water-tight compartment, the Government of India was paying a handsome subsidy in gold and rifles to the great rival of King Hussein, the redoubtable Ibn Sa-ud. Ibn Sa-ud is the leader of those Arabs who inhabit that part of Arabia from which sprang Mahommed himself. For a hundred years or so, a fierce and fanatical holy war has been preached by these austere Puritans of the desert. The Wahibi or Arabian Puritans, commanded by Ibn Sa-ud, have been fighting their iconoclastic war against

Mecca for a decade. The Great War itself was a boon and a blessing to these rival sects. For the India Office supplied golden sovereigns and modern rifles to Ibn Sa-ud and his Wahibi, and the British Foreign Office supplied golden sovereigns and modern rifles *ad lib.* to Hussein's Arabs of Mecca and Medina. And on this occasion the right hand of the British Government, personified in the India Office, knew not what the left hand, personified in the Foreign Office, was doing. It was not until the Peace Conference when the memoranda of the India Office and the Foreign Office came before the British Cabinet that the true facts were exposed.

The Puritans have won, and to-day Ibn Sa-ud rules at Mecca. He and his Puritans are a formidable force of desert fighting men, sworn to make an end of the Sheriffian dynasty. One prince of that dynasty, Abdullah, rules uneasily in the frontier town of Amman, where, well larded with English sovereigns and weapons, he governs an unstable buffer state between Palestine and the desert. Another, propped by British bayonets and supported by a large British Air Force, rules at Baghdad in the person of King Feisal. If British support, diplomatic, financial, and military, was withdrawn from these two potentates, the Wahibi would sweep into their camps to-morrow. This Arabic quarrel is a survival of the dynastic and religious types of war that devastated Europe and Asia for centuries ; but instead of religion as an excuse for wholesale killing—in other words, war—the modern ferment of Nationalism plus racial feelings has taken its place. Except in Arabia and India, religious wars no longer endanger peace.

Modern Nationalism is of comparatively recent origin, and was hardly noticeable before the commencement of the nineteenth century. Its early beginnings are to be

found in the decay of the feudal system and a wider loyalty of the subject to the Crown replacing the narrower loyalty of the liege for his lord. It has since spread across the world like a modern scourge. It has been the principal cause of wars since the peace of exhaustion following the downfall of Napoleon. Napoleon left a terrible legacy in the system of conscription. Small professional armies were used for the European wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. So long as the professional armies could rely upon their pay and their officers, and so long as the ruling class was unchallenged in its supremacy in each country, the feelings of the common people about a war were not of much account. It was when it became necessary to enrol all the men of military age that the need for popular enthusiasm arose. Nationalism has advanced hand in hand with popular education, the decay of aggressive religion, and the establishment of democratic forms of government.

A hundred and fifty years ago a patriotic Frenchman's loyalty was to his Sovereign. Afterwards, during the First Empire, to the person of Napoleon. Then for the Republic, and now for *la Patrie*. The German fights for his Fatherland ; and for this nebulous thing, love of country, men are prepared to face the horrors and tortures of modern war, and women the loss of all they hold dear. First generation American citizens, whose parents can scarcely speak English, are as aggressively patriotic for the United States as Italians who have never left Italy are for Italy, or Serbians who have never left Yugo-Slavia for the kingdom of the Serbs, Coats, and Slovenes. A flag, a symbol, a word, a slogan, makes the heart of the patriot beat faster and drives the blood coursing through his veins. And when the present-day Nationalist goes abroad he becomes

twice as patriotic as when he is at home. No one will deny the unselfishness and devotion of the true patriot to his country. There are all kinds of patriotism. The Cockney Londoner who says to his friend, "There's a foreigner; heave a brick at him," is a patriot. One of the worst rascals I ever met in my life would dissolve into drunken tears when he talked of his Canadian Fatherland. Dr. Johnson went so far as to say that patriotism was the large refuge of a scoundrel, and the doctor was, unfortunately, right in thousands of cases. But for the habit of war this feeling would be harmless enough, and might be a powerful force for good in eradicating corruption and preventing an over-devotion to party politics. Between Ruskin's definition of patriotism as "an absurd prejudice founded on an extended selfishness" and the cry of "my country, right or wrong" lies a sane, healthy sentiment. "If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, may my right hand forget her cunning," expresses the devotion to an ideal of a people whose very religion is founded on the desire for peace. Perhaps Lowell best describes this higher idealism: "Our true country is bounded on the north and the south, on the east and the west, by Justice, and when she oversteps that invisible boundary line by so much as a hair's breadth she ceases to be our Mother."

A Scottish sage, old Fletcher of Saltoun, was responsible for the saying: "Let me write a people's songs, and let who will make their laws."

National Anthems are the harmonious expressions of Nationalist feelings. In England we are blessed with a National Anthem, "God Save the King," adapted from a German hymn, and with a national war song, "Rule, Britannia!" The admirable National Anthem "God Save the King" is rapidly becoming a battle song of

the class war, the opposing forces singing the "Internationale" or the "Red Flag." Perhaps as an anti-Socialist measure the National Anthem is encouraged by the powers that be. This book, however, is not dealing with class war except in so far as it affects international relations. In all countries many to-day subscribe to the Socialist programme more on account of its professed peace policy than because of its economic programme. In England in particular many worthy pacifists and peace-lovers warm towards the British Labour party because of the various attempts at internationalism made by the European Socialists generally. These same good people are far from Socialism, however, in its economic sphere.

The Nationalist influences are as bitterly opposed to the internationalism of Socialism as to its anti-capitalism. These may be trusted to try to counter any attempt at international solidarity of the working class, even if this should prove in the future, as it may well be, an extra means of ensuring peace between peoples. Our very correct English National Anthem of "God Save the King" and, of course, in other countries their own National Anthems, are sung as a mark of opposition to Socialism both in its economic and international expression. That form of war song of international republicans, the "Marseillaise," has been sanctified as the national hymn of France. Only a little more than a hundred years ago in England a workman found guilty of singing the "Marseillaise" was transported to the penal colonies of Australia. For the "Marseillaise" was the revolutionary war song of the international anti-dynasts.

But, as I stated above, the real battle song of the English people is "Rule, Britannia! Britannia rules the

Waves," and is a popular expression of the theory that power and prosperity, if not peace, will be achieved by an overwhelming Navy. It corresponds almost exactly to the German "Deutschland über Alles." Once a year, on Empire Day, endeavours are made to induce some millions of school-children in Britain to sing "God Save the King," which is the official National Anthem. To this no objection can be taken. But this is usually followed by "Rule, Britannia!" Let me quote the second verse of this ancient battle song, written in the year 1740:

"The nations not so blest as thee,
Must in their turn to tyrants fall;
Whilst thou shalt flourish, great and free,
The dread and envy of them all."

In July, 1927, the King of England opened the new Gladstone Dock in Liverpool. The arrangements for the ceremony were made by the officials of the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board. As usual when royal visits take place, a public holiday was proclaimed and all the children released from school. Many thousands of children were rehearsed for weeks previous to the royal visit in singing the second verse of "Rule, Britannia!" as well, of course, as the first verse. Rather late in the day some protests were made by conscience-stricken citizens of Liverpool, who suddenly awakened to the real meaning of the words of the British national battle song. It was, however, too late to alter the arrangements, as 50,000 leaflets with the words printed on them had already been circulated to the school-children in the city.

If we really wish to inculcate anti-war feelings in the plastic minds of children between the ages of four and fourteen in our country, we should set up a Committee of

Poets, perhaps under the chairmanship of one of the less warlike of the English Bishops, to rewrite the verses of "Rule, Britannia!" In 1740 it was, no doubt, highly desirable to inculcate feelings of contempt and hostility towards every other nation in the minds of the citizens, young and old, of Great Britain. In 1740 warfare was a less costly barbarity than in 1928. If in 1940 we wish to avoid waves of mass emotion sweeping over the nations because the national "honour" is assailed, or because somebody has insulted the national flag, we should teach the gospel of humanity to the school-children of the world instead of blatant Nationalism and Jingoism.

In every country to-day there is much direct schooling of the public mind into acceptance of war as a legal and, in certain circumstances, desirable thing by the naval and military chiefs. When Lindbergh, the heroic post office Atlantic flyer, returned to the United States, great efforts were made to exploit him as an advertisement for American naval and military flying. I had the honour of meeting Lindbergh in London and of some conversation with him. If I am any judge, he is completely free of xenophobia and dislikes the very thought of war.

I have referred to the popularity of military parades and displays. Since the war this method of glorifying militarism and representing only the pride, pomp, and circumstances of war has been reduced to a fine art. Let us take England in the year 1927 as a sample. The standpoint of English statesmen is that the British are a non-military nation, and we glory in Napoleon's description of us as a nation of shopkeepers. With regard to the Army, the members of the Government of the day, and particularly the head of the War Office, are never tired of pointing to the small army maintained

by Britain and the peaceful atmosphere of the country. But what actually happened in a short twelve months of 1927? The King's birthday, as in previous years, was made the occasion for a full-dress parade of the Brigade of Guards, mounted and foot. This is the ceremony of the annual Trooping of the Colour. An enormous crowd assembled, as in previous years, to watch and applaud the marching of the scarlet-tunicked Guardsmen and the cavalry manœuvres of the steel breast-plated Life Guards. The massed bands of the Brigade played suitable music, and the whole episode was one long glorification of the soldier's calling, ending with the King himself, in Guardsman's uniform, riding on horseback at the head of his troops to Buckingham Palace. Literally hundreds of Press photographers and cinematograph photographers "shot" the episodes, which were then reproduced in the large circulation picture papers and on the cinema screens throughout the country. Furthermore, the music, the words of command, and a short description of the military manœuvres were relayed by wireless all over the realm. That day I was motoring in the heart of rural England. Looking in at a small country inn, my ears were greeted with soldierly words of command and the strains of martial music. The wireless loud speaker was relaying the ceremony into the peaceful summer atmosphere of an English village. This was on June 4th.

These parades of troops are spectacular and magnificent, but they are not war. But simple-minded people are apt to think that they are war. The last English King to lead his troops into battle was George II. at Dettingen in 1743. No English King is ever likely to lead his troops in battle again. The parade-ground movements provide a spectacle for the people, but they

are utterly unlike anything that would be attempted on the field of battle. It would be more honest if the troops marched past in battle kit, their faces hidden in the hideous modern gas-masks. But this might bring home the reality of war. It is only its romantic side that is presented.

Surely honour can be paid to His Majesty without this glorification of militarism and war. In passing I would note that there is a tendency in some quarters to blame all this on the institution of Monarchy. This is quite wrong. In republican France the annual celebration of the Fall of the Bastille, the greatest blow ever struck at the Monarchical system, is made the occasion for a great military display. The President of the French kisses the army generals after the magnificent ceremony, amid the cheers of the assembled multitude, not all of whom are French. Poland is a republic and extremely bellicose. In Italy the King is completely overshadowed, and Italy disturbs the peace of mind of the world.

To return to England in the ninth year after the Armistice which ended the war to end war, colours were presented on June 11th to the Horse Guards in London, and a similar episode took place. In the same month the annual Naval and Military Tournament, a kind of glorified circus, the performers being picked soldiers and sailors, was held. The excuse for this annual tournament is the familiar one that the profits go to naval and military charities. It lasts a week, is intensely popular with children, and is crowded at every performance. Military exercises, naval field-gun drill, the grand gallop past of the horse artillery, all delight the spectators. There is the usual sham fight at the end, in 1927 the Battle of Bannockburn being presented. The Naval and Military Tournament gives no representation of gas war-

fare, and a forward field dressing station is conspicuously absent. No military doctor is shown at work, and nobody hears the screams of the wounded and dying, nor the choking of the suffocated and poisoned. There is no smell of burning human flesh shrivelled by the flame-throwers, we see no man still living with the lower parts of his body blown away by high explosives. The wounded floundering in the mud in their death agonies, trodden underfoot by their advancing comrades, are not shown. Nor do we see the terror of the white-faced youths, whose nerve has failed them under the horrors of a modern battlefield, being marched off to death at the hands of their own comrades for "cowardice in the field." And there are no widows, no orphans, and no outraged women. There was no representation of the *maison tolérée* in France, with the soldiers queuing up under the control of the military police to satisfy their war-created appetites on the bodies of the wretched inmates. It may be said that men satisfy their bestial appetites in peace-time ; but these young soldiers would find no *maisons tolérées* in their home towns, and they would have their fathers' advice and their mothers' love to keep them straight. And at these military tattoos, parades, and mimic combats we hear nothing of the terrible venereal disease statistics of all the combatant armies in the last war. We are not shown the long avenues of tombs in the war graves, one of them even within sight of the holy city of Jerusalem and of Calvary. If we were even now in earnest about preaching peace in the world instead of war, we should depict a few of the graves of the 10,000,000 dead English, American, German, French, Russian, Serbian, Austrian, Italian soldiers of the Great War. And every grave represents the sorrow of some woman who brought forth her offspring in love

and agony—for what? So that he should be blown into a bundle of bloody rags by a stranger he had never seen and with whom he had no quarrel of any kind?

In peace parades the man of war is shown as a beautifully arrayed, well-drilled and disciplined fighting machine, not as a fighting animal filled with blood lust, sometimes giving no quarter to the enemy.

Next, and in the same year, in every military centre the increasingly popular tattoos have been presented. The surplus funds go to military charities. These tattoos take place at night by the artificial light of searchlights, and are beautiful spectacles. The greatest is at Aldershot, and has taken place now for several years in succession. In 1927 it was calculated that 40,000 people witnessed the tattoo on every one of the four nights on which it was held. I cannot do better than quote the description from the special correspondent of one of the leading London papers, the *Evening Standard*, of June 15th, 1927—a large circulation paper—which may be taken as typical of the descriptions which appeared in every journal of England. The italics are mine :

“To-night we have seen history’s scroll rolled backwards hundreds of years, and on the spreading greensward of Rushmoor we have watched the great Battle of Blenheim fought over again. *A grand spectacle!* The night skies have flamed with the glare of modern searchlights, sweeping together into one vast blaze of brilliance in order to illuminate a living picture wrested from the pages of the heroic past.

“Our ears have deafened under the roar of artillery. We have caught our breath as Marlborough’s mad cavalry dashed out in a headlong

helter-skelter charge, and hurled themselves upon the French.

"We have gazed in admiration at the gorgeous uniforms of olden times—the flashing scarlet and gold of the British redcoats, the blue and red of the French Gardes le Roi, and the white tunics of the regiments de Dauphin, Anjou, and Poitou; *we have thrilled to the notes of the bugle and felt our pulses gallop at the sight of armed men engaged in hand-to-hand combat.* And yet I think that the most moving moment in the brilliant pageant of the Aldershot Tattoo which started this evening came near the end when the gathering armies had assembled for their last parade. The battle was over, the shouting stilled. The searchlights were switched off, save for one central beam, which cast its spot light on the massed bands in the middle of the amphitheatre.

"The circle of light widened. Its glare grew stronger, and then, in a dazzling radiance which matched the sunshine of a summer day, *we beheld the great parade of old-time warriors with soldiers of our own day in their scarlet and pipeclay.* But something was missing—and presently we found it. On the fringe of the arena, where the searchlight's beams faded into shadow, a little company of men stood motionless. Almost we failed to notice them. But as we looked closer we recognised them. We picked out the dull drab khaki, the steel helmets, the grim accoutrements of modern war.

"*Glory and Romance*: What was the band playing? It came to us so familiarly from out the years, bringing memories that thrilled and saddened and inspired. It was 'Tipperary,' the war march

of the 'Old Contemptibles,' and as the well-remembered tune floated out into the arena the men in khaki kit marched slowly across the great parade and took up their position in the forefront of all. It had been a night of thrills and rare spectacles. *Before dusk fell a thousand bandsmen had discoursed wonderful music, and buglers and trumpeters had stirred us all with their clarion notes.* We had heard Tschaikovsky's overture, '1812,' tell the story of Napoleon's defeat at Moscow, and *had watched the Russian city in flames.* The First Cavalry Brigade had charmed us with the graceful movements of their musical rides, the beautiful horses keeping perfect time, with never a false step. We had watched the Air Force stage a fight in the dark with illuminated planes, and seen the tanks and present-day infantry storm a village amid a thunderous artillery barrage that beat against the ear-drums like a mighty hammer.

"But this honouring of the sombre khaki—symbolising the nation's joy and suffering, pride and heartbreak—above the *glittering pageantry* staged to recall the cherished achievements of old, was a simple yet dramatic stroke which moved the great assembly to the depths. We scarcely realised that midnight had come until we heard the evening hymn 'Abide with me.'"

If this is not glorification of war generally, and the preparation of the public mind for the next one, there is no meaning in the words of the English language.

The Aldershot Tattoo, owing to the size of the military establishment there, is the greatest and most spectacular of these military displays. Others of a similar

nature, though smaller, but all tending to glorify militarism and school the public mind to war, took place at intervals during the summer in other military centres, depôts, and garrison towns in the kingdom. And all this in anti-militarist England where we boast of our small Army and our peaceful desires ! These spectacles can be matched in France, Italy, and almost every other country in Europe ; and America is by no means free from them.

Naval reviews and demonstrations follow much the same lines as the military reviews and tattoos, and have the same objects. There have been no great naval manœuvres so far as the British Navy is concerned since the war, the major fleet exercises taking places without "war correspondents" on board.

In July, 1927, very extensive air manœuvres took place over England representing air attacks on London. They received wide publicity in the Press and were looked upon as normal practice for the next war.

The American naval manœuvres have been on the old-fashioned model, have created a great deal of interest in the American Press, and have been fully reported in the papers. Round the coast of Britain special visits are arranged, the warships moor off the great holiday resorts, especially during the month of August, are thrown open to visitors, and every means taken to "popularise" the Navy. This is, of course, perfectly excusable to men whose business it is to prepare the British Navy for war, or in America the American Navy for war, or in France the French Navy for war ; and to accustom the taxpayers of the respective countries to foot the bill.

A visit of the President of the French Republic in 1927 was hailed as a reaffirmation of the Entente Cor-

diale. The original Entente Cordiale was the beginning of the so-called encirclement of Germany, followed in due course in 1914 by Germany's frantic effort to break through the ring, and the World War. And by way of showing their friendship to the English people, the French Government sent the latest models of French naval architecture to Portsmouth for a week of festivities. All this in the year 1927.

And finally the great annual pageant of the British Royal Air Force was held near London, and attended by 100,000 people. This annual display of the latest types of air fighting craft is becoming more popular every year. The profits go to Air Force charities. This is always the excuse. Parents take their children, the taxpayer feels he is getting something for his money, and it all helps to inure the popular mind to the prospect of further wars and to familiarise it with the spectacle of death thrown from the heavens. After the displays of air fighting, air tactics, aerial drill, a bombing competition at ground targets, exercises showing the machine-gunning of ground forces or the ground civilian population from the air, an air battle over London, and so on, the most popular feature of all, the grand finale, is staged. A native town is in the centre of an insurrection against the Imperialist power. Missionaries and merchants are supposed to be held prisoner. This undefended town is unmercifully bombed from the air, "the church being spared." How many churches were spared in France and Flanders? Even Amiens Cathedral had to be sandbagged up to the roof. In actual fact, the church collapsed with the other buildings in the bombing episode in 1927! The bombs fall, the dummy buildings blow up in fragments, the artificial trees collapse under the blast of the high explosive,

the dummy defenders are shattered by the bombs, the fleeing natives are machine-gunned from the air. The crowd cheers and goes wild with excitement. Its feelings are the same as the crowd at the Roman gladiatorial games calling for more blood, or the public at a Spanish bull-fight calling for more bulls. And of course it was all relayed by wireless, with suitable descriptions of the events. Children under the age of fourteen years were admitted free ! And in 1927 this annual display of the Air Force actually took place while representatives of Japan, Britain, and America were gathered together to discuss further limitations of naval armaments, and while preparations were being made for a World Conference on Reduction of Armaments in general.

What hypocrisy and what wickedness !

I go further and state categorically that, where it can be done, a deliberate attempt is made to familiarise the minds of school-children with the idea of war. Thus the Secretary of the Royal Air Force Display Committee, a Government servant, addressed a letter before the display of 1927 to all the educational authorities in the London area and Home Counties, and others within reach of London, inviting them to organise parties of school-children to attend the rehearsal of this display previous to the actual event. In Parliament, the President of the Board of Education, Lord Eustace Percy, a former member of the Diplomatic Service, when asked to protest, refused, saying that he agreed with the view of the Committee that the display might be of interest and educational value to the children. So where the local educational authorities were complacent or tractable, these young children were taken in their numbers to witness the spectacle of war aeroplanes dropping real bombs on dummy villages.

And during the late war the population of London crowded the tunnels of the Underground railways, or the cellars of their houses, or fled nightly to Brighton in order to lessen the danger from a primitive form of air attack which in a future war will be intensified a hundredfold. How soon the pleasure-loving people forget with the diversions of peace and the steady propaganda and suggestion of militarism for a future war. The crowd gloats to-day over the destruction of a native village in the Sudan or in Arabia.

What will it find to gloat over to-morrow?

£16,000,000 is not spent by impoverished England on an Air Force for the sole purpose of bringing the blessings of civilisation to any part of Africa or Arabia or to rescue missionaries. The money is spent, in the words of the officially declared Government policy, in order to provide an Air Force of such strength that the strongest Air Power in the world would hesitate to attack England. Why should she hesitate to attack England? Because of that blessed word "reprisals." The British Air Force exists partly for the purpose of attacking with bombs charged with highest explosives, poison gases, or disease germs, the crowded white populations of industrial cities. The British Air Force and other Air Forces exist for the purpose of terrorising whole peoples with the most frightful form of warfare yet invented by man's genius. And the very children who cheered the bombing from the air of the native village in 1927 may be cowering in their cellars with *their* children in 1937.

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The British League of Nations Union has made some efforts to organise peace teaching and instruction in

the aims and objects of the League of Nations in the schools. On July 8th, 1927, Professor Morison had a letter in the London *Times* elaborating this scheme. It was answered in the same newspaper on July 13th following, by a prominent Conservative Member of Parliament, Sir Cyril Cobb. He is a typical Conservative politician, with some influence in his party. Patriotism to this type means hating somebody or something. The day before yesterday it was the French; yesterday the Germans; to-day the Russians or Chinese; to-morrow it may well be the Americans. Occasionally the dislike is switched to sections of their own countrymen, either Papists, or labour leaders, or teetotallers, or others from whom they differ. In home and foreign politics they divide mankind into two sections: those who agree with them, and scoundrels.

Cobb wrote as follows:

“The letter of Professor Morison in *The Times* of July 8th is a timely and effective warning which should be noted by all those who are in any way connected with education. The prospect of a new compulsory propaganda being launched in our schools, under the auspices of such a society as the League of Nations Union, is alarming.

“The Union is very unlikely to include in its programme the inculcation of those basic virtues by which our Empire has become great—namely, the patriotism and fine spirit of a race whose traditions and life are those of the seas. Its programme would naturally be international in its ideas, pacifist in tendency, and calculated to undermine the natural patriotism on which the salvation of a nation depends.

“Two outstanding examples of detrimental educational propaganda may be given. Germany for many years taught militarism in her schools, and generations of Americans have been brought up on tainted history with results that are patent. The first example was certainly one of the prime causes tending towards the claim of Germany to dominate the world as of right, which caused the Great War, and the second is one of the reasons why too many people in the United States misread the character and misunderstand the intentions of our people. The falsification of history for propaganda purposes is now widely practised, as Professor Morison indicates, and the apparent attempt of the internationally minded League of Nations Union to teach doctored history in the State and other schools may, perhaps, open the eyes of patriotic Britons to a grave public danger. It is, therefore, to be hoped that education authorities and heads of colleges who have hitherto adopted the practice of disallowing the propaganda of any societies, however well-meaning, in their schools, will decline to alter this attitude when, or if, approached by the League of Nations Union.”

Sir Cyril voiced openly what thousands of representative and influential Englishmen are saying every day in private. The above letter is symptomatic. *N.B.:* (1) Patriotism—*i.e.*, pugnacious Nationalism, is necessary for the salvation of the country. (2) America *to-day* is bracketed with Germany *before* the war. (3) Education in the history, aims, and objects of the League of Nations is considered undesirable. These Cobbs and their dupes will ruin us all yet.

It is customary to blame the newspapers in all countries for nationalistic belligerency and to accuse them of stirring up strife and fanning the flames of popular resentment. It is easy to exaggerate here, especially as to the influence of the Press in moments of popular exaltation—*e.g.*, mobilisations and General Elections. The Press then gives the public what the public wants, or thinks it wants. In politics, especially, the platform can beat the Press if the platform is good enough. But the influence of the Press is cumulative. Its real power lies in its opportunities for selecting and presenting the news and the way this is done. If, for example, the Press of a country fixes on a neighbour or a potential enemy (and in Europe this often means one and the same thing) and holds up that neighbour or potential enemy *for a series of years* as an object of fear, suspicion, hatred, and derision, a national resentment is formed against that neighbour or potential enemy, which in moments of mental stress, terror, or excitement is mistaken for patriotism. This process has begun already in America *vis-à-vis* England and in England *vis-à-vis* America. And in both countries and in Italy, Japan, France, Poland, Russia, and Spain, large sections of the Press glorify war in general, and are accustoming the minds of the people to the idea of another one.

But of all the means of moulding public opinion, probably the greatest and the most efficacious is the cinematograph screen. This great popular form of entertainment has more influence on the minds of the people, old and young, than the churches, the Press, and the political platforms combined; and, consciously or unconsciously, the production of films has not been blameless. In the years immediately following 1918, the war film was unpopular. But there has been a notable re-

vival of it in the last two or three years. A number of British war films have been reproduced and new ones have been manufactured, and these British war films, in particular, are frankly propagandist. They glorify war, they appeal to Nationalism, they hold up the enemy in the worst light, and they pander to the latent fighting instincts we have inherited from our jungle and troglodyte ancestors. Examples are the military films *Ypres* and *Mademoiselle from Armentières*, and the naval film *Zeebrugge*, the latter having been shown to thousands of school-children. A mimic representation of *Zeebrugge*, incidentally, with models, was an immensely popular feature of the British Empire Exhibition in 1925, and the specially organised pilgrimages of children to Wembley were all taken to see this scene of death and destruction, to their intense delight. Their latent atavistic instincts responded according to plan.

But with regard to the films, a very ambitious picture, known as *The Battle of the Falkland Islands*, illustrating episodes of the war in the Pacific and South Atlantic has recently been made. It deals with the destruction of a British squadron at Coronel by German cruisers and then the trapping and sinking in their turn of the Germans by the British battle-cruisers. The British Admiralty threw itself whole-heartedly into the making of this film, and the most powerful British squadron in commission, the Mediterranean Fleet, was placed unreservedly at the disposal of the producers. The fleet went to sea and carried out firing with its heavy guns for the sole purpose of the making of this film.

Another British naval film, *The Flag Lieutenant*, is frankly militarist. Let anyone who doubts the possibility of war, if we pursue our present course, attend a big theatre when a war film is being shown and note the

cheers of delight when the hero runs his sword through an enemy, or his faithful marine servant bayonets a Turkish rifleman. Or let this agnostic see that fine American film, *The Big Parade*. This is not direct propaganda for war, and shows some of its horrors. But note the cheers when one of the American infantrymen brings down the German sniper from the tree, or when the German aeroplane is shot down by an anti-aircraft gun and falls blazing in flames to earth with its human occupants.

Another war film "shot" in 1927 is, I fear, typical. This is *The Flight Commander*, representing modern aerial warfare, the "enemy" in this film being the Chinese. My friend Sir Alan Cobham, one of the leading British fliers, bombs the main street of a Chinese village with great gusto. The British producers of this film will not attempt to sell it in China, and if they did the British Foreign Office would step in and prevent its sale in the Celestial Kingdom. But we can anticipate the Russian propagandists purchasing the film and supplying it to Chinese cinematograph theatres free of charge.

I have heard of only one film advocating peace. This is an educational film dealing with the history of the League of Nations, called *The World War and After*, and produced by the British League of Nations Union.

The Germans, for their part, have produced some modern war films, one telling the story of the *Emden*, another of the Battle of Jutland. There is this to be said, however, for the post-war militarist *commercial* films: they do not represent all the enemy actors as cads or beasts. Not so a real propaganda film such as *The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse*. Since Valentino's death this film has been revived, obviously for commercial purposes, because of the posthumous popu-

larity of the great Italian film actor. This film is in the real war spirit, and represents all the Germans as brutes and the Frenchmen and their friends as heroes and angels. The diplomats have been taking a hand in the matter with reference to this film. The German Ambassador in Washington actually protested to the State Department against the resurrection of the *Four Horsemen*, as did the German Ambassador in Warsaw to the Polish Government against its presentation there. In England or America the *Four Horsemen* is comparatively innocuous; but it is a very mischievous film to show in Poland or France in the present state of Europe.

On the other hand, the Germans have in the negative some films taken in the battle line by German operators during the war of so horrible a character that it is said they will prove very effective propaganda against war. The German authorities have prevented their release on account of the realism and horror of the events depicted. Should these films be ultimately released, it will be a test of the sincerity of the various Governments of to-day as to whether they will permit them to be shown in their countries. Again, the great American film, *What Price Glory?* is strongly anti-war, and some counter-balance to the others I have mentioned. The American film industry as a whole can be acquitted of deliberately producing propaganda films glorifying war and militarism. Its objects are frankly commercial and not political. Yet the German Government protested against the showing in France of *Mare Nostrum*, produced by the firm of Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer. There were rumours in 1927, however, of an unholy alliance between certain elements in the American film producing industry and the American Army. The industry was to "boost" militarism, combat pacifist doctrines, and advertise the army. On their part the United States military authorities were to

supply an army of "supers" from the troops. The official excuse, should these rumours be correct—and it must be observed that the "Movie Czar," Mr. Will Hayes, has been made a Colonel in the Signal Corps of the United States Army—will be that the propaganda is to help recruiting. This is the usual excuse made in Britain. And if the army is utilising the films in the United States, the navy will soon copy its example.

But though the American film industry can plead innocence in the past, and, except where the Government has taken a hand, the British film industry is not very guilty, the Germans and the Poles have been producing films against each other for deliberately propagandist purposes. Thus the Denlig Company, controlled by a prominent German Nationalist leader, Herr Hugenberg, produced a film in 1927 entitled *A Land under the Cross*, showing the persecutions of the Germans by the Polish authorities in Upper Silesia. As soon as it was shown, the Polish Minister in Berlin made an official protest. Yet it has been exhibited since all over Germany. A similar film entitled *The Burning Frontier*, dealing with the Corridor, had its title altered to *Homeland* after official diplomatic protest by the Poles. In these stories the angelic German women are harried and persecuted and insulted by the amorous Polish officials; the Poles are shown as drunken debauchees and robbers, and the Germans as faithful and pure patriots. The usual happy ending shows the steel-helmeted German soldiers either rescuing the German heroine or chasing away the cowardly Polish incendiaries from her home while the band plays "Deutschland über Alles."

The Polish Government, not to be outdone, has produced similar films, or subsidised their production, in which the Germans are shown as cowardly sots and the Poles as high-minded heroes. Here the beautiful

Polish maidens fall into the clutches of the lecherous German commanders and are rescued by handsome Polish officers who put the cowardly Germans to flight, to the playing of the Polish National Anthem by the orchestra, or the pianist, according to the standard of the Polish picture-house. And their production is regularly followed by diplomatic protests in Warsaw, laid officially by the German Minister. An attempt has been made at boycotting the German films produced by the Ufa and Denlig Companies from the Polish market, and the Germans have threatened to boycott the Metro-Goldwyn Company from the German cinema theatres. This Polish-German cinematograph duel is the most mischievous development in the industry since the war. For we have here a competition in hate generation by means of the cinematograph screen. Russia is also producing war films, but not yet aimed at any particular country. Thus the Soviet State Military Cinematograph Studio produced eight educational war films in 1927, bearing such titles as *The War against War*, *The Life Story of the Tank*, and *The Chemical War in the Air*. These are for Russian domestic consumption.

But some of the war films produced in England and America, referred to above, are just as dangerous to the world as a whole. For films that glorify war and enhance its romance will have a cumulative effect on the mind of humanity. And if ever we tackle this question at the root, we shall ban such films from the screens for all time.

Military parades, naval displays, aerial pageants, war films, nationalistic battle songs, a powerful Press subtly praising the institution of war—what chance has the feeble propaganda of the "peace societies" against all these? Conditions are ripening for another great war, and the public mind is being prepared for it.

CHAPTER XII

THE DRIFT TOWARDS WAR

Meaning of modern war—Last naval campaign fought at long range—Intensive land fighting—Marshal Foch on the next war—New war would spread—Its results—Outlook for England, America, and Japan—Prestige and security—Hostility to America in England—The vicious circle—The spectre of war at the Coolidge Conference.

Do those who lightly contemplate another great war realise what it would mean? The war of 1914 to 1918 was the most terrible convulsion that mankind had ever experienced. This was due to the partial application of modern science and invention, and especially of the science of the chemist, to fighting. Yet at sea the rival navies never really got to grips, and the one great fleet action was abortive in its immediate results.

The naval campaign as a whole was conducted at long range, though the hapless merchantmen of the Allied Powers, technically non-combatants, suffered the miseries of the submarine campaign. The most active part of the naval war was a prolonged skirmish between the German submarines and the British and Allied small craft fitted out to combat them. These bore the brunt of the fighting. The main navies never fought a pitched battle. Later in these pages I shall show what naval warfare under modern conditions, with both sides determined on a fight to a finish, would mean.

But on land a score of nations, comprising the majority of the human race, were at each other's throats for four years. The flames of the furnace burned higher and higher, continuously fed with the bodies of young men.

Yet the full resources of the engineer, the chemist, and the electrician were not employed in the first two or three years. For all the armies in 1914 commenced with the doctrine evolved from the preceding military campaigns: the South African War, the Russo-Japanese War in Manchuria, and the Balkan Wars. The infantryman with his rifle was the combatant unit, the deciding factor. Artillery and aircraft, and later the tanks, were considered mere adjuncts to the infantry battalions.

As the war progressed and the latent resources of the nations were mobilised, the mechanical side of the war increased in importance, and the battles became more terrible. From a mere observation machine, for example, the aeroplane itself became a fighting unit. Had the war continued another year, the aircraft employed would have been four times in number and power than at the time of the Armistice. For the Allies and America had decided on a terrific programme of aeroplanes. The mass of the artillery was increasing with every week of the fighting, the tanks were being prepared by the thousand, and would presently have been numbered by the tens of thousand. The cavalry had disappeared and the infantrymen were disappearing.

Towards the end the foot soldier was tending to become only an instrument for occupying the positions out of which the enemy had been blown by superior artillery fire.

Chemical warfare had become normal. If there is another war on the large scale it will begin where the last one left off, but with increased devilment of the weapons employed. The aircraft, the artillery, the tanks, the poisons, have all become more efficient and therefore more potent. And the development of aircraft has made the direct attack on the civil population of an enemy. the recognised method of bringing pressure to bear upon

him. Let those who suppose that the next great war will be a mere repetition of the last great war ponder these words of Marshal Foch :

“ The military mind always imagines that the next war will be on the same lines as the last. That has never been the case and never will be. One of the great factors in the next war will obviously be aircraft. The potentialities of aircraft attack on a large scale are almost incalculable.”

And as the civilian populations will be more vulnerable to attack than the armies or navies, they will bear the main brunt of the new frightfulness. The industrial nations are capable of immense military effort by very reason of their engineering resources. That is why in the abortive conferences which have been held since the Great War on reduction of land armaments certain Powers, notably the French with their logical reasoning, have insisted on reckoning the latent military resources in the engineering factories, chemical and steel producing plants of possible combatants.

Again Marshal Foch. On July 10th, 1927, the famous soldier gave an interview to a London journal, the *Weekly Dispatch*. He began by saying :

“ You ask me to tell you something of the next war. *Nothing is easier*. Take the conditions that prevailed on the Western Front in 1918, and amplify them by adding new and more powerful weapons of destruction and more and more harrowing features. That should give you a pretty good idea of the war that will be fought in the course of the next *fifteen or twenty years* on a vastly larger scale than the last great conflict. Such a war will be a world war and will not be localised in any

sense of the word, for almost every country will take part in it, and the combatants will include not only the manhood but the women and children of each nation."

Munitions of war to-day can be turned out as quickly as the soldiers can be trained. Mechanically skilled men can become efficient artillerymen or tank gunners in a few weeks. With intensive training infantrymen can be made ready for the holocaust in six weeks. Under the old parade-ground methods with infantrymen fighting shoulder to shoulder in close order the process of making a soldier was a long one ; but to-day the infantryman (if he survives as a fighting unit) must go forward in an attack, as his only chance of life is to keep up with his own creeping artillery barrage, and if there is any sign of wavering a barrage can be put down behind him. This was actually done in the case of certain troops, whom I will not specify, on the European Front in the Great War.

For the closely interlocked nations of Europe another great war on that continent would mean intensive fighting on land, at sea, and in the air, if the peace were once broken in earnest.

Owing to the system of alliances, the fears, the resentments, and the greeds of the various peoples concerned, it is hard to see how any of the nations, old and new, that took part in the late war could avoid being dragged in again. Britain, owing to her engagements and commitments, would have as hard a task as any in maintaining neutrality. But certainly France, Germany, Belgium, Russia, Finland, Poland, the three Baltic provinces, Czecho-Slovakia, Roumania, Hungary, Austria, Italy, the whole of the Balkans, and Turkey would be involved. Spain would be in danger, and only

Portugal, Switzerland, and the northern neutrals of the late war would have any real chance of escaping the maelstrom.

The result would be utter ruin, bankruptcy, revolution, starvation, and finally Bolshevism everywhere. America and Japan are the only two major Powers who could manage to avoid being involved in some way, but they would suffer in the general world depression and the annihilation of international trade. As before, the inhabitants of the colonies would take up the gage of battle and the subject peoples of Asia and Africa would have to choose between their young men being used as soldiers or themselves revolting against the Imperialist Powers.

I shall deal later with some of the developments of modern weapons, and will show that the next great war, should it come to plague mankind, will be more intensive, and more damaging than the last in as great a degree as the World War of 1914 to 1918 was more intensive and damaging than the Napoleonic Wars of a hundred years before.

What of the three great Maritime Powers, the British Empire, America, and Japan? If the European caldron remains simmering but never boils over, are they themselves quite clear of danger? In the month of June, 1927, the Geneva Naval Conference was held between the representatives of Japan, America, and the British Empire. These three Powers are *to-day* the only ones capable of waging a prolonged war on the great scale. Yet they are separated from each other by immense ocean distances. Are they capable of fighting? Certainly. Is war possible between them? Of course. Otherwise, why do the American admirals, British admirals, and Japanese admirals stand behind their political chiefs, seated round the horse-shoe table in the

Palais des Nations, and ply them with the figures of the number of ships, sailors, and cannon of the rival navies? Why do my friends Congressmen Butler and Brittain talk continuously of the number of British cruisers and demand an American Fleet equal to the British Fleet?

Congressman Brittain is one of the leaders of the American Big Navy Party. Talking with him I found myself meeting exactly the same type, mentally and physically, that abounds in the smoking-rooms of the political clubs in London, and on both the front and back benches of that part of the House of Commons occupied by the Conservative Party. If he were a poet he would be engaged in writing an American version of "Rule, Britannia!" To him, America's future lies on the water. He doesn't want war, but it keeps him awake at night to think of an American Navy List less in the numbers of tons, guns, ships, sailors, torpedo-tubes, funnels, and masts than the British Navy List.

Congressman Butler, on the other hand, Chairman of the Congress Naval Committee, is a pure sentimentalist, seeking for the opportunity to love all the world, but all the more dangerous in that his thwarted friendliness may turn into bitter distrust and suspicion. These two gentlemen and their friends agitate accordingly. If it is simply a matter of America's prestige, then the agitation is very wicked, though I cannot acquit my own countrymen of blame. It was that selfish pride in a nation's potentialities for war that led the Kaiser of Germany to his doom. It was prestige, counting only the material power of a country and not its moral righteousness, that led him to demand a navy of such size that he put the fear of losing their sea supremacy into the hearts of the British people and caused them to answer with an expansion of their Fleet. This led to

a naval shipbuilding race, and was one of the causes of the Great War. That blessed word "security" with its allied term "preparedness" was always being trotted out. Security from whom? And preparedness against whom? Figures of total tons of shipping, numbers of guns, of torpedo-tubes, of sailors, are used like hucksters bargaining for prices of commodities. If there is no possibility of war between Japan and America, or America and Britain, or Britain and Japan, what does it matter how many ships they build, or what guns they carry, or how many sailors they enlist and train?

If the three nations concerned would sign a solemn pact never to engage in war against each other, and behaved accordingly, all these calculations, doubts, suspicions, bargainings, and debates could be dispensed with.

One more symptom of the disease: on July 6th, 1927, when the Geneva Naval Conference between America, England, and Japan had reached a critical stage and threatened to be abortive, the London *Times* printed at the head of its middle page a letter from Admiral Wilfrid Henderson. This is the most prominent position in the most important British journal from the official point of view. Incidentally *The Times* newspaper is controlled by the Astor family, who are certainly not anti-American. It may be taken as representing the views of the moderate majority of the English governing class. After attacking Professor Gilbert Murray for pleading for an agreement with America for equality in cruisers, the Admiral ended with these words:

"At first sight it would seem to the man-in-the-street, perhaps, that parity in cruiser strength as between the British Empire and the United States

is eminently fair. What he does not realise is that when the British Empire is at war its cruisers, in the early stages of war, are necessarily spread all over the trade routes. When the United States is at war, a wireless message can be broadcast to all its merchantmen at sea, directing them to enter neutral ports, and all United States cruisers are thereby at once liberated for service with the fleet or for an offensive *guerre de course*—the United States not being dependent on any oversea supplies.

“The position is, therefore, this: England has frankly shown how her cruiser needs arise—we insist on that minimum number of cruisers. If America insists on building to parity, that is her affair, but it would not be an act of good will, nor would it advance the cause of the limitation of armaments, nor would it present to other Naval Powers a very encouraging example of ‘give and take,’ which is the fundamental principle in the settlement of international affairs.”

These words envisage a war between the British Empire and America. *The Times* chose to print it. No one protested.

And the Admiral's utterance is not isolated. It voices a widely held opinion in governing circles in England. If this talk continues, and a new race in naval armaments is run, it will be good-bye to Anglo-American friendship, and another World War will be possible or even probable. And all because the Washington Conference of 1921, though successful up to a point, left a wide loophole by not limiting the number of cruisers that the naval nations of the world, the signatories of

that Treaty, are entitled to build. Another blunder was the failure to insist on the abolition of the submarine. The French and Italians, unable to afford battleships, clung to the submarine and still cling to this devilish device. Because they were building submarines, the British Admiralty demanded cruisers. And because of the British cruiser programme the Americans demanded more cruisers likewise. These again gave the excuse for more British cruisers.

The vicious circle is complete. It can only be broken by altering our whole ideas about war. War must be ruled out as a legality.

The spectre of war stalked always through the conference rooms at the Geneva Naval Conference in 1927. Its shadow darkened counsel. The fear of it led to the naval rivalry unashamedly disclosed.

I would not be honest, and I would be eating my own words in many a speech in Parliament, if I did not admit that the pace has been set by the British Admiralty since 1921. My saving qualification is that this pace has been set against the wishes of successive Governments in Britain, against the efforts of the last two British Chancellors of the Exchequer, Conservative and Labour alike, and against the judgment of all the saner elements in Great Britain.

And the Washington Conference of 1921, the one and only even partly successful measure taken by great nations for the limitation of armaments, was expected to make this very pace-setting by the British Admiralty impossible. The Geneva Conference failed likewise. Let us examine the events which led up to this deplorable state of affairs.

CHAPTER XIII

NAVAL RIVALRY: WASHINGTON AND GENEVA

Fleet rivalry after the war—Circumstances of calling of 1921 Washington Conference—Senator Borah—Results of Conference—Influence of the Admirals—Loopholes—The Washington type cruiser—Her cost—First Labour Government stampeded by Admiralty—Admiralty repeats success with next Government—Churchill—Beaten by Admiralty—The cruiser programme of 1925—Japanese and American programmes retarded—Coolidge Conference of 1927—Bridgeman—Lord Cecil—Mussolini's comment—Causes of failure—Cruiser figures—Difficulties of trade protection—New conditions of ocean warfare—Italian case—Blockade weapon—"Parity" and sentiment.

FOLLOWING on the last war the three principal Naval Powers—the United States, Britain, and Japan—found themselves with heavy shipbuilding programmes arising out of the war. Battleships, battle cruisers, destroyers, and submarines in great numbers were in various stages of completion for their respective navies. The financial strain was felt by both Japan and Britain, and there was a very natural call for economy in America. France, on the other hand, flushed with victory, was beginning to talk of building up her navy again. Her naval chiefs had had, perforce, to bow to army requirements during the war, and they were able to make out a good case for naval expenditure after the peace. And would not the expected German reparations provide the money?

In spite of the financial stringency, a race in the construction of great battleships, heavily armoured, carrying guns of the greatest size and of terrific hitting power, costing between £7,000,000 and £8,000,000

apiece, was actually in progress within two years of the Armistice.

It was under these circumstances that the then President of the United States issued his invitations for a Conference to the five principal Naval Powers—the United States, Britain, Japan, France, and Italy—at Washington. It met in 1921. That Conference achieved great things. It was arranged to build no more battle-ships for ten years. Many of the ships recently completed or approaching completion were to be destroyed. This was agreed to and was done.

Senator Borah is popularly supposed to be the real author of the Washington Naval Conference of 1921 and the Coolidge Naval Conference of 1927. The most powerful individual in the United States where public opinion is concerned in all matters of foreign affairs, he combines intense patriotism with an ardent desire for peace. His anti-Imperialist patriotism corresponds closely to the political make-up of the British Labour moderates. If Borah had been an Englishman, he would be a great and moderating figure in the political Labour world. He has wisely refused all invitations to visit Europe, though I doubt if the magnificence of the Earl of Derby's country home of Knowsley, the disarming geniality of the Earl himself, or the attentions of Buckingham Palace could, any more than can the stateliness of the White House or the luxury of the palaces of the American millionaires, cause him to deviate one inch from the line of his firmly held opinions. It is a pity that there is no means of contact between the Senator and the British Embassy at Washington. And I would like him to meet some of our representative British politicians in an American atmosphere. Our politicians would benefit.

At the 1921 Conference, America surrendered a potential battleship superiority. And the American public supposed that all-round naval parity with the British Empire had been agreed upon. Many tall ships, British, American, and Japanese, were scrapped under this agreement. Britain was permitted to construct two great Dreadnought battleships, the *Nelson* and the *Rodney*, but in exchange she scrapped four efficient battleships already completed. The number of aeroplane carriers was limited, and the size of cruisers to be built was limited to 10,000 tons.

But the *number* of cruisers to be built was limited in no way. Here the door was left wide open for a rivalry as dangerous, and nearly as costly, as that forsworn by the Convention itself. Only the plotters and schemers saw through it at the time.

It must be remembered that every nation taking part in the Conference was represented by senior admirals. Naval flag officers, throughout the world, form a close trade union comparable only to the trade union of monarchs. In every one of the countries participating in the Washington Conference there was resistance from the naval chiefs to attendance at the Conference at all. They fought hard in council and behind the scenes to make the Washington Conference of 1921 abortive. They were beaten on the battleship question by public opinion and their respective Secretaries of the Treasuries and Finance Ministers. This defeat was assisted by a strong feeling, which had penetrated even into the ranks of the national navies, and rose out of war experience, that the day of the great battleship was over.

But though they gave way on capital ships and aeroplane carriers, the allied admirals—and they were allied for this purpose—got their way where 10,000-ton

cruisers were concerned. At that time 10,000 tons did not seem very much as compared to the 35,000 tons of the most modern battleships and aeroplane carriers, or the 41,000 tons of the latest battle cruiser, the British *Hood*. But there were no fast cruisers of this type and of such tonnage actually built or even building for any of the navies of the world. In all these conferences on armaments the "experts" play a great rôle. It was so at the Coolidge Conference in 1927. It would be as sensible to summon a conference of bookmakers and jockeys to limit or abolish horse-racing as it is to gather together the admirals and generals of any nation to limit or abolish armaments. Their whole training is in the opposite direction. To expect these gallant officers to welcome armament reduction is to expect too much of frail human nature.

The 10,000-ton so-called "light" cruiser became the fashion at once in the naval world, like a new fashion straight from Paris in the feminine world. They out-classed all the ships of the cruiser type in existence, and they set the new standard of naval strength. All the best brains amongst the naval constructors of the nations concerned set to work on this 10,000-ton limitation, and they produced a vessel already known as the "Washington type" cruiser with, first of all, the hitherto unheard-of speed of thirty-five nautical miles an hour; secondly, with some armour worked into the hull; and, thirdly, with the colossal armament, for a "light" cruiser, of nine, ten, or even twelve guns of a new design and 8-inch calibre, equal in hitting power and range to the 12-inch guns mounted in the older battleships which fought at the Battle of Jutland.

Owing to the immensely powerful engines carried in these new ships and the greater cost to-day of some

of the materials used in them, their price is about £3,000,000 each. This was the price of battleships before 1914. For battleships a ratio between Britain, Japan, and America of 5/3/5 was agreed upon at Washington. But, I repeat, no limit was set to the number of cruisers.

Hence all the trouble.

Britain has always been strong in cruisers, having specialised in this kind of craft on account of the heavy seaborne commerce of the British Empire and the great length of our marine trade routes. The British Admiralty had been far-sighted enough to clear the Navy List of all the older cruisers.

Let us see the sequel.

Nothing very startling happened in Britain for two years. The ship designers were busy behind the scenes. In the autumn of 1923 the Conservative Government in Britain was beaten in a General Election. In the beginning of the following year, 1924, a Labour Government, the first in Britain, took office. Certain influences were brought to bear, and a Conservative, Lord Chelmsford, who had not been active in politics, but was a former Viceroy of India, took the post of First Lord of the Admiralty. The Labour Government had not a majority in Parliament over the Liberal and Conservative parties combined, and the Conservative party alone was actually stronger than the party in office.

No sooner had Ramsay MacDonald accepted the seals of office as Prime Minister than a violent naval agitation commenced. Remember that Admiral of the Fleet Earl Beatty, with immense fame and prestige arising out of the war, was executive head of the Navy. The Conservative Party was soon in full cry in support of the Admiralty, and in the spring the Labour Government bowed to the storm, though it was only a storm

in a teacup. The Japanese naval staff, and, for that matter, the American naval staff, were quoted as proposing programmes for building cruisers of the new "Washington" type. None had been commenced. They had only been talked of. But the Admiralty forced a building programme of five of these new ships in one year upon the Government at Westminster. This was not all.

These five cruisers were of this new 10,000-ton type, and outclassed anything built or building anywhere else in the world. The ball was set rolling. There was an answering note from the naval staffs in Paris, Rome, Tokio, and Washington. Heavy building programmes were projected in all these capitals.

At the end of 1924 the first Labour Government was beaten in the election and resigned office. The Conservatives came in again in overwhelming strength. By tradition the Conservative party has always stood for a great Navy. The chiefs of the Conservative party during Labour's brief tenure of office had restated their traditional policy and committed themselves to the Admiralty.

Emboldened by their success in 1924, the British Admiralty commenced a new naval scare in the spring of 1925. They demanded a large building programme of cruisers spread over a number of years. But they were resisted by the economists in the Cabinet and in the Conservative party, led by Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer Winston Churchill in the rôle of poacher-turned-gamekeeper. A fierce fight raged in the Cabinet and on the floor of the House of Commons. It might have been supposed that the Empire was in great danger. Let me quote the actual figures given by Lord Beatty in writing during the 1925 controversy: "Of modern cruisers afloat, of which many under the British flag, it must be allowed, are of small size built for work in the North Sea during the war and unfitted for cruising over the great

stretches of the Atlantic and the Pacific, Great Britain has 49, Japan 18, the United States 9, and France 7."

No foreigner can grumble at American desires to increase the cruiser strength of the American Navy, even if no new ships were built by the other principal navies of the world for a period. It must be admitted, frankly, that the American cruiser strength is insufficient by itself, in view of the responsibilities of the American Navy the world over. This lack of cruisers is, in part, compensated for by the strong fleet of submarines and the torpedo-boat destroyers owned by America.

It might be supposed that the case for economy and prudence on the part of the British Treasury was overwhelming. The British financial position was bad, though it was stronger than in 1927, following on the industrial disputes in England in 1926. Winston Churchill is one of our ablest Parliamentarians and a very brilliant man. A former Big Navy advocate, he is now the watchdog of the Treasury. Yet he lost. He is the perfect type of a political soldier of fortune. Four hundred years ago he would have been the leader of an army of *condottieri*, for which he has the military attainments. An exceptionally good departmental chief, with a great capacity for work, in brain-power in the Conservative party he is like a sprat among the minnows. He realises quite clearly what Anglo-American rivalry will lead to. But the strongest and toughest elements in the Conservative party are Jingoists where the Navy is concerned, and Anglo-American friendship is a secondary consideration. These ranting Jingoists are perfectly sincere in their Jingoism. And Churchill hopes one day to lead them as Prime Minister. In his better moods he would wish to lead them towards peace. For he knows what war will mean in the future. But in the meantime he must temporise and beat the patriotic "blue-water" drum with

the rest of his party. The curse of post-war politics in all countries is that policy must be reduced to the lowest common denominator of the herd.

To realise why the Board of Admiralty won, it must be understood what a tremendous influence this department wields in British politics. The very facts that Britain is dependent for her food for nine months in the year out of the twelve on overseas supplies, and that most of the raw materials needed for her manufactures come from overseas, make the English people particularly susceptible to naval scares.

On this occasion the whole Board of Admiralty threatened to resign.

In the end the Admiralty won, and the only compromise reached was that all the cruisers agreed upon for the next five years were not to be of the largest size of 10,000 tons. The final programme of sixteen cruisers fixed upon was as follows :

In 1925, 4 of 10,000 tons.

In 1926, 2 of 10,000 tons and 1 of 7,500 tons.

In 1927, 1 of 10,000 tons and 2 of 7,500 tons.

In 1928, 1 of 10,000 tons and 2 of 7,500 tons.

In 1929, 1 of 10,000 tons and 2 of 7,500 tons.

The total cost of this *additional* programme for ship-building alone, with the cost of some submarines, torpedo-boat destroyers, and an aircraft carrier, will in the five years reach £48,000,000. This, of course, is colossal spending, and far beyond the means of the British Treasury. The least of the evils resulting is that the expenditure on education, public health, and the like must be and has been cut down.

The Japanese naval building programme was, on the other hand, postponed for a year owing to financial stringency following the great earthquake. The British

Admiralty was invited to retard its programme. It refused. The Navy Appropriations in America were delayed owing to President Coolidge's plan for a new naval conference to limit the building of cruisers as battleships had been limited in 1921. The British Admiralty continued to build. Then came an American and Japanese demand for corresponding building programmes. The new naval race had commenced in earnest. Such were the preliminaries to the conference called on the invitation of President Coolidge.

Coolidge has been described as always silent at interviews, and the description is given as showing a demerit. I found him able to put his point of view very clearly and concisely on any subject that interested him, and in the spring of 1927 he was certainly exercised in his mind at the prospect of an Anglo-American race in naval ship-building. It is particularly mean to describe his efforts at limitation of naval armaments by agreement as being due to his desire for a third-term nomination for the American Presidency. Nothing is gained by underrating those with whom we disagree. It was Britain's turn to call a new naval conference. But we should all be grateful to the American President for taking the initiative.

"Cal" Coolidge is sometimes compared to Stanley Baldwin. Both have an apparent simplicity of character. But there the resemblance ceases. There are two schools of thought about Stanley Baldwin. The one school holds that he is a good and well-meaning man, overborne by tougher, stronger, and less scrupulous colleagues. The other school holds that he is a clever hypocrite who sings hymns from a large hymn-book, between the pages of which is the stiletto of an assassin. Whatever his influence in his own Cabinet on domestic affairs, he has had less influence in great, vital questions of foreign

relations, peace and war, armaments and treaties, than any British Prime Minister for fifty years. In their days of power, Ramsay MacDonald, Lloyd George, Asquith, Campbell-Bannerman, Balfour, Rosebery, Gladstone, Salisbury, Disraeli, at least spoke for the majority of their countrymen. Baldwin, at most, speaks for a small minority of conscientious and conscience-stricken members of the governing class, and even these are becoming impatient with him. A great British Prime Minister has an analogous position to a great President of the United States. But to compare Baldwin to an American President is like comparing a village priest to the Papal Secretary of State.

The British Delegation was headed by the First Lord of the Admiralty, Mr. Bridgeman. "Willie" Bridgeman is typical of a tough and still influential element in British political and social life. He is a true product of the English landed aristocracy and a typical squire. Given a certain set of circumstances, his brain will always react automatically in a certain way. Put him at the War Office and he will fight hard for more tanks, more heavy guns, more battalions. Above all, he will insist on retaining the cavalry, and at the Admiralty he will insist on the building of battleships again at the earliest possible moment.

Only four things matter in the make-up of the Bridgemans of the present day: the Constitution, which means The Throne and the Hereditary House of Lords; the Established Church; the dominance of the British Navy; and the survival of the Conservative party—not necessarily in this order of importance.

He looked upon the Geneva Conference as a game of poker. The only use of disarmament conferences to the Bridgeman school is to lessen the armaments of potential enemies. And every strong Power in the world

is a potential enemy. At Geneva he bluffed. And he bluffed with a "four-flush." For while England has men, ships, a naval tradition, and overseas bases, the fifth card of the series, money, is not available. And when it comes to a show-down, Bridgeman's flush will be a burst one. And he made the further mistake of calling for high stakes, when the Americans and Japanese were prepared to play for low stakes. Within these limits of character and outlook is much subtlety of brain. The pose of the simple, bluff, hearty gentleman covers much astuteness and not a little cunning. If Machiavelli had been an Englishman, and alive to-day, he would have had a red face, with bright blue eyes, and would have disarmed his contemporaries by enthusing about fox-hunting and complaining about his golf handicap.

Before the Coolidge Conference it had been intended to confine the British mission to the political head of the Admiralty, Mr. Bridgeman, and a glittering galaxy of admirals and other naval officers of distinction. The incongruity of this being pointed out to Mr. Baldwin, he attempted to reinsure himself by including Viscount Cecil in the mission.

In feudal days the armour-wearing, hard-drinking, hard-riding, soldierly nobles led their vassals by reason of their personal magnetism, courage, and ruthlessness. But they were unlettered, so employed learned priests to advise them on matters of law and to write up their records. These priests were usually the younger sons of the nobility—and Lord Cecil is the younger son of the late Marquis of Salisbury. In medieval times Lord Cecil would have been such a priest, and in due course would have been rewarded with a fat abbey. But he is no more capable of standing up against the Bridgemans, the Churchills, the Amerys, and the Birkenheads of the British Conservative party than the learned

Minister of Blockade in the closing years of the war, and his conscience led him afterwards to attempt the making good of some of the damage for which he was responsible. He will do anything for the ideals of the League of Nations and the cause of peace except fight for them. He has all the qualities of a great missionary for peace except ultimate courage. His resignation took place *after* the conference had failed.

The first British proposals at Geneva in the summer of 1927 were for a total of 70 cruisers. The experts suddenly discovered a liking for small cruisers of 6,000 or 7,000 tons, though in the debates in 1924 the spokesmen for the Admiralty would look at nothing smaller than 10,000 tons.

The cost of the modern cruiser is £250 to £300 per ton, and the cost of such a fleet, therefore, of the smaller vessels alone—i.e., cruisers—will be £150,000,000 to £180,000,000.

The London *Economist* stated during the 1927 Naval Conference, and allowing for the value of the vessels already built, that the cost of the proposed new British cruiser fleet would be £122,570,000 with a permanent yearly cost of upkeep of £10,525,000. The *Economist* went on to say:

“And this colossal bill would be for cruisers alone. In addition we should have to maintain, and from time to time replace, a fleet of 20 to 15 Dreadnoughts, 144 flotilla leaders and destroyers, and from 55 to 65 submarines, to say nothing of aircraft carriers and the host of auxiliary craft which no modern fleet can do without.”

The American delegation proposed that the United States Navy Department should emulate the British Admiralty in building 10,000-ton cruisers. The first thirteen cruisers laid down or projected for the British

Navy after the 1921 Washington Conference, including the two Australian cruisers, commenced in 1925, were all of this type. And the four preceding cruisers of the Frobisher type approximated to this tonnage (9,750 tons). Yet as soon as the Americans proposed to build a score of these 10,000 ton cruisers, and said so at Geneva, a howl was raised by the British "Big Navy" advocates that the new American cruisers would be a strengthening for the United States Battle Fleet. This is arrant nonsense. Such ships could not lie in the line of battle. At Jutland two British *armoured* cruisers found themselves within range of the German battle line while skirmishing ahead of their own battleships. They were stout ships, the *Defence* of 14,600 tons, and the *Warrior* of 13,550 tons. The *Defence* was quickly sunk and the *Warrior* so damaged that she was forced out of the battle. All those German battleships would now be obsolescent if still afloat. Yet it is seriously proposed that 10,000 ton lightly armoured cruisers could "stand up to" the super-Dreadnoughts of to-day!

I repeat that there is nothing easier to-day than to raise a naval scare.

So the experts and their political chiefs met—and parted. The most eloquent comment on the Geneva Naval Conference of 1927 was made by Mussolini. Addressing a meeting of Italian Admirals on July 16th, 1927, the Duce said: "The results of the Disarmament Conference show the necessity of being ready (for war) when the King calls."

To all intents and purposes the Coolidge Conference, as it has been called, was wrecked by the insistence of the delegates concerned on talking in terms of war, instead of in terms of peace. Each one kept his mind firmly fixed on some future war and thought of it in terms of the last war.

At the beginning of the last war the British Navy List contained 130 cruisers armoured and protected, of which 94 in number could be taken as modern or fairly modern. Of these about 27 were with the Grand Fleet, the number varying with the naval situation, 8 with the Mediterranean Fleet, and 4 with other battle fleets. Six were undergoing refits at the outbreak of war.

The remainder, with the addition of Japanese, French, and Russian cruisers, 104 in all, were inadequate to guard the trade routes effectively from the few German cruisers at large. At one time 70 ships were hunting the *Emden* in the Indian Ocean, or denying certain areas of the seas to her. She was eventually run down and destroyed by the Australian cruiser *Sydney* which, at the time news was received of her, was escorting Australian troop ships to Europe. It may be said, therefore, that she was finally engaged and destroyed by an accident. Other German raiders succeeded in evading the strong patrols maintained by the British and Allied warships at later periods during the war. Half those which attempted to break through succeeded. Modern developments have made the attacks on trade at sea easier to a greater extent than they have strengthened the defence. Seventy-five large British passenger liners were commissioned during the course of the war as cruisers, all being employed on the trade routes. Eleven other large merchant ships were commissioned as armed escorts for the convoys. Forty new cruisers were added to the British Navy List during the war. We can never afford a fleet of such size again. Nor will the geographical conditions be so easy. Yet the losses of merchant ships were colossal.

Let us examine the argument that 70 cruisers are required for the protection of the British trade routes. At least 20 must be with the Mediterranean and Atlantic

Fleets. Admiral Jellicoe at the 1927 Conference claimed 25 for the fleets. Of the remaining 45 or 50, 30, or at the most 35, can be at sea at the same time. The remainder must be refuelling, resting, boiler-cleaning, etc., or the efficiency of the whole commerce-protecting fleet will deteriorate. Fighting a fairly equal enemy some of our cruisers will be sunk or damaged early in the campaign.

It is true that armed merchantmen can be used for commerce protection on certain trade routes, but an armed merchantman, as Admiral Jellicoe maintained at the Conference, cannot engage a regular cruiser with any hope of success. Thirty to thirty-five cruisers, therefore, will be available for commerce protection, including the escort of the more important convoys. No doubt in home waters and in areas not too far from land torpedo-boat destroyers can be employed. Submarines can also be used to guard certain important areas. Aircraft will play a similar rôle. But we may take it that the destroyers and aircraft would be more usefully employed in submarine hunting and the submarines in direct fleet operations.

Thirty-five cruisers available out of the 70 for actual work on the trade routes is, therefore, a just estimate, and the number is altogether inadequate against an efficient navy, especially if the enemy has oversea bases. For the German oversea bases were all masked or captured at the beginning of the last war. And once local command of the sea is lost all trade must stop. An example in the last war was the temporary and local command of the Southern Pacific, or rather the waters off the west coast of South America, obtained by the German armoured cruisers *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisnau* and their consorts after they had defeated an inferior force under Admiral Craddock and had sunk the *Good*

Hope and *Monmouth*. All British and Allied trade ceased until they had been sunk in their turn at the Falkland Islands.

The whole strategy of commerce protection at sea has been altered by the introduction of the steam-engine and, still more, by the invention of the internal combustion engine. In the old days the privateer or frigate operating on the trade routes had only a speed of 8 or 9 knots. This was little more than the speed of the merchant vessel she preyed upon. The sailing frigate acting as a commerce destroyer, therefore, could go to sea and cruise till her water was used up; and if she only worked in the far stretches of the oceans she would make few prizes. To do real damage to the trade, therefore, commerce destroyers in the old days had to attack the merchant ships where they congregated. Certain land falls or narrow waters were the most fruitful cruising grounds. "The Soundings" in the western part of the English Channel, the Straits of Gibraltar, Cape San Roque in Brazil, the Cape of Good Hope, the Straits of Malacca, Point de Galle in Ceylon, were all important land falls or nodal points. If these areas were denied to the enemy by superior force, the trade was fairly safe, important convoys, troop ships, etc., being escorted separately.

But with the modern marine engine, a commerce destroyer can cruise at a speed of 20 knots; and the latest cruisers have a full speed of 35 knots. Oil fuel, and, still more, the internal combustion engine, will enable them to undertake very long cruises, and they can distil their own water. Furthermore, to-day, we may expect the commerce raider, whether a surface cruiser, an armed merchantman, or a submarine, to carry sea-planes, thus increasing her area of vision and effective area of operations while at the same time giving notice

of the approach of superior forces. The exploits of the *Alabama* gave the first warning of the new commerce destroying methods. The exploits of the *Emden*, *Karlsruhe*, and other German raiders in the last war were further illustrations. At the beginning of that war the Germans had 2 armoured cruisers, 6 light cruisers, and 4 armed merchant vessels outside the North Sea. They sunk 220,000 tons of British shipping and 30,000 tons of Allied shipping before they were sunk or otherwise disposed of. Later in that war the three German armed auxiliaries which had evaded the British patrols appeared on the ocean trade routes. They sunk 250,000 tons of British and 39,000 tons of Allied merchant shipping.

The successes of the German submarines on the trade routes were still more examples. The speed of the ordinary cargo steamer is 9 or 10 knots. The problem of commerce protection, therefore, under modern conditions is far more difficult. In a future war the British Navy cannot expect to have the same geographical advantages or to be able to dispose of the enemy overseas bases so easily. Thirty-five cruisers (out of a total of 70 for all purposes) or double or treble that number will be quite inadequate. The argument used at Geneva, therefore, may impose on the uninformed public, but not on any informed naval student. Furthermore, the submarine acting as a cruiser is an entirely new factor. And neither 10,000 ton cruisers nor 7,000 ton cruisers are suitable for submarine hunting.

I have referred to the problem of the submarine in some detail later in these pages. 6,692,642 tons of British merchant shipping alone were sunk by submarines during the late war. It is quite true that the British people are dependent on overseas supplies. But their safety will not be ensured by 70 cruisers or twice 70

cruisers. *Failing the outlawry of war*, British security can only be assured by (1) international agreement to ensure the safety of peaceable commerce in war-time, though I admit that much here depends on the good faith of nations who may not keep faith if war remains an institution; (2) the abolition of the submarine; (3) agreements between Britain, Japan, and the United States of America to safeguard each other's commerce in case of war in their own areas; that is, the United States being responsible for the American seaboard, the Western Atlantic and the Eastern Pacific; the British Navy for the Eastern Atlantic, the Mediterranean and Indian Oceans, and the Southern Pacific; and Japan for the China Seas and the Western Pacific. And all these measures are necessary. If the British and American peoples rely on cruisers alone for the safeguarding of commerce they will have a rude awakening one day. But like the Bourbons we learn nothing and forget nothing. We become each year more and more dependent on overseas supplies, our agriculture declines and we look for the mercy of the fickle god of war. Thus Winston Churchill, speaking at the London Mansion House before a great assembly of bankers and merchants on July 12, 1927, during the most critical hours of the Coolidge Naval Conference, delivered himself as follows:

“ I do not believe that the power of the purse has ever settled or will ever settle the fate and destiny of mighty nations and communities. The history of the world shows that many other factors are constantly at work. But I should regard it as the paramount duty of the British Exchequer, in priority to all other considerations, to find any money that was really needed to safeguard those

ocean-borne food supplies without which neither the life nor the independence of the British nation could continue."

To safeguard our food supplies against whom? And by what means? The reference to the "power of the purse" means America. Later, Mr. Churchill said:

"We hold a firm faith that the world will never be riven in twain by the fratricidal conflict of the English-speaking peoples."

Well and good. Then why boggle about a few cruisers, and whether they should carry 8-inch or 6-inch guns? Because we still lean on the broken reed of force and war. The British and American peoples must understand that the very forces which they desire should be of such strength as to safeguard their trade routes are also in a position to deny those trade routes to the nationals of other countries. Sacred egoism can be carried a little too far in the present-day world.

If Ramsay MacDonald had been conducting the negotiations at Geneva with a free hand, he would have seized on the American offer of parity in naval shipping, and that at a low figure, with both hands as a gift from heaven. For, apart from his sentiments and his faith, he knows that the two most unpopular things in England are war and increased taxation. The people may be swept into a war in moments of excitement, but the reaction is all the more thorough; while high taxation, even for battleships, will eventually alienate the English middle class from the Conservative Government.

While the British Admiralty makes its case for a minimum of 70 cruisers for the defence of the trade routes, other nations are not likely to lose sight of the fact

that while defending the trade routes these same cruisers can be used to exercise the pressure of blockade. This weapon is part and parcel of the British system of defence. I use the word "defence" as all wars, by whoever waged, or for whatever object, are always described as defensive. Thus Italy, in declining the invitation of President Coolidge to this very Conference:

"Italy, in fact, has only three lines of communication with the rest of the world, three unescapable lines through Suez, Gibraltar, and the Dardanelles, for her supplies of food and raw materials. . . . Italy must, in fact, also bear in mind other nations which are present or may be present in the Mediterranean, particularly favoured by their weighty geographical position on essential lines of communication and which have many units of various types building, or are elaborating naval programmes of great extent."

For temperamental, political, and geographical reasons the British people have not relied on the power of land armies. In this we resemble the Americans. Both nations when put to it can raise very large armies and will do so again if required. Armies can exercise pressure by the occupation of territory. The modern air weapon can be used to exercise pressure by the destruction of vital points and the terrorising of the civil population. Navies can exercise pressure by bombardments of coastal cities. Such pressure is rarely efficacious by itself, though there are one or two examples in history against smaller Powers. But the well-tried pressure of naval power is by the interruption of ocean communications and the strangling economic injury brought about by the prevention of seaborne trade. This weapon con-

tributed as much as any other to the downfall of Napoleon and to the downfall of Kaiser Wilhelm II.

So long as war remains an institution, the British people will cling to their chosen weapon to the end.

It is the only means we can use to bring pressure to bear on a Continental Power unless we have allies and can place large armies in the field. It is, however, a double-edged weapon, and in the dislocation of world trade by a large-scale blockade the blockader is injured, especially if the blockader is a trading nation like the British.

Now against whom is this weapon to be used in the future? Let us face the facts boldly. Against Italy? Yes: but relations are very good between England and Italy, and the real danger of war in Europe is not between the Italians and the British. Against France? Long before the blockade weapon could be put into force war between England and France would be decided in the air. Against Japan? Possibly; but a close blockade would be difficult, without an overwhelming defeat of the Japanese Navy first. Such a defeat would be unlikely owing to the great distances to be traversed. Without a close blockade Japan could receive her most necessary supplies from China. But in the end successful war on her commerce would ruin her financially. Against Russia? The weapon would be ineffective. No nation is less dependent on seaborne trade than Russia. The war with Russia would be decided on the north-west frontier of India, and further fighting might take place in Mesopotamia.

Against America? Yes, most certainly, if war is considered possible between the British Empire and the United States. The blockade weapon is slow in its effects. But even America would be crippled in the

end by the total severance of her sea communications. With the possible exception of Italy, therefore, the only Great Powers against whom the blockable weapon could be used by Britain in a war so as to affect the course of that war would be America and Japan. And this must be the subconscious thought underlying the declarations of all the delegates at conferences between the three naval Powers for limitation of armaments, so long as war itself is regarded as legal and normal. The British people cannot give up this blockade weapon, they cannot agree to freedom of peaceable commerce on the high seas while the fear of another war obsesses them.

Our attitude is easy to understand.

Yet of all nations who could be injured most effectively by the blockade weapon, Britain has most to lose. For she would be utterly defeated and brought to her knees, could a successful interception of *her* seaborne trade be effected.

The American attitude also is only too easy to understand. Before the Washington Agreement the United States had naval superiority within her reach. She surrendered it for what she believed was equality. The subsequent British cruiser building programme deprived her of that equality. An equal navy with the British Empire is a matter of sentiment with the Americans. So is all other patriotic emotion everywhere else in the world. Wars are made because of a mixture of fear and sentiment. The French feelings of hostility to Germany are sentimental. Is it not time practical men of affairs provided an antidote?

CHAPTER XIV

THE CASE FOR THE ABOLITION OF THE SUBMARINE

French and Italian submarines—Development of the submarine—Menace of submarine cruiser—Attempts to illegalise submarines—Uselessness of cruiser against submarine—Organised fleets little to fear—Threat to merchant shipping—Figures of last war—Heavily armed submarines—Impossibility of employing submarines legally against trade—Why submarines cannot be prepared in secret—Submarines in a war between France and Italy.

WHILE the Big Navy advocates in America, England, and Japan are talking in terms of cruisers, an even greater menace exists in the building of submarines. France and Italy have heavy submarine building programmes in hand. These two Powers are pinning their faith to this diabolical weapon in warfare rather than to cruisers. To show how acute is the menace, France has to-day more submarines under construction than Germany ever had at any time in the years before the war. Furthermore, owing to the advance of naval architecture and engineering science, the modern submarine is a far more powerful and efficient weapon of war, especially against merchant shipping, than she was during the Great War.

With few exceptions, the submarines with which Germany did tremendous damage to the merchant shipping of the world were of small size and designed for work near the coast. Right at the end of the war one or two large German submarines, known as submarine cruisers, were completed. These were able to operate over great distances, were habitable, so that their crews remained efficient during long cruises, and they actually appeared off the African coast thousands

of miles from their German bases, and there sunk merchant vessels. Germany had no overseas bases at that time where these submarine cruisers could replenish with oil and provisions.

Should humanity be plagued by another great war, the ocean-going submarine cruiser of great size and power will be a real menace. Such vessels could arrive secretly by night off New York City and fire shells filled with poison gases into Park Avenue; or they could release poison gas clouds from cylinders to windward off cities in the darkness of night; or they could lay mines by night off every harbour on the American seaboard. Such acts would be contrary to the laws of war. *But a submarine cannot act effectively except against the laws of war and of humanity.*

There is no practical reason why the submarine should not be declared illegal as a weapon of war. A half-hearted attempt towards this end was made by the British at the Paris Conference of 1919, but it did not get very far. A further attempt was made at Washington in 1921 to have the submarine declared illegal. This was supported by Britain, America, and Japan, but it was blocked by France.

The Geneva Conference of 1927 was primarily called to check a building race in cruisers. So far from abolishing the submarine, it embedded it in the shipbuilding programmes and in the navies of the three leading Powers. The so-called compromise nearly reached is useless. The one proposed gain was the inhibition on building further submarines armed with 12-inch guns. France and Italy, of course, can build as many and as large submarines as they like. The maximum displacement for submarines agreed upon at the Conference—namely, 1,800 tons—would enable a vessel to be built

large enough to operate on the most distant trade routes and to carry sufficient fuel to enable her to remain at sea for several weeks. As to the maximum gun calibre suggested—5 inches—this would enable a much more powerful gun than the cargo steamer, as distinct from the liner, can mount to be carried by a submarine, and the resultant vessel would be a real threat to the peaceable merchantman.* All the cruisers that can be built by America and England will not suffice to protect the world's peaceable merchant shipping from decimation by large ocean-going submarines such as are now being built for all the principal navies of the world, or coast towns from gas attacks. Large cruisers are unsuitable for anti-submarine operations. This is the work of the flotillas. But the flotillas cannot operate far from land. The modern submarine can. Germany, with comparatively few submarines, and those of a primitive type, and with no overseas bases, sunk more than 6,000,000 tons of British merchant shipping and 2,000,000 tons of Allied shipping.

The present cruiser building will cost many millions of pounds. But while submarines continue as legal weapons, American and British merchandise and American and British passengers will be insecure on the high seas in war. With submarines in use against merchant shipping in a future war there will be many *Lusitania* episodes. Nor will pious resolutions against the torpedoing of unarmed merchantmen by submarines in war be worth more than the paper they are written on so long as submarines are allowed to exist with trained crews on board. Certain barbarous acts in land warfare are taboo chiefly because of the ease of reprisals against

* At the end of the Geneva Conference all the agreements actually reached were scrapped.

the combatants of the armies committing them. But a hard-pressed Continental nation possessed of submarines will use them to hit her maritime adversary in the weakest spot—his ocean-borne merchandise and nationals.

Let me now examine the arguments for the declared illegality of the submarine.

The case for the abolition of the submarine is, briefly, as follows: the submarine is slow and unwieldy under water and extremely vulnerable. Her one advantage is invisibility. This enables her to attack unseen, and it gives her the strategical advantage of being able to outflank or avoid a blockading line of surface warships.

But just as every poison has its antidote, so the inventions of science, when applied to warfare, produce, sooner or later, counter-inventions able to defeat them. The rifled cannon produced iron armour, the armour-piercing projectile was answered by specially hardened steel armour, and so on. The primitive bulges used during the late war as a defence against torpedoes have given way to a series of thin armoured plates worked into the double bottoms below water. These use up the force of the explosion and prevent it reaching the vitals.

A well-organised and well-handled fleet of warships, once out in blue water and unhampered by troop transports, has little to fear from submarine attack. In the late war the Allied battle fleet, British and American, was often threatened with submarine action, but no successful attack was ever pushed home on the battle line. Outlying cruisers, acting as scouts, were torpedoed, it is true, during operations, but no ship of the line was struck.

The principal defence against submarine attack on battle fleets are screens of torpedo-boat destroyers thrown out well ahead and forcing the submarines to dive deep before they can make their attack on the large ships.

Aeroplanes and seaplanes are also a particularly efficient weapon against submarines, observing them from a height and attacking by means of bombs set to explode under water. Means have been perfected of locating submarines both by sound and by the echo of electrical waves projected through the water. Lastly, the larger surface warships now carry considerable underwater protection against the explosion of the submarine's torpedoes. Yet there is much to be said for the French and Italian claim that the submarine has great uses for defensive purposes. Merchant ships converted into transports for the carrying of troops for an invasion or raid would have much to fear from submarines. The appearance of the first German submarine at the Dardanelles sounded the knell of the great British effort to force the straits. The danger is that submarines maintained nominally for coast defence purposes will be used for attacks on trading ships. For it is against the merchant ship that the submarine is the most effective. If submarines are operating on the trade routes, the merchant shipping must either be concentrated into convoys or take its chance in the open sea. If convoys are organised, the system is extremely inconvenient for seaborne shipping, they use up a great number of warships as escorts; and, owing to the slow speed of the convoy, which must be the speed of its slowest member, it is even more vulnerable to attack by torpedoes fired by submarines lying submerged at a distance. Ten-thousand-ton cruisers and 7,000-ton cruisers are alike too large and costly to use up in convoy work. And there will never be enough of them.

During the height of the Great War the British Admiralty maintained 3,971 armed vessels, great and small, in submarine hunting, patrolling against sub-

marines and escorting merchant ships. At the same time 1,550 Allied vessels of war were also engaged in submarine hunting, patrolling, etc. In the same period 935 British and 350 Allied war vessels were engaged in sweeping for mines laid by German submarines or in laying mines to prevent the egress of German submarines or to destroy them on their return to the German harbours. This was the supreme effort put forward by the British and Allied navies against the German submarines. At this period in one month 59,229 tons of British and 41,308 tons of Allied merchant shipping was sunk by submarine action. The heaviest losses occurred during the *week* ending April 29th, 1917, when 172,209 tons of British and 67,045 tons of Allied and neutral merchant ship tonnage was sunk. The German Navy never had more than thirty submarines at sea at the same time, and yet the sinking of merchant vessels actually touched 50 in a week.

If merchant vessels take their chance in the open sea they are vulnerable. Cargo steamers cannot carry the under-water protection of the warship; and although the guns carried in the late war by liners were useful against the light guns carried by the small submarines in the early stages of their development, the modern submarine cruiser to-day can carry heavier and more powerful guns than any merchant vessel.

After three years' exhaustive trials, there has been added to the British Fleet a submarine carrying a 12-inch gun, firing a 900-pound shell, the same type of gun carried by many of the Dreadnought battleships at the Battle of Jutland. Similar vessels have been designed for both the American and Japanese Navies. Even with the limits of submarine guns, 5 inches calibre, tentatively agreed upon at Geneva in 1927, the artillery proposed is

more powerful than the average cargo steamer can mount with safety. Submarine cruisers armed with guns of this size, or even smaller but still powerful guns, could lie off and shoot a merchant vessel to pieces at long range, while the speed of these submarine cruisers *on the surface* is greater than that of all but the fastest passenger liners.

The great argument in favour of declaring the submarine illegal is that she cannot, with the best will in the world, carry out her work as a commerce destroyer in accordance with the laws of warfare. By these laws the passengers and crews of merchant vessels are immune from injury except in the case of blockade runners—that is, vessels attempting to break a declared blockade by stealth or force. By these laws of war a merchant vessel captured and made prize must be sent into a prize court, properly constituted, there to be judged and condemned or released. A prize court cannot be set up on neutral territory. A prize crew must be placed on board to navigate a captive to such prize court, or she must be escorted there by a vessel of war and navigated by her own crew. If this is impossible for military reasons, a merchant vessel may be destroyed at sea; but her passengers and crew must first be removed to a place of safety.

None of these obligations can be fulfilled by a submarine cruiser. She does not carry enough men to be able to spare prize crews, nor has she accommodation on board for prisoners. What, in practice, was done in the late war by German submarine commanders was either to permit the passengers and crews of captured merchant vessels to take to the open boats, very often hundreds of miles from the nearest land, or, as was actually done in scores of cases, to sink the vessels out of hand, and not to bother further about the human beings on board. Both these practices were strongly

condemned by all the Allied Powers and by the neutrals during the late war.

To-day, however, we find French naval officers of distinction advocating the building of a great submarine fleet by France. Further, they declare openly that this submarine fleet is to be used against merchant shipping, and they make a detailed apology for the German submarine campaign against merchant vessels during the war.

The great argument, therefore, for declaring the submarine illegal by agreement is that of humanity. It is the same argument that is written into the laws of war, such as the rules against the slaughtering of prisoners, the poisoning of wells, and the bombardment of unfortified cities.

The objections put forward against declaring the submarine illegal are, firstly, that it is impracticable, as submarines could be built in secret; and secondly, that the submarine is the weapon of the weaker and poorer nations.

As to the first, there is a very good reply on technical grounds. It would be possible to build submarines in secret, though the secrecy would be doubtful. The ocean-going submarines I have described above are very large vessels, equal in size to the smaller cruisers, their engines are costly and complicated, and it is doubtful if they could be built without the news coming to the world.

But, supposing they could be built in secret, one thing certain is that they could not go to sea and cruise in secret. A submarine is so distinctive in type that she can be recognised at sea immediately. Now, unless she can go to sea and cruise in peace-time, her crew, and, still more, her officers, cannot be trained. It takes at least a year to train an efficient submarine crew and at

least three years of continuous training to make efficient submarine officers. This was proved up to the hilt during the late war when the Germans failed to use their submarines with success unless manned and commanded by trained personnel.

After the outbreak of a war, submarines could be built in secret by an unscrupulous Power against legal restrictions ; but they would take at least a year to construct and longer for their crews to be trained. There would be a breathing space during which special anti-submarine measures could be prepared, even if the war were not over in that time.

As to the second argument, it can be met by an agreement to build no more battleships and to limit strictly the construction of smaller ships. A thesis that will reassure the poorer and weaker nations is the motif of this book.

To-day the submarine is legal. While England and America are building cruisers, great submarine fleets are being built up by two Continental Powers. France, for example, already disposes of 46 submarines, all fairly modern, and she actually has 59 under construction, the greatest number of submarines in preparation for any navy since the submarine was invented. Italy has 43 submarines built and is building another 20. The submarine building programmes of both these Powers include many of the largest type.

Japan is building 28 submarines ; but the submarine building programmes for the American and British Navies are comparatively modest. The United States programme consists of 15, and the British of 12 only under construction now and 6 to be built in each of the years 1928 and 1929.

There is, however, a powerful school of thought in both France and Italy, represented even on the naval

staffs of those countries, opposed to the submarine on account of its barbarity and the fact that in the long run it cannot settle the issue of a campaign.

And here it is necessary to take a wide view of European politics. The hotheads in Rome and Paris point to the French and Italian Navies respectively as an excuse for their own shipbuilding. There is more friction being created between France and Italy at the present time than between any two great nations anywhere in the world. It must be admitted that there is a possible danger of war in the future between these two Latin peoples. And in such a war France would stand to lose more by the use of the submarine than she would gain.

The French naval problem in a war against Italy, or any other Continental Power, would be the safe transport of her troops from North Africa to the South of France. It would be a relief to the French naval authorities to know that the submarine need not enter into their calculations, while the Italians would know that their submarine fleet, however numerous, while it could hamper, could not prevent the passage of these troops unless general command of the Mediterranean were secured.

The real reason for the building of the great French submarine fleet is so that it may be used as a counter for diplomatic bargaining against Britain. Recent history shows clearly the danger of such a policy. If America, England, and Japan, supported as they would be in all probability by Italy, and, with certainty, by the rest of the world excepting France, demanded the illegality of the submarine, France would acquiesce. A bluff would be attempted; but it could be "called." Abolish war as a legality, and the case for the submarine cannot stand.

CHAPTER XV

THE APPLICATION OF SCIENCE IN BATTLE

Mistake to think war can be waged cheaply—Effect of science on warfare—Attempts to begin new wars with weapons of old wars—Chemical warfare at sea—Aeroplanes *versus* warships—Cavalry obsolete—Infantry nearly obsolete—Aeroplanes and the military manœuvres—Strength of French Air Force—Aeroplanes attacking troops—Tanks and one-man tanks—A naval battle of the future—Cost of latest battleships—Will be built in fleets if Washington Agreement not renewed—Example of Jutland—Fleets never at grips—More decisive fighting in future—Fleet action will not end a war.

IT is a mistake to think that war can be waged cheaply. If the doctrine that war is a possibility continues to be accepted, then nations cannot be blamed for arming themselves with all the resources of science and invention.

Before life and property were safe in civilised countries, men went about armed. But when society turned its face against the freebooter and raider the police were relied upon to protect both property and life. If freebooting and raiding wars of aggression and class, wars for prestige and to protect the national "honour," are to be looked upon as normal episodes in the present-day history of mankind, then let us prepare accordingly. Once war has broken out, the best brains of the chemists and scientists will be prostituted to its service. So adequate preparations may just as well be made beforehand.

There is no middle course.

If war is to remain legal, then let us prepare the most devilish devices for the wholesale murder of our enemies. And let us recognise the moral bankruptcy of our so-called civilisation.

Invention has made giant strides in the last hundred years. The industrial age, the age of machinery, has its counterpart in warfare. But the military mind ashore and afloat has always lagged behind. It has not realised the great weapons science has placed ready to the hand of the soldier and sailor. Apart from the invention of gunpowder, warfare remained static for many centuries. Since then the changes have been tremendous. The inventions of steam, electricity, high explosives, and the internal combustion engine, the discoveries of the chemists, and finally the conquest of the air, have completely revolutionised fighting methods. And yet at the beginning of every war for the last three hundred years, the period of greatest discovery, the British in particular have always attempted to fight it in the style and with the weapons of the previous war. Thus, in the Crimean War, we clung to the tactics of the Peninsular War, and this fact is brought out again and again in the military memoirs of the time. Our next great war was the Boer War in South Africa, and here we attempted to follow the close formation fighting of the Crimea. Although the clothing of the troops had been changed from scarlet to khaki, we began with the tactics of the "thin red line." The results were deadly to ourselves. But did we learn the lesson?

In the Great War we commenced with the methods of the South African War. Fortunately the British Empire has always produced original thinkers; and although in the Army and Navy these men suffer at the hands of wooden-headed superiors in peace-time, in war-time

they come into their own. Thus, although the Germans obtained initial advantages by the use of the great artillery as mobile pieces, and by being the first to use poison gases, we countered successfully as the pioneers of the tank ; while the end of the war saw us with the finest Air Force in the world and possessing the great strategical weapon of an independent Air Striking Force. Once we British are stirred out of our lethargy by war we adapt ourselves to the new conditions with great rapidity and thoroughness.

After every great war there is a peace of exhaustion and stagnation. The best brains avoid the regular fighting forces. Bureaucratic control predominates again. Development is arrested, invention ignored, the original thinkers snubbed and suppressed, and the fighting methods last in use stereotyped. War has become so terrible that none can foretell its ultimate results on the social and economic structures of the nations rash enough to indulge again. Because it has become so terrible in its methods, so costly, and so complicated, we cannot afford to run the risk of drifting into hostilities unless our fighting forces are armed with the latest product of scientific discovery and invention. Informed students examining the British Estimates for the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and listening to the explanatory statements of Cabinet Ministers responsible for the three fighting arms, realise that the bow-and-arrow mentality predominates once more. This is the case, more or less, in all contemporary armies and navies, though the very limitations placed on Germany will cause her to rely on science to a greater extent than the nominally fully armed Powers.

The determining factors in the next war between first-class Powers, whenever it comes and whoever the com-

batants, will be aircraft and chemicals. Neither was fully developed in the late war, and this is especially true of chemicals. Poison gases, for example, were unused in sea fighting, partly because there was no great fleet action after Jutland, and partly because the German Naval Department became overshadowed after Jutland by the German War Office ; the products of the German chemical and dye factories and the inventions of the German chemists being monopolised by the German Army.

If there is another naval campaign between first-class fleets, chemical warfare will be used at sea with as deadly and far-reaching effect as on land in the last war. A modern battleship or cruiser is dependent on internal ventilation artificially sucked in by powerful electric fans. There is no technical obstacle to the use of poison gas clouds against a fleet whether produced by artillery shells, by gas bombs dropped by aircraft, or by poison clouds released from submarines. The warships also can release gas clouds from special shells ahead of attacking aircraft. It is doubtful if the Admiralties of the world's navies are giving sufficient attention to this problem. It will be difficult for the guns crews in the turrets, the powdermen in the magazines, the fire parties between decks and the men in the engine-rooms and stokeholds all to wear gas-masks. And yet they are dependent for their life's breath on the air sucked in by a hundred electrical fans in a modern warship. Also gas-masks, efficacious against one form of poison gas, may be as useless as the steel helmets of medieval knights against other forms of poison gases. At least one gas is known against which, as yet, no efficient form of gas-mask has been evolved.

The potentialities of aircraft against the largest war-

ships are insufficiently realised. Recent experiments in the United States Navy have proved up to the hilt the possibility of a warship being sunk by the great bombs carried by a single modern aeroplane exploding in the water alongside of her. The battleship *Virginia* was sunk in a few minutes by one 1,100 pound bomb. And for the cost of the present-day battleship 1,000 modern aeroplanes can be built. Paragraph 18 of the American Joint Board, which reported on the series of bombing tests referred to above, states :

“ It will be difficult, if not impossible, to build any type of vessel of sufficient strength to withstand the destructive force that can be obtained with the largest bombs that aeroplanes may be able to carry.”

The Americans have concentrated on time bombs released from aircraft. We are developing the dropping of mobile torpedoes from aircraft. This is not a very modern invention. In the Dardanelles campaign a mobile torpedo released from a British aeroplane sank a Turkish transport full of troops in the Sea of Marmora. This weapon has not yet been fully developed. Its potentialities are enormous.

I myself have ventured to prophesy that, except in the first clash of arms, and the first defeats, naked infantry will not appear on a modern battlefield. The whippet tank will be the queen of the battlefield in the future, and not the rifle-armed infantryman.

As for the cavalry arm, it is as obsolete as the archers who fought at Agincourt. Yet with money tight and a strenuous battle raging between the Treasury and the fighting Services, the British War Office spends over

£1,000,000 a year on cavalry soldiers. Tanks, large and small, tanks heavily armed, and tanks lightly armed, *but all of them gas-tight*, together with heavy artillery, will be the ground forces of the future. But the combatant with command of the air and sufficient aeroplanes will have the whip-hand of his enemy.

Victory in war is the imposition of the will of one of the combatants upon the other. In the days of small professional armies this was achieved by bringing pressure to bear on the enemy's Government. To-morrow it will be achieved by bringing pressure to bear on the enemy populace. Yesterday it was necessary to occupy the enemy's territory with horse, foot, and artillery to bring about victory. To-morrow this will not be necessary.

The three great upheavals on land have been brought about by the conquest of the air, the application of petrol to transport and movement, and the introduction of the mass power of the machine-gun. The generals, no less than the admirals, have been slow to gauge the tremendous importance of the introduction of the air arm. The generals were inclined to look upon aeroplanes as an adjunct to the cavalry or as a means of assistance to long-range artillery fire. In the same way the admirals even now look upon the aeroplane only as a scouting machine, and as an assistant to the cruiser. The late war did not fully expose the tremendous importance of this change, because the aeroplanes were then in their infancy and comparatively few in number. Thus all the armies started the war without a single machine-gun mounted in an aeroplane. No one ever thought that an aeroplane could fight another aeroplane, and still less that aeroplanes could attack with success what has heretofore been called the Queen of Battles, the infantry arm. The first

fighting in the air took place with rifles. Not for some time was it discovered that a machine-gun could fire through the propeller of an aeroplane by a synchronisation of the mechanism.

Army manœuvres in England in 1926, the first held since the war on a large scale, in which probably the best equipped army for its size in the world was engaged, was no real test. For one thing, very few aeroplanes were engaged. The present programme of the Air Force is to have in England 300 aeroplanes, and although a fraction of these must be allocated for service with the Navy and others again for reprisal bombings as an Independent Air Force, nevertheless very many more will be available for the army in war than in the 1926 manœuvres. The French, for example, have 140 squadrons of 9 aeroplanes each, of which 110 are stationed in Europe; and the French Reserve is so organised that shortly after the outbreak of a war 4,000 aeroplanes with their pilots, repair staffs, ground personnel, etc., can be brought into action.

Manœuvres are unrealistic, and especially so where the air arm is concerned. The most realistic manœuvres ever carried out were those in the late Russian Army before the war, when one cartridge in every hundred had a real bullet. The casualties were very slight, and soldiers were rarely hit, but the effect was wonderful. This could hardly be adopted in a Western army.

No one has ever seen a brigade on the march attacked by a hundred aeroplanes. The nearest approach was in the campaign in Palestine in the late war, when five aeroplanes attacked the whole Turkish Army in retreat and utterly disorganised their line of march. *But of this we may be sure: directly war breaks out and actual fighting has taken place, there will be a demand for*

more aeroplanes equal to the demand for more shells in the early days of the last war. The Western Powers, with their engineering resources, will be able to put aeroplanes into the air in their thousands ; and infantry, as we know them, will be swept off the field as surely as the old pikemen, billmen, and archers were with the introduction of gunpowder.

Similarly with the tanks. There were not nearly enough of them engaged in the recent manœuvres to prove their value. Also we are making the mistake of concentrating on a sort of land battleship. The heavily armoured tank mounting cannon has her uses, as has an armoured warship at sea. But the future lies with the one-man tank, carrying a brace of machine-guns mounted in parallel, the crew of which will consist of one machine-gunner-mechanic. We have something like this in the fast whippet tanks, but progress has not been rapid enough to do justice to the advance in invention. One small swift tank already on the market costs only £400. These one-man tanks will be the infantry and cavalry of the future. The cavalryman as we know him will disappear. His only chance of survival is to become a machine-gunner. "Every man a machine-gunner" will be a development of infantry during the last years of their survival as a fighting arm. But so great is the power of the machine-gun to-day, whether in the air or on the ground, that the days when naked—*i.e.*, unarmoured—infantrymen could advance in open order, or any other formation, to the attack of a suitably armed enemy have gone for ever. It must be repeated that all manœuvres are unrealistic, and if nothing else would bring this home, the sight of General Staff officers walking about in the open should convince everyone who saw our armies in operation in France !

Take another development—the use of poison gas. It will be impossible for living men or horses to move anywhere in the battle zone in the future without elaborate gas-masks. Men can wear these masks in aeroplanes, or in tanks, or in concrete machine-gun nests, but they cannot wear them marching or charging ; or, if they do, they will be at such a disadvantage that the army which has learnt the lessons that science can teach will have an overwhelming advantage.

In a previous chapter I described the probable course of a campaign in an Anglo-American war. What would be the nature of a modern naval engagement, supposing the main fleets made contact and were determined to fight to a finish? There are only a few battleships in existence embodying all the lessons of the last war and therefore thoroughly modern. I have my technical doubts as to the advisability of battleship building, and I will state the reasons briefly. Aeroplanes flown from the shore and flotillas, only able to operate at limited distances from land, confer a great advantage on the fleet operating near its home waters. A fleet fighting off its own coast has the further advantage of its own defensive minefields ; and its disabled ships can reach the shelter of fortified harbours. The Anglo-German naval warfare took place, for the most part, within the comparatively narrow limits of the North Sea. The British fleet was vastly superior in material strength, and its superiority was increased after the entry of America, while during the whole war there was a division of modern Dreadnoughts under the French flag available in reserve. Yet the British fleet never ventured far into the Heligoland Bight, and avoided coming within reach of the German flotillas as much as possible. Therefore I believe that in a war between America and Japan,

or between England and Japan, the battleships will never venture far enough from their bases to meet. For the distances separating the fleets will be too great. Even the distance from Singapore to Yokohama is 2,888 miles. The real fighting will be done by cruisers, armed merchantmen, submarines, and the anti-submarine vessels, including destroyers, aircraft, and other submarines.

The Battle of Jutland was a chance meeting. The Germans hoped to draw the British battle cruisers within reach of their battle fleet, which the British admirals supposed to be in harbour. On the other hand, the Germans did not know that the British battle fleet was so close up to the cruisers ; the encounter was a partial surprise to both sides. But when we come to consider naval strategy over the wide spaces of the Atlantic or the Pacific, these factors are multiplied twentyfold. Nevertheless, let us imagine a combination of circumstances leading to a meeting of the principal fleets, and that the navies concerned had decided some years before to build the most powerful vessels of the battleship type that can be produced by the art of the naval architect. Let it be presumed that, as the result of the failure of the Geneva Conference for the limitation of naval armaments in 1927, the Washington Agreement of 1921 is not renewed at the end of the period contracted for, and that, after 1931, England and America commence building all types of vessels to the limit of their financial resources. And that about 1938 war breaks out.

The latest battleships in the world are the British *Rodney* and *Nelson*. They comprise all the lessons of the late war, and have a displacement of 35,000 tons. They mount the colossal armament of nine 16-inch guns in three triple turrets. Other battleships in their class are

the Japanese *Mutsu* of 33,000 tons and the American *New Mexico* of 32,600 tons.

There is no reason why larger and even more powerful vessels should not be built. The largest warship in the world, the British battle cruiser *Hood*, has a displacement of 42,000 tons. Warships could be built of 60,000 tons displacement, mounting 18-inch guns. Eighteen-inch guns have been constructed already. Whatever types are finally decided upon, they will be built in squadrons. Now, the *Nelson* type of British battleship costs £7,000,000, and the *Mutsu* is reported to have cost £8,000,000. The 60,000 monsters with their guns and their armour would cost about £12,000,000 each. Supposing England and America laid down four of these leviathans a year for four years, they would have two squadrons of eight ships each at the end of the seventh year—that is, in 1938—which would have cost £384,000,000 to build. Yet this was the scale of building indulged in by the German and British Navies in their great race for naval supremacy in the years preceding the war. The British fleet that deployed at Jutland cost the British taxpayer, apart from upkeep and repair costs, approximately £132,000,000. The German fleet at Jutland cost the German taxpayers £92,000,000. And the British had another squadron of battleships in reserve, which never came into action, and many other cruisers and the like not present at the battle.

In addition there is the cost of the battle cruisers which both sides would build, and they are no cheaper than the battleships. There will be the cost of the light fast cruisers, the aeroplane carriers, of the destroyers and the submarines. Two such fleets meeting and bent on fighting would almost annihilate each other, providing

they met with a clear atmosphere and, say, six hours of daylight, and neither side wished to avoid action.

At the Battle of Jutland the German Admiral wished to avoid close action at all costs, and in view of the inferiority of his fleet his tactics were perfectly proper. Visibility was poor and was made worse by the smoke and cordite fumes of the battle and other cruisers on both sides, who had been fighting a preliminary action in between the approaching battle fleets. Four battleships in the British fleet never got into action at all and hardly fired their heavy guns. The rear division of Von Scheer's fleet, which became a leading division after his two dramatic turns away from the British fleet, hardly fired their guns except at destroyers during the night attacks, and were scarcely fired at. Owing to the conditions of visibility, a few of the German battleships were visible to a part of the British fleet, but these German battleships could not see their British opponents clearly enough to fire ; they only saw the gun flashes. Only one battleship in the British line was hit by a heavy shell, and that not in a vital place. Firing at long range in bad visibility and without the assistance of spotting aeroplanes, the British battle fleet fired some 2,400 rounds of heavy gun ammunition. They scored a number of hits, and considerable damage was done to the German fleet. But there was no opportunity for the attack to be pressed home on either side.

The preliminary battle cruiser action took place at long range, and the two British battle cruisers lost were blown up through certain defects in their turrets, since remedied in all modern warships. The only large vessel to come under fire of a battle squadron at close range during the whole war was the armoured cruiser *Black Prince*. She had become separated from her consorts,

and while endeavouring to rejoin the fleet at night suddenly found herself close to a squadron of German battleships. She was blown to pieces in a few seconds, and not a man survived. This gives some idea of the destructive force of modern artillery at sea.

In an encounter between modern fleets, whether British and American, American and Japanese, or British and Japanese, the artillery fire would be more deadly than ever owing to the greater power of the latest guns and to the assistance that would be given by aeroplanes flying overhead and spotting for the guns crews. The signals would be given by wireless. However far from land the action took place, there would be plenty of aeroplanes available. Every modern fleet will be accompanied by aircraft carriers, special ships with flush decks, the aeroplanes being stowed below in special holds and raised to the upper decks by lifts. All the larger warships in addition will carry their own aeroplanes which will be projected into the air when required by catapults, hydraulic rams on revolving turntables which will throw them out into the eye of the wind. The American Navy has made great progress with this method of carrying and launching aeroplanes, and the British and Japanese Navies are following suit.

The preliminary stages of such a battle might well be an encounter in the air, and the fleet which attains a superiority in aircraft will have a great advantage. In addition to observation of the artillery fire, the aeroplanes can attack the big ships on their own account. I have referred earlier to the mighty bombs which can be dropped alongside a warship to explode several feet under water. The ex-German battleship *Ostfriesland* and the *Virginia* were sunk in this way in the course of experiments. I have referred also to the method per-

fectured by the British of torpedoes being launched close to the surface of the sea from aeroplanes and then running just like torpedoes from the destroyers. I have also referred to the production of poison gas clouds by the aeroplanes in the path of advance of the warships.

We can therefore visualise two mighty fleets of battleships engaging first at long range and then at more decisive ranges. Once hitting is established on both sides the effect will be so terrific that the fleets costing £400,000,000 will blow each other into masses of sinking scrap-iron. The 16-inch guns mounted in the latest battleships fire a shell weighing more than a ton and able to pierce 14 inches of armour at any point in their range of over thirty miles. The destroyers and light cruisers will attempt to attack the opposing battle fleets with their torpedoes and will engage each other with gunfire. If there is a chance of a pitched battle at sea the cruisers (surface and submarine) employed on trade protection or on raiding the trade routes will be reduced to a minimum on both sides, all available vessels fit to fight being concentrated for the great encounter.

The tactics employed at the Battle of Jutland by the British Commander-in-Chief were those that had become orthodox in the British Navy since the days of the sailing ships. One reason why the German fleet managed to escape without greater loss at the Battle of Jutland was the extreme rigidity of the British line. The British doctrine had developed over-centralisation. The British Commander-in-Chief attempted to control the whole battle line. If he wishes to control the whole battle line in a future war he will have to fly his admiral's flag in an aeroplane overhead. But the tactics of the future will be more elastic, allowing greater initiative to the individual commanders of divisions and sub-

divisions of battleships. We have at any rate learnt that from the last war. This will mean much more decisive and closer fighting.

This, then, is a picture of a naval battle of the future? And what will be gained by it? Whichever side wins the victory in such an encounter will be little better off than his defeated adversary. He will be able to intensify his cruiser campaign against the commerce of his enemy, and will be able to carry on more raids upon the outlying colonies and positions of his adversary. He will be able to bombard more coast towns and gas the entrances to more commercial harbours. After the Battle of Trafalgar in the Napoleonic Wars in 1805 it needed another ten years to bring France and her Allies to their knees. A great gladiatorial contest in the Atlantic or Pacific between these mighty fleets, built up at such cost and self-sacrifice, will not end that particular war. Many thousands of officers and men, the very cream of their race, will have perished, the triumph of the engineer's and naval architect's arts will be sunk in the depths of the ocean, the savings and the financial resources of the people concerned will have been blown away, and the bankruptcy of civilisation will have been declared. Unless the peoples concerned have taken leave of their senses they will insist on all the existing battleships being taken out into deep water on a suitable day and, after suitable religious ceremonies, sunk; and they will agree never again to build anything bigger than a light cruiser for police duties in the more distant seas.

CHAPTER XVI

WAR IN THE AIR

Marshal Foch on air warfare—Informed public would demand end of warfare—Japan and United States of America comparatively free from air menace—London indefensible—No defence against air raids by night—General Groves—Whitsun 1918 attack on London—London open to long range gun bombardment—Raids possible by French Air Force—Their extent—General Lord Thomson's opinions—General von Altrock—Churchill, chemical and bacteriological weapons—British War Office Manual of Chemical Warfare—Aeroplane as aid to peace.

"The potentialities of aircraft attack on a large scale are almost incalculable, but it is clear that such an attack, owing to its crushing moral effect on a nation, may impress public opinion to a point of disarming the Government, and thus become decisive."—MARSHAL FOCH.

IT is in the development of the aeroplane that the greatest changes will be brought about in the character of any future war. I have quoted above the cold, matter-of-fact statement of one of the present-day masters of warfare, Marshal Foch. Behind these simple words of the French Marshal lie a promise of horror, suffering, and terror of which the general public is quite ignorant, or they would demand an end of the war makers. If it could only be brought home to the people what war in the future will mean with aircraft playing their inevitable part there would be a demand for the abolition of war as a legality and a possibility which no Governments could withstand. The United States and Japan, amongst the Great Powers of the world, will be comparatively immune from air attack on the great scale for some years to come. But the aeroplane is developing

so rapidly that their peoples would be foolish to count upon this immunity for an indefinite period. Their comparative invulnerability depends solely on their geographical position. Yet if Canada were to become the cockpit of an Anglo-American war, the inhabitants of the great cities in the states in the north of the Union would be exposed to all the horrors of aerial warfare. As for the inhabitants of war-racked Europe, the sufferings of the civil population in the last war will be as nothing compared to what they will have to face in the next. It will be useless for France to hold the Rhine bridge-heads against Germany. The valley of the Rhine will be no obstacle to the clouds of acroplanes that will cross it to reduce the French cities to heaps of smoking ashes. The German cities would suffer a like fate.

Again, London is indefensible against air attack coming from across the Channel. This fact may as well be recognised at once. Brigadier-General Groves, Director of Air Operations of the British Air Forces in 1918, in an address given before the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London on March 29th, 1927, made the following statement :

“The consensus of opinion in aviation circles is that local defence is of negligible value ; that no adequate means of protection against aircraft attack are yet in view ; that the best defence against such an attack is the aerial counter-offensive ; and that the only effective deterrent to aerial aggression is the threat of reprisals in kind.”

Take only the example of the late war. At Whitsun, 1918, the Germans delivered their last great aeroplane attack on London. Only 33 machines took part, manned

by less than 100 men. The defending forces had 800 guns, 400 searchlights, and in the South of England there were about 100 fighting aeroplanes for defensive purposes. To man these weapons we were using nearly a division of troops badly needed in France. Moored balloons carrying aprons of piano-wire were placed in the most likely positions to trap the attackers. The night was favourable to the defenders, yet only 6 of the attacking aeroplanes were shot down, 3 by the guns and 3 by the defending aeroplanes. By the end of the attack the artillerymen were tired out, the guns had nearly exhausted their ammunition and the defending aeroplanes their petrol. If there had been another 30 German aeroplanes following up we should have been helpless. Many casualties were caused by the falling shrapnel and shells from our own guns.

In addition to the means of defence used during this raid, we now have improved projectiles and improved guns, with gas shells capable of producing a gas barrage in the air. But it is exceedingly difficult to gauge the height, speed, and course of attacking aircraft at night, and it is difficult to make these barrages effective. The same thing applies to the various forms of rocket shells now under experiment. The improvement in artillery has not kept pace with the improvement in aeroplane engines and aeroplane design; aircraft can now fly much higher, at greater speed, and therefore with greater immunity from attack from the ground. Three hundred miles an hour is a practical speed for aeroplanes. Also, it must be remembered that the huge area of London is not the only territory requiring defence. In the South of England there are the three naval arsenals of Chatham, Portsmouth, and Plymouth, the fortress and naval port of Dover, the large south coast

towns and many important railway centres, bridges, etc. Any effective form of passive defence for the whole of this great area would be too expensive.

Nor must we forget the difficulties of the defending aeroplanes. In the first place it is only by a fluke that they can find the enemy at night, especially in rainy or misty weather. It is almost impossible for destroyers at sea to find each other at night, and they move in two dimensions. Aeroplanes are much smaller, move in three dimensions, the pilots are deafened by their own engines and have not the advantage of hearing the enemy, as at sea. Again, the defending aeroplanes can only stay in the air for a limited time ; and it is difficult to distinguish friend from foe. In the late war it was possible to distinguish German engines by sound, but this will not be the case in the next war, and in any case the future raids would be on a much larger scale with much more hurly-burly, noise, and confusion. Chicago will be equally vulnerable in a war in which Canada is hostile. New York and San Francisco will be open to similar attack in certain circumstances from the sea.

The fact of the matter, as General Groves states, is that there is no defence except counter-attack. We talk of bombing the enemy aerodromes, but the French, whom we have perforce to consider as possible enemies, are building aerodromes with underground hangars heavily armoured and concreted. What we should do would be to hit at the most vulnerable parts of the enemy, whether these are large towns, railway centres, engineering works, or what not, and questions of humanity will not enter into a struggle for existence any more than they did in the last war.

Brigadier-General Lord Thomson, Secretary of State for Air in the first Labour Government of England, in

his book "Air Facts and Problems," published in 1927, writes :

"The most effective form of defence against air attack is confined to bombing squadrons. Admittedly it is a misuse of words to speak of a bombing aeroplane as a defensive weapon, but the fact is that, for the present, anyhow, the use of this weapon is chiefly for reprisals . . . by the ruthless bombing of localities."

Even if London could be defended against planes, including planes operated by wireless and without crews, the city could be bombarded by long range guns from the French coast. I believe it would be found necessary to move the seat of Government, finance, etc., to Glasgow or Belfast immediately war became inevitable with the strongest Air Power in the world. For, consider the destructiveness of the latest bombs. The United States of America is manufacturing bombs of 4,300 pounds weight, with a bursting effect that displaces 1,000 cubic yards of hard sand. Such a bomb dropped in Piccadilly, or Park Avenue, or the Faubourg St. Honore, or the Unter den Linden, would wipe out the whole street.

In the late war the greatest weight of bombs dropped in any one *month* was 12 tons. The French to-day can in one raid drop 120 tons of bombs. The terrible menace of aerial attack can hardly be exaggerated. I will here quote Major-General the Rt. Hon. J. E. B. Seely, speaking in the House of Commons on the Air Estimates on February 19th, 1924. General Seely speaks with authority. He was Secretary of State for War from 1912 to 1914. He served in the South African War, and in the European War from 1914 to 1918, seeing

much active service and being mentioned in despatches five times. He was Under-Secretary of State for Air, and President of the Air Council from January to November, 1919, and he has long been recognised as one of the leading authorities on military and aerial matters in Britain. This is what he said, describing the probable events in case of a war between England and France :

“ Let us consider it (a great air raid) in the form of casualties to human beings. We are told that the matter has always been exaggerated. That is quite true, but it can be said with certainty that not less than 100 casualties will follow every ton of bombs dropped. I challenge contradiction on this. It follows as a consequence that assuming the force to which I have referred to be capable of dropping 90 per cent. of its available bomb dropping power in the first raid, 75 per cent. in the next, and from 40 to 50 per cent. for successive days, in the absence of an adequate force to prevent it, in the first raid there would be 10,000 casualties, and for an indefinite period thereafter, in the absence of an adequate Air Force, which is asked for in this motion, there would be from 8,000 to 9,000 casualties daily, certainly and unavoidably.

“ Supposing that this force were employed to set fire to a town. The London County Council retains a certain fire brigade. It is known how many fires can be put out in a given time. It is quite certain that, if it were decided to set the place on fire, instead of destroying human life, by the ordinary method of dropping explosive bombs, in the absence

of an adequate Air Force the whole of London would certainly be set on fire. If, to take a third case, it were decided by this very modest force to attack railway centres, it is quite certain that trains would cease to run and that London could not be fed. We therefore come to this conclusion, which I think will not be disputed by any impartial authority, that the result of an attack of this kind, in the absence of an adequate Air Force, would certainly be that London would have to be evacuated within a few days. The Under-Secretary of State for Air said: 'But what is the defence for this? Are you going to have an aeroplane every hundred yards all round? What about Portsmouth? What about Harwich?' Surely he must see that in this new and disastrous phase—and nobody thinks it more disastrous than I do; in fact, I was Chairman of the Limitation of Armaments Committee, and I care as much as anybody else about the limitation of armaments—that this is, alas! a matter of reprisals. If it is asked, 'Is there an answer to the aeroplane?' the reply is: 'There is no other answer but another aeroplane!''

Major-General Seely was making out a case for the militarists, for I heard the whole debate in which this remarkable speech was given. He was urging the provision of an Air Force of such a size and strength that other Powers would hesitate to attack England. In other words, terror is to be met by terror, and force by force. This policy has been tried for thousands of years now, and has always led in the long run to war. Yet the aeroplane armed by the chemist is only at the beginning of its development as a weapon of war. Aircraft, for

example, are capable of creating smoke clouds of very great size. These clouds may be made horizontally or vertically. In certain weather conditions experiments have already shown that they are of special value in air operations. It has been estimated that 100 aeroplanes of the present type could in a few minutes create a smoke cloud 10 miles square and 100 feet thick. Now, there is no reason why, instead of smoke clouds, they should not make poison gas clouds. Gas can be carried as liquid and delivered in the form of a fine spray, and successful tests have already been carried out. Let me here quote Marshal Foch again. Writing in 1921, he states :

“ The carrying power of the aeroplane is increasing. Improvements are made almost daily, enabling greater and greater weights to be carried. These developments introduce an entirely new method for the large-scale use of poison gas. By the use of bombs, which are becoming increasingly efficient and of greater capacity, not only have armies become more vulnerable, but the centres of population situated in the rear, and whole regions inhabited by civilians, will be threatened. Chemical warfare thus acquires the power to produce more terrible effects over much larger areas.”

Again, the following is from an article by the well-known German military writer, General von Altrock. Writing in the *Militär Vochenblatt*, he states :

“ In wars of the future the initial hostile attack will be directed against the great nerve and communication centres of the enemy's territory, against its large cities, factory centres, munition areas, water, gas, and light supplies ; in fact, against every

life artery of the country. Discharge of poisonous gases will become the rule, since great progress has been made in the production of poison gases. Such attacks will be carried out to great depths in rear of the actual fighting troops. Entire regions inhabited by peaceful populations will be continually threatened with extinction. The war will frequently have the appearance of a destruction *en masse* of the entire civil population rather than a combat of armed men."

Now let me quote Winston Churchill. He has been First Lord of the Admiralty, Secretary of State for War, and Secretary of State for Air. He has seen active service in the field in the late war and in previous wars. He was Minister of Munitions in the latter stages of the last war, and prepared the great forces for the air raids on Berlin, stopped by the Armistice. Writing in the *Pall Mall Magazine* in September, 1924, he states :

" Might not a bomb, no bigger than an orange, be found to possess a secret power to destroy a whole block of buildings—nay, to concentrate the force of a thousand tons of cordite and blast a township at a stroke? Could not explosives even of the existing type be guided automatically in flying machines by wireless or other rays, without a human pilot, in ceaseless procession upon a hostile city, arsenal, camp, or dockyard? As for Poison Gas and Chemical Warfare in all its forms, only the first chapter has been written of a terrible book. Certainly every one of these new avenues to destruction is being studied on both sides of the Rhine, with all the science and patience of which man is capable. And why should it be supposed that these

resources will be limited to Inorganic Chemistry? A study of Disease—of Pestilences methodically prepared and deliberately launched upon man and beast—is certainly being pursued in the laboratories of more than one great country. Blight to destroy crops, Anthrax to slay horses and cattle, Plague to poison, not armies only, but whole districts—such are the lines along which military science is remorselessly advancing.”

What chance will the civilian population have of a survival of their life or reason when once exposed to the most modern methods of warfare? It will be useless for them to take refuge again in the cellars or railway tunnels, for the heavier gases will penetrate everywhere. During a debate on the Air Estimates in the House of Commons in 1927, I suggested to the Prime Minister in Parliament that the best way of bringing the public to a realisation of the peril threatening them was to serve out gas-masks to the civilian population, beginning with the children. Many Members of Parliament laughed. O valour of ignorance! In at least one European country, even now fearful of attack, this is done already. The chemists know of two gases at least against which no masks yet invented are proof. If suitable gas-masks can be designed, however, and if we continue to accept war as a possibility, it will be prudent to issue them, beginning with the children as being the most valuable and innocent section of the population. It would be quite logical for the infant class in elementary schools to receive weekly instruction in anti-gas devices. This devilish method of warfare, however, has developed into the use of a combination of gases. An area attacked is soaked with poison gas, and then another gas of an

irritating nature is used, the effect of which is to force the victims to tear off their anti-gas defences. Let me here quote the British War Office. The 1926 edition of the *Manual of Chemical Warfare* has a chapter dealing with arsenical gases :

“ . . . They are readily dispersed without decomposition by the aid of heat, in the form of an intensely irritant smoke—*i.e.*, in actual particles of an extremely minute size. A substance in this very fine particulate form can remain suspended in the air for an immense time. In man slight and transitory nasal irritation is appreciable after an exposure of 5 minutes to as little as 1 part of diphenyl-chloroarsine in 200,000,000 parts of air, and as the concentration is increased the irritation shows itself sooner and in rapidly increasing severity. Marked symptoms are produced by exposure to 1 part of diphenyl-chloroarsine in 50,000,000 parts of air, and it may be stated in general that this concentration forms the limit of tolerance of ordinary individuals for an exposure lasting 5 minutes. A concentration of 1 part in 10,000,000 will probably incapacitate a man within a minute from the pain and distress, and nausea and vomiting accompany an exposure of from 2 to 3 minutes of this concentration. . . . These substances are generally used to cause such sensory irritation that the victim is unable to tolerate a respirator.”

And as the chemists continue their researches in aid of the military departments of all nations, they will evolve even more terrible chemical weapons.

I have quoted the views above of four students of warfare—two English, one German, and one French.

All are practical soldiers. All are agreed upon the frightful nature of another great war in which the science of flight will be allied to the science of the chemist and the bacteriologist. I ask again, do those who lightly contemplate another great war realise what it would mean?

Man's conquest of the air must be followed by man's conquest of war, or by the end of civilisation.

* * * * *

And yet the aeroplane, by making it certain that at any rate amongst the European nations all would be endangered in another war, may rouse the peoples of Europe to the depth of the abyss towards which they are heading. The aeroplane could be made a great instrument of peace. It increases the speed and ease of travel, and therefore increases the knowledge of people of each other. The great flights in the early summer of 1927 of the American pilots, Lindbergh, Chamberlin, and Byrd, undoubtedly led to increased friendship between the European peoples and America. As air travel develops in Europe in particular it will be brought home to the peoples that their comparatively small countries with their hampering and ridiculous frontiers are a survival from the monarchical and tribal systems. The artificial barriers, Customs stations, passport offices, and the like, which increase Nationalist feeling and therefore help to keep alive the war spirit, must slowly give way before this great new means of communication. And if the energy and courage at present devoted to the fighting air forces of the world were used for the development of aerial communications instead of preparation for war, the great human family would benefit.

CHAPTER XVII

THE FAILURE OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Preliminary successes of League—Aaland Islands—Blunders in Upper Silesia—Poland and Vilna—League rebuffed—Italy bombards Corfu and defies League—Success with Bulgaria and Greece, but fighting would have been prevented without League—French invasion of Ruhr—American abstention—No possibility of Russia's admission—League Council a cloak for secret diplomacy—British Foreign Office sceptical of League—Mr. Ambassador Houghton's report to United States President on League—Failure to accomplish disarmament—Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance—The Protocol—Lloyd George on League Disarmament Conferences—Denmark disarms—Good work of League in checking black and white slavery, disease, etc.—Loans guaranteed by League—The handicaps of the League—Difficulty of defining aggression—Proposed international police force—Its futility—The League as an opiate.

IN the first four or five years after the end of the last Great War the outlook for peace through the League of Nations was bright. Thoroughly well-meaning people pointed to the League as a comfort and hope for mankind. True, it was at the commencement a League of victors minus the United States and Russia. But it was felt that the ex-enemy states would presently be admitted and that America and Russia would join. Great things were expected.

The League had a preliminary success over the Aaland Islands dispute between Finland and Sweden. This group of islands, inhabited by Swedish-speaking farmers and fishermen, was claimed by both Sweden and Finland, and was at the disposal of the victors owing to the isolation of Russia and the successful assertion of her independence by Finland. The League adjudicated, the

Aaland Islands were allocated to Finland, and the award was accepted. This has been the outstanding success of the League of Nations in removing the possible causes of a war.

The League also intervened in the very difficult case of Upper Silesia. This ancient German territory had a large Polish-speaking minority. France had the double object of weakening Germany and strengthening Poland. She therefore favoured the whole province being made over to Poland. A plebiscite was held, in which certain districts voted for Poland, but the greater number of the Kreises were loyal to Germany. Before the final award was made, Polish forces, led by filibusters under Korfanty, took the field and attempted to seize the whole province. They were kept back by British, French, and Italian troops, though the French were accused by the British and Italians of turning the blind eye to the excesses of these Polish forces. These Polish irregulars actually fired on British and Italian soldiers. A League of Nations Commission was set up to interpret the results of the plebiscite and to fix the new frontiers. It was under the chairmanship of the Earl of Balfour. The award, when made, exceeded the wildest hopes of the Poles and the French. The frontier was fixed dividing this highly organised and very wealthy industrial district into two parts. Coal-mines were cut off from smelting works and *vice versa*, railway stations were actually divided by the new frontier, and this thickly populated district was amputated with immense inconvenience to everyone concerned. The Poles obtained some coal-mines and some valuable smelting works and steel factories, the whole organisation of the district was disjointed, and yet another German *irridenta* created. No impartial person with a knowledge of Upper Silesia and the facts of the

situation can possibly approve of the award made.⁴ It was a partisan, one-sided settlement, and has been so condemned by every independent observer, including many distinguished Englishmen and Americans. This Upper Silesian award struck a blow at the prestige of the League. It was finally exposed as a League of Victors, an extension of the Council of Ambassadors of the victorious Powers. The League received a further blow when another Polish filibustering army invaded Lithuania and seized Vilna, the capital of the newly liberated state which had been awarded to her by the League itself. The League protested, the Polish Government made a show of denouncing their rebellious General, but afterwards followed the example of Italy, who forgave d'Annunzio for his seizure of Fiume. Poland, internationally liberated, weak, in financial difficulties, actually at war with Russia, in effect defied the League with French support. The League acquiesced, Vilna has been Polish ever since, and is likely to remain so. Ethnographically it was Lithuanian, had been awarded to Lithuania in the peace settlement, and, as the capital of the new Lithuania, was approved by the League itself.

The next League failure occurred over the quarrel between Italy and Greece in 1923. Italian officers serving on the mission for the delineation of the frontier between Albania and Greece were murdered in an ambush. The murderers were supposed to be Greek partisans. Mussolini, newly in power, applied the strong hand to Greece in the old-fashioned way. Corfu was bombarded, an ultimatum was sent to the Greek Government demanding apologies, reparations, and so on, with a time limit and a threat of war. Public opinion in all the countries belonging to the League, including Greece, demanded immediate action by the League. The

Italian Government let it be known that no League interference would be tolerated. Yet it was for just such a situation that the League itself was created. If Greece had been stronger she would have fought Italy and a war would have resulted. As it happened, Greece was weak and could do nothing. Italy's allies used their good offices with their friend, and the matter was finally adjusted. Italy's allies could and would have done the same thing if no League of Nations had ever been heard of. The League never recovered from this blow to its prestige. Any really serious crisis imperilling the peace of the world—and there have been several in the last few years—is left untouched by the Council of the League. China, through the Pekin Government, has for some time been a full member of the Council. She was made a member of the Council in order that the position of the Pekin Government should be strengthened. When first she was elected, the Pekin Government had no suzerainty beyond the walls of Pekin itself. That China should be made a member of the Council in order to strengthen a discredited central government of China is an insight into the regard with which the League is really held by its most powerful members. And, sure enough, when a British Expeditionary Force of 20,000 men was sent to China to occupy Shanghai, and when France, Italy, Japan, and America all sent contingents, the League was entirely inactive.

True, the League was active when the Greeks bombarded Bulgarian territory and prepared an invasion. But all the nations of Europe rushed in to stamp out a premature conflagration. And neither Greece nor Bulgaria is a "Great Power" or a "victor."

Again, the League machinery was used in the dispute between Britain and Turkey over the Mosul Vilayet.

But the recommendation of the League Commission was ignored and the matter settled for the time being by bargaining and bluffing between the two principals.

In the trouble between Italy and Yugo-Slavia over Albania, the League has been prevented by its members from making any attempt towards a peaceful solution ; and when France invaded Germany and occupied the Ruhr, the League could do nothing. So the tale goes on. The Tacna-Arica dispute was presented by Chile to the League, and I myself heard its presentation and debate in the Assembly. The League was able to contribute nothing to a peaceful solution.

One by one the ex-enemy states have been admitted to membership. Hungary, Austria, Bulgaria, are all members of the Assembly. Finally, Germany was admitted. This was only after six months of strenuous wire-pulling and log-rolling. France and her friends insisted on Poland becoming a member of the Council as a counter-balance to Germany. Poland was duly elected, as otherwise France would have blocked the election of Germany. Brazil and Spain were so incensed that they threatened to withdraw altogether. Brazil made good her threat, and Spain has given notice of withdrawal. Sweden and Czecho-Slovakia were candidates for the Council, but the election went by favour, and Poland received the seat.

There is less likelihood than ever, after eight years, of American adhesion and with the rupture of diplomatic relations between England and Russia there is no possibility of Russia being admitted even if she applied. The League, which began its work with such high hopes, was, for the first years of the peace, a League of victors, used for stereotyping the territorial settlements after the war. It became, in fact, an instrument of French foreign

policy, an adjunct of the Quai d'Orsay. With the admission of Germany and Poland and the continuance of the national rivalries that the last war only accentuated, the Council which should be the executive organ of the League is stultified. Far from Germany's admission to the League having proved a strength, it has rendered the League helpless. At the beginning of the June meeting of the Council in 1927 the agenda dealt with everything of no importance. The Chinese troubles, the non-evacuation of the Rhineland, Germany's eastern fortresses, the friction between Russia and Poland, the quarrel between Italy and Serbia over Albania, found no place on the agenda. The Geneva correspondent of the *London Times*, at the beginning of the session, could write to his paper as follows :

“ The League Council's chief usefulness lies in the fact that the formal questions to be adopted, however important they may appear to the respective protagonists, really form a screen behind which the real work goes on.”

The Foreign Ministers and, in some cases, the Prime Ministers of the states members of the Council meet at Geneva, but they leave the real work of the League to subordinates and assistants. They themselves gather behind closed doors in hotels and intrigue and plot in secrecy. One of the safeguards of world peace which the League of Nations was to have created was publicity. All grave matters in dispute were to be exposed to the fierce light of public opinion. In practice, as *The Times* correspondent says, the Council meetings simply act as a cloak behind which the worst practices of the old secret diplomacy are carried out. No wonder that the British Foreign Minister, Sir Austen Chamberlain,

in a memorandum drafted by the Foreign Office and presented by him for the guidance of the British Cabinet in 1925, after a gloomy picture of the danger of war in the near future in Europe, used the following words :

“How far can the League be counted on to control a situation of such uncertainty? As a clearing-house for international disputes, the League of Nations is a wholly admirable institution. In many minor questions it has already played a most useful part, but at present and probably for years it will be unsafe to count upon its authority being sufficient to restrain a Great Power in any case in which that Power considers its vital interests to be at stake. The time may come when the League will be able to deal not only with incidental disputes, but even with more permanent and deep-seated rivalries. It is vain to deny, however, that this stage has not yet been reached, or to hide the fact that a sense of security cannot in such vital matters to-day emanate from Geneva.”

Sir Austen Chamberlain is the most old-fashioned of our living British politicians. Entering politics in the nineteenth century, his mind was run into the current mould of thought and has remained unalterably fixed ever since, even though his tongue sometimes speaks the language of the twentieth. In the days of his brilliant father, foreign affairs were not the concern of the common people or even of Parliament. They were a matter for monarchs, ambassadors, and foreign secretaries alone. This entailed secret diplomacy, with the secrets leaking out in the salons. Sir Austen still believes in the divine right of professional diplomats and their political chiefs. He unfortunately speaks fluent French

and thinks he understands the language. His conduct of foreign affairs is like unto a one-eyed man walking backwards and leading a crowd of blind men. And he is leading us all towards war.

Mr. Houghton, the American Ambassador in London, formerly American Ambassador in Berlin, whose knowledge of European post-war politics is unique, in his report to President Coolidge, paraphrased in the *London Times* of March 18th, 1926, stated the following :

“The continent of Europe, so far as its statesmen are concerned, has learned nothing from the war ; the League of Nations, far from becoming a truly international instrument for the organisation of peace, is moving toward a revival of the alliance of 1815 . . . the Powers of the European continent do not genuinely wish to disarm . . . the preliminary arms conference at Geneva will meet . . . to discuss proposals upon which agreement is neither desired nor expected, and which have been deliberately . . . advanced in order to make failure certain.”

So much for the League's efficacy for preventing war ; and instead of getting better, the position is getting worse. And yet all the members of the League officially support it ; in England, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, and other countries are very strong bodies of devoted enthusiasts who exist for the purpose of educating public opinion, and are certainly active and untiring in their efforts. In England, in particular, all the three political parties officially support the League, and hardly anyone throws doubt upon it openly. The League of Nations Union in England is wealthy and powerful, and its vice-presidents include the leaders of all the three

political parties, all the living ex-Prime Ministers, every former Foreign Secretary, and amongst its members are all the religious leaders in the country. "Ah!" say its apologists, "the League cannot run before it can walk. Its growth must be slow. If it goes too fast it would be dangerous. It cannot intervene at present in any crisis where a Great Power is involved." The trouble is, however, that if only it walked or even crawled *forward* it would be something. In fact, the League is walking fast and almost running in the wrong direction. The League of Nations is abdicating its functions as a body for the preservation of peace and the prevention of war. It is weaker now than in 1920.

What is its record on armaments? In the first Covenant of the League it was distinctly laid down that general disarmament was one of its first duties. This duty it is certainly attempting to carry out; that is, if the holding of conferences is any test. Article VIII. of the Covenant reads as follows:

"The members of the League recognise that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety, and the enforcement by common action of international obligations. The Council, taking account of the geographical situation and circumstances of each state, shall formulate plans for such reduction for the consideration and action of the several Governments. Such plans shall be subject to reconsideration and revision at least every ten years. After these plans shall have been adopted by the several Governments, the limits of armaments therein fixed shall not be exceeded without the concurrence of the Council."

It is no exaggeration to say that, since the signature of the peace treaties, committees, sub-committees, permanent advisory committees, temporary mixed commissions, the Council of the League, or the experts employed by it, have been continuously in session discussing disarmament, the limitation of armaments, security, the prevention of the private traffic in munitions, and the like.

In 1923 the Assembly passed the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance. In this draft treaty, which all the Powers were invited to sign, whether members of the League or not, offers of security were made through a general Treaty of Arbitration, all the states members binding themselves to intervene against an aggressor nation refusing to go to arbitration. Also particular alliances and agreements were invited for a reduction of armaments by geographical regions, neighbours agreeing amongst themselves to cut down their military establishments. Great Britain, the United States of America, Germany, and Russia refused to sign this particular treaty. In the following year (1924) the Fifth Assembly met. The Treaty of Mutual Assistance was transformed into the Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. Once again the Protocol relied upon mutual security, guaranteed by the states members, disarmament and arbitration. All disputes were to be settled compulsorily. The Protocol was not to come into force until a general all-round measure of disarmament had taken place. The British Government refused to sign, as did other states, but the Pact of Locarno was drawn up and agreed to instead. And since then the further commissions have been at work examining into the whole question of the reduction of armaments.

The net result of all this work is exactly nothing.

All the meetings, all the conferences, all the committees, the Locarno Treaty itself, have not led to the disbandment of one battalion of infantry in Europe, to the scrapping of one warship, or the destruction of one military aeroplane. Not a fortress has been dismantled, not a naval dockyard reduced. And no nation has hesitated to enlist one additional soldier, to manufacture one cannon, to assemble one fighting aeroplane, or to build one warship because of the League of Nations and all its committees. There is a growing body of opinion in Germany which demands that she should seek permission to rearm owing to the failure to bring about all-round reductions in armaments !

Let me quote here Mr. Lloyd George, ex-Prime Minister of England, formerly Secretary of State for War, whose signature appears on the Treaty of Versailles containing the Covenant of the League of Nations, a vice-president of the British League of Nations Union, the author of the Genoa Conference for the attempted resettlement of post-war Europe. On June 22nd, 1927, a monument to the late Rev. Henry Richard, Member of Parliament, and a great advocate of peace by negotiation, was unveiled. The atmosphere was certainly favourable to a eulogy of the work of the League. Yet this is what Mr. Lloyd George said on that occasion, and no one has been found to protest or to gainsay him. His statement was received with tacit approval by the Press and the public, and it received wide publicity :

“ For weeks and months they have been meeting in Geneva trying to settle disarmament. Allow me to say, as one who knows something about these conferences, that up to the present it has been

a case of fooling about. One nation has been manœuvring to get the advantage, to disarm the other one and to retain the supremacy itself. That is not the spirit of disarmament. I say quite frankly, from what knowledge I have of the conditions, that the way in which they are going about it is not an effort to avert war, but to see that when war comes they will get the advantage. You will never disarm in that spirit."

It is even said quite openly by persons in a position to know the facts that Viscount Cecil, then a member of the British Cabinet, the British member of the League of Nations Conference on Armaments in 1927, this Conference being called in order to agree on proposals for a reduction acceptable to all the countries concerned, was ordered by his Government to come to no agreement on this occasion especially where naval armaments were concerned, so as in no way to decrease the importance of the Conference on naval armaments of the three principal maritime Powers, Great Britain, Japan, and America, which was to meet in the same setting the following month. If this is true, and an impartial reading of the proceedings would lead one to suppose that, in racing parlance, Viscount Cecil was "riding for a fall," it is an insight into the real opinion of the British Government towards the efforts of the League of Nations to reduce armaments and of the Governments of most of the other countries concerned.

It is curious, in fact, that the serious attempts at limitation of armaments by mutual agreement have all been brought about outside the orbit of the League of Nations. The Washington Agreement of 1921, in spite of its blemishes and loopholes for further trouble, did

stop a race in the building of capital ships of war for ten years. It did lead to some attempt to rationalise the practice of warfare with regard to the use of submarines, poison gases, aircraft, etc. Some promising conferences on armaments have taken place between Russia and the Baltic States and Poland outside the auspices of the League. The regional agreement for disarmament between the five Central American States of Guatemala, Honduras, Salvador, Nicaragua and Costa Rica took place under the auspices of the United States in 1923.

During the year 1926 and the first part of 1927, immense work was put in by the League in endeavouring to find a basis on which agreement could be reached for mutual disarmament. Two technical sub-committees, one consisting of naval and military experts, the other of financial and economic experts, made a thorough exploration of the whole subject. But agreement was not reached on many vital matters, and it never will be reached along the lines attempted. For always the expert committees and the politicians who have to interpret their findings and embody them in treaties are faced by the ever recurring difficulty. War remains a legal and organised institution, and the greater and more powerful the nation the more her people fear war. There is no possibility of all-round general disarmament while war remains a possibility, and, as I have shown in earlier chapters, an actual probability in many parts of the world. All the labours of 1926 and 1927 will in any case have been brought to naught by events beyond the control of the League. Two factors have made any solid achievement impossible. They are, firstly, the rupture of relations between the British Empire and Russia and its consequences, and secondly, the total failure of

the Geneva Naval Conference of 1927, when Britain, America, and Japan could not whole-heartedly agree on further limitation of armaments.

One nation in Europe has disarmed herself physically and morally. This is Denmark. But no one is afraid of Denmark, and the curious thing is that nobody supposes that any nation will take advantage of her unarmed state to attack her. No one is afraid of Denmark, so Denmark need fear no one. In pioneering days certain states in the south-west of the American Union were "wild" in the sense that men carried weapons and were prepared to use them. But in these newly settled states before the courts and the police had been sufficiently established, men were divided into two categories, gunmen and non-gunmen. In a quarrel a gunman could be shot and his slayer had a very good chance of acquittal by public opinion and the courts. But a gunman dare not shoot down a non-gunman. In a quarrel he must fight with his fists. For a gunman to shoot a non-gunman was murder. For the gunman had nothing to fear from the non-gunman. So it is with nations. Who would dare to attack Denmark, or, for that matter, Switzerland? It is useless to quote the case of Belgium in the last war, as Belgium was involved in the system of alliances, and the British, French, and German war plans alike counted on her being a party to the conflict and a theatre of operations.

Again, take the example of Germany. Germany is disarmed physically but not mentally. She can raise an army quickly and equip it with the most scientific instruments of slaughter. She has the man-power and the chemical, scientific and engineering resources. France is afraid of her, and there is a real danger of a new war between France and Germany, in spite of Locarno,

which I have described in Chapter X, "The Ancient Feud of the Rhine." But there is little possibility of a direct quarrel between England and Germany. In fact, the governing party in Britain has been deliberately moulding public opinion in the direction of active friendship with Germany. What is this difference in outlook between England and France towards their beaten enemy? There was nothing to choose during the war between the frenzied hatred of the population of France and England towards the Germans. The reason is partly to be found in differences of temperament between the English and French people. But this does not account for the whole of the difference. The greatest reason is that the English are no longer afraid of the Germans. Germany threatened England's sea communications. She challenged her overlordship of the oceans. But the German Navy has been destroyed. Germany is only allowed to maintain a meagre force of little battleships and very light cruisers. Submarines are forbidden to her. And all hostility therefore against Germany has died or is dying. The British, like every other people, only hate those of whom they are afraid. And, as in human affairs, nations are apt to hate those whom they have treated badly. The English have a clear conscience where Germany is concerned. They know, at any rate, that if they had not been partners in the Peace Treaty it would have been even more harsh than it was; and they know that they have brought their pressure to bear to see that Germany is not further humiliated and insulted since the end of the war. But there is a vague fear of Russia, and therefore a resentment. Russia will recover one day, will be once again a mighty force in the world, and this the British know. And while the British Navy remains supreme, Russia is the only

country to-day which can really injure the British Empire, with the exception of the United States of America, which is in a different category altogether. If this fear is once felt for America, ill-feeling and bad relations between the two English-speaking democracies will follow with absolute certainty.

The League of Nations has done good work in checking the white slave traffic, in preventing the smuggling of opium, in putting down the black slave trade, and in preventing the spread of contagious diseases by international action. The International Labour Office has done, and does, valuable work for the humanisation of industry by mutual agreement amongst the nations. The League has done good work in resettling Christian refugees from Turkey in Greece and in providing for the humane evacuation of Moslem refugees from Europe. It has helped the Armenians, and it guarantees loans for Austria, Hungary, Danzig, and other nations or communities suffering as a result of the war. But, as a means of preventing war, or even bringing about a reduction of armaments by preventing the private manufacture and sale of weapons, it has failed hopelessly. And yet its machinery is excellent, the organisation of its secretariat very good ; it has something in the nature of an international Civil Service, devoted, industrious, and capable ; it certainly has the good will of public opinion, and it was designed to fill the greatest need in the post-war world. It has, of course, had many handicaps. The Covenant itself was a compromise ; the necessity for the Council being absolutely unanimous before it can take any action, for example, is a brake on its activities ; but the trouble goes far deeper.

The whole conception of the League of Nations is wrong.

Its declared object is to prevent war breaking out and if war should break out to prevent its spreading and to end it as soon as possible. But the very existence of war as an established legality makes the success of the League impossible.

It is not even an insurance against war. The theories of the League have undergone changes since the drawing up of the first Protocol, it is true. But it was born out of the American idea of the League to enforce Peace—that is, to prevent war by making war or threatening it.

In its chase after means of reconciling the future peace of the world with the continued recognition of war, the League has explored several means of preventing or segregating outbreaks of war. The blockade weapon is one. The idea is that two nations having quarrelled and decided to fight things out, the Council of the League is to decide which is the aggressor. The international jurists have failed to find a definition of aggression, but it is generally taken to mean now a refusal to arbitrate or to abide by arbitration.

As showing the doubt existing on this subject, I will quote the words of Mr. Godfrey Locker-Lampson, M.P., Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in the House of Commons on July 11th, 1927 (Hansard, col. 1890, vol. 208, no. 97) :

“The hon. and gallant member for Central Hull (Commander Kenworthy) made an interesting suggestion which was also made by several other hon. Members, that war ought to be made illegal. That is, of course, the object of the Geneva Protocol ; but the difficulty is that you have to define the aggressor. If you make war illegal, in order to show that an illegality has occurred you have to define

the aggressor. You may have two very nervous countries co-terminous with one another, where frontier issues may arise, and it would be practically impossible to define the aggressor in that case."

Owing to the system of alliances which has been continued in post-war Europe, the state accused of aggression is almost sure to find sympathisers. However this may be, having satisfied themselves as to the aggressor—and the Council must be unanimous in this—financial assistance is refused to the aggressive Power, trading relations with her are broken off, and it is sometimes proposed that a maritime blockade should be instituted. This latter especially is a form of warfare. The Finns have come forward with a bright suggestion, which has been seriously debated, that the states members of the League should go further and give financial assistance to the other party to the dispute—that is, the party who is judged not to be the aggressor. This is as if there are two parties to a civil action at law, and the friends of both who wish to prevent litigation offer unlimited financial support to one of the parties. No doubt this plan is attractive to poverty-stricken nations with unstable currencies and weak credit, especially when the states members include the wealthy English and Dutch and, it is to be hoped, the even more wealthy Americans. All these sanctions may be made to sound very plausible; but until the Council of the League will oppose the actual aggression of a Great Power, and I have mentioned at least four unmistakable examples of failure, it will remain what it is, a glorified debating society, able to do good social work and useful as a means of bringing national leaders together so that they can understand each other better.

Another proposal, very popular during the late war, is that there should be general disarmament and that the League should have an international Police Force. It should have an Army, a Navy, and an Air Force of such strength that the local defence forces permitted to the states members would be unable to offer any effective resistance. This plan is, of course, quite outside practical politics while the United States, Brazil, Turkey, and Russia, and possibly other states, remain outside the League, and while the Chinese Government represented on the Council of the League can speak for perhaps 10,000,000 Chinese out of 440,000,000. It is absurd to talk of an international Police Force when, out of a world population of 1,800,000,000, 740,000,000 are outside the League.

Another idea is that following the example of King Henry VII. of Britain, who held all the artillery and refused permission to any noble to maintain cannon, the League should possess the only fighting Air Force in the world. The idea is attractive at first sight. Youths of all nations would be brought up together as the future international police officers, and become true internationalists. Any aggressive Power would be overawed by aerial demonstrations which, if they did not have the desired effect, would be followed by aerial bombardments. In a hundred years' or even fifty years' time we may have accomplished something in the nature of a world federation, and an international aerial police will be a possibility. Unfortunately this is a problem of to-morrow and we are faced with danger to-day. Long before fifty years the world may have been racked by several wars on the most terrible scale. This is inevitable under present-day conditions and with present-day tendencies.

The simple fact is that so long as war is a recognised

possibility and an accepted normal legality, the League can never prevent war by a threat of force. In other words it can never prevent war by threatening war itself. And for this reason, fear, the parent of war, will remain. And because of fear, every nation suffering it, which means most nations of the world, will arm. And because they arm, their neighbours will be afraid. And exactly the same conditions which brought on the last Great War will arise again. Until war is accepted as an illegality like burglary, or murder, it will be a danger to the world. Primitive societies could engage in war, and backward nations can do it to-day, without suffering vital injury. But civilised nations, because they are civilised, have evolved such terrible weapons of destruction that by engaging in war civilisation will destroy itself.

Until this fact is recognised the League of Nations, as at present constituted—and no amount of alteration in its procedure or organisation will make the least difference—does more harm than good. For it acts as an opiate on the popular mind of the world. The peoples know that the League of Nations is in being, and think that all is well. They suppose that the League can prevent war, or, at any rate, prevent it in their time. While there was a possibility of the League functioning successfully and performing the duties laid upon it, it was the duty of all men of good will in Europe to support it. I have supported it myself in the past, and am prepared to support it in the future. With war recognised as illegal by the most powerful of the nations, the League of Nations will be a great instrument for the adjustment of differences and the settlement of disputes between the crowded peoples of Europe. But it will not prevent war, and it cannot prevent war, so long as war is recognised as an institution ; and the sooner this fact is understood, the better.

CHAPTER XVIII

SOME PLANS FOR PEACE

Idea that the more terrible the weapons of war the less likely their use—Its fallacy—Marshal Foch explains antidotes to new weapons—His plan for peace—Proposals to prohibit fighting in the air—Analogy with submarine—Monitor Peace Plan—French and Russian universal conscription—Modern Amazons—Publicity for peace—Objections of Governments—United States of Europe—The main obstacle—Internationalism—Socialism and war—Power of organised Labour—Its weakness—Classic example of Labour preventing a war—War weariness—Its passing.

THERE are many good people labouring ceaselessly at plans to prevent wars. Prizes are offered by various peace societies and private philanthropists; numerous societies, especially in England and America, exist for the purpose of studying peace plans; the Christian Churches have their own organisation; and some of the keenest minds, especially in America, have been devoted to the cause of peace ever since the outbreak of the last war.

In the previous chapter I dealt with the League of Nations itself and its plans for preventing war by making certain of its extension when it breaks out.

Let me now refer to some of the other proposals in debate.

There is a school of thought that sees hopes of peace in the increasing destructiveness and fearfulness of modern weapons. Let war be made more terrible, they say, and the peoples will insist on its avoidance. But this school overlooks one of the universal causes of war—namely, fear. The more people are afraid of war

the more they will insist on being armed themselves. This is the openly declared policy of the British Government in building up a strong Air Force, including a great proportion of bombing aeroplanes. The avowed policy adopted by successive Governments is to equip Britain with such an Air Force that the strongest Power in the world will hesitate to attack her. All history shows that armaments do not prevent wars. Allied to the peace-by-terror party are those who think that if only a nation is armed to the teeth she will be able to escape war. The most heavily armed nations in Europe were those involved in the last war. This school of thought is addicted to the quotation of Scripture. They are fond of citing the twenty-first verse of the eleventh chapter of the Gospel according to St. Luke, which reads as follows: "When a strong man armed keepeth his palace, his goods are in peace." But they omit the next verse, which reads as follows: "But when a stronger than he shall come upon him, and overcome him, he taketh from him all his armour wherein he trusted, and divideth his spoils."

Si vis pacem, para bellum; another slogan of the peace-by-armaments party. "Wishing for peace, prepare for war," is the free translation. These words appear over the portals of naval shore establishments and gunnery schools, and in brass letters on the quarterdecks of warships. And in spite of the fate of Prussia and the teachings of all history, the peace-by-armaments school continues to chant this slogan.

There is another school whose arguments cancel that of the peace-by-terror party. Thus Marshal Foch in an interview given to an English newspaper, the *Weekly Dispatch*, published on July 10th, 1927, says:

“Remember the mine and the torpedo, and how people at the time they were first invented predicted the end of war. Yet means of protection against them were found soon afterwards. The same will happen again to-morrow.”

Going on to speak of the increasing power of aircraft, Marshal Foch says :

“In the case of land forces, and assuming that other defensive measures have proved unavailing, I am convinced that concealment of position, personnel, and material, as well as the avoidance of any large concentrations, can always materially reduce the efficiency of Air Forces.”

The Marshal is, of course, thinking of his beloved armies ; how concentration in great cities is to be avoided he does not explain. As I mention this great master of strategy again, it is interesting to note his peace plan. It is the Entente Cordiale, the naval and military and financial alliance of Great Britain and France. This he believes will keep the peace. Marshal Foch's plan is flattering to an Englishman. But it has the slight defect of having been tried once and having failed to prevent the greatest war that has yet plagued mankind.

Another school of thought proposes to declare the illegality of war in the air. Aerial bombardments are to be forbidden and the construction of fighting aeroplanes made unlawful. The great Bayard had similar plans when gunpowder first began to be used in the field ; this great Christian paragon of chivalry would give no quarter to captured musketeers. But apart from historical precedent, the proposal to illegalise air fighting breaks down because the aeroplane is useful for peaceful purposes.

Its manufacture can no more be prohibited than the manufacture of motor-cars, though in England an attempt was made to prevent the use of motor-cars for many years. So long as there are commercial aeroplanes there will be pilots. Commercial aeroplanes can be used for bombing purposes. Furthermore, aeroplanes and their engines can be built rapidly and young men and women trained to fly them. The growth of all the Air Forces in the late war, and especially the British and American Air Forces, was miraculous. The cases of the aeroplane and submarine are sometimes compared. But the analogy fails because, unlike the aeroplane, the submarine has no function in peace-time. Furthermore, it takes far longer to train a submarine's crew than to train an aeroplane pilot. Good fighting pilots have been trained in as many weeks as it takes years to make a good submarine officer.

Another line of approach is to abolish the profits and advantages of war. Of this order is the *Christian Science Monitor* Peace Plan, born in Boston, Massachusetts. The *Monitor* plan is that on the outbreak of war the whole nation shall be conscripted. The draft shall apply to men and women, old and young, rich and poor, gentle and simple. And everyone shall be on soldier's pay, or a dollar a day.

All those who witnessed the building up of war fortunes in all the belligerent countries in the last war must feel sympathetic to this idea. It is a pity, in fact, that it cannot be carried further and the Cabinet Ministers and higher Civil Servants and general staff officers be sent into the fighting line. It used to be said in Flanders amongst the British soldiers that if the belligerent Secretaries of State could spend a week in the front line trenches it would be the last week of fighting in

the war. But since the *Monitor* plan was propounded, it has been adopted by the greatest military nation in the world. France has passed a universal conscription law. Every French man, woman, and child will henceforth be allocated his or her place in the national war organisation. It looks very much as if it would be impossible in any case to keep the younger women out of the fighting line in the next war. They have invaded every sphere of masculine activity, and that of active warfare can no longer be denied them. Modern Amazons drill with the soldiers in Russia to-day, and, after the break of diplomatic relations with Britain in 1927, during the campaign of preparedness initiated by the Soviet Government, great efforts were made to enrol young women, and especially the strong young peasant women, in the Red Militia. Furthermore, the prevention of private profit-making out of war prevails in Russia as a Socialist State to-day. The munition factories have been nationalised like the rest. But the most optimistic worker for peace cannot claim that it has been brought any nearer either by the French universal conscription law or the nationalisation of the gun and cordite factories in Russia. Concurrently with the *Monitor* Peace Plan of universal conscription is the movement to abolish conscription. This was imposed on Germany, Austria, Bulgaria, and Hungary after the last war. But there is no chance of inducing the conscription countries to follow this example of their own free will. Bulgaria, especially, has been petitioning the Conference of the Ambassadors of the victorious Powers to permit her to revert to conscription, for reasons of economy, for the raising of the small army allowed to her. 'Iraq, mandatory of the British Empire, finds difficulty in raising a voluntary army from her Bedouin population. The

Government of King Feisal proposes, therefore, to introduce conscription. The British Government is favourable to the proposal, while supporting plans for the abolition of conscription at League of Nations conferences on armaments. Italy, Serbia, France, Japan, and other conscription countries will abandon the draft when they can reduce their armaments. And they will never reduce their armaments until the fear of war is removed. And that fear will only be removed when war ceases to be an institution.

Yet another plan is a wide-world campaign of publicity and propaganda for bringing home to the peoples the horrors, stupidity, and uselessness of war. Needless to say this plan is favoured by the publicity profession, and is none the worse for that. Far too much propaganda for war is in progress all over the world, and far too little for peace. The weak point of this plan, promising as it is, is that the arming States look upon the willingness of their people to fight as a weapon in their armouries. So long as war is a possibility, nations will arm. So long as they must arm they must ensure that their people are willing to fight; and they will hardly consent to a campaign of publicity, for which they themselves would help to pay, which would convert their peoples to pacifism by the million. For the pacifist is out of place unless we are all pacifists. The propaganda for peace will follow automatically the outlawry of war.

Yet another proposal is for a United States of Europe. The argument is that Europe is the cockpit of the nations, and that if Europe can be kept peaceable the peace of the world will be maintained. The plan is to begin with a European Zollverein. The Customs barriers in Europe keep that Continent poor by interfering with its trade. They keep the peoples apart and they cause

irritation between the nations. The belief follows that free trade throughout Europe would ensure peace ; and it is a powerful argument. The Economic Conference called by the League of Nations in 1927 and attended by representatives of all the states members of the League and by the United States of America, Turkey, Russia, and other countries outside the League, came to conclusions which, if adopted, would lead the nations of Europe some distance along the road leading to a United States of the Continent of Europe.

But the fear of war will prevent this proposal maturing for many years to come. I can best explain the real obstacle to a United States of Europe by quoting Louis Loucheur. He is one of the recognised leaders of economics and finance in France, and was the principal representative of France at the above-mentioned Economic Conference. During the war he was head of the French Ministry of Munitions, and at the conclusion of hostilities he became the Minister of Industrial Reconstruction. Monsieur Loucheur remained at its head for two years and directed its activities with great skill and vision. He was one of the framers of the economic sections of the Versailles Treaty. In Monsieur Clemenceau's Government of 1917 to 1920 he was Minister for Armaments ; he was Minister for the Liberated Regions from 1921 to 1922 under Monsieur Briand's Government ; he was Minister of Finance in 1925, and he has been France's principal delegate to the League of Nations Assembly. Monsieur Loucheur has been eight times a Minister in the French Cabinet. He is the proprietor of the well-known French newspaper *Le Petit Journal*. On May 8th, 1927, he contributed an article to the weekly London newspaper, the *Referee*, in which he examined very sympathetically the proposal for a United States of

Europe and the abolition of Customs barriers. He then stated the following :

“There is an objection which occurs to one, concerned more with national security than with economic questions. Let us reflect, for example, on what would happen if we decided that steel should circulate freely in Europe and if we had an inter-European concentration for the production of this metal. It would inevitably happen that the inconveniently situated factories, far from fuel and minerals, would go under and production would be concentrated in the factories near to coal and iron mines. As a result, certain countries would acquire a semi-monopoly of steel. The nation thus advantageously placed would have an immediate tendency to abuse its hegemony and would have in its hands the most powerful means of making war. For this reason and others it is impossible at present to contemplate the suppression of Customs barriers.”

There we have it, and from the pen of a man of the eminence and fineness of brain of Monsieur Loucheur ! War, the fear of war, war as an institution, stands once more blocking the path to peace and progress.

There are in the field a whole series of plans for bringing about peace by disarmament or by limitation of armaments, or by reduction of armaments by mutual agreement. I have referred to the attempts to put these plans into operation in previous chapters, and have dealt with the great obstacle in the way of their fulfilment. In brief, so long as war exists and nations are afraid of being involved in war, they will insist on armaments and “preparedness.” To attempt to bring about peace by

disarmament is to tackle the problem from the wrong direction.

Of the order of these plans is the proposal to abolish the private manufacture of and traffic in arms. This trade offends the public conscience. One of the numerous League of Nations committees on armaments, the Temporary Mixed Commission, has made a special report through the Secretary-General of the League on the traffic in armaments, containing a heavy indictment. The following specific charges are made: The armament firms in several countries in the past, and possibly in recent times, have deliberately fermented war scares. They have used their political influence on their respective Governments in favour of Imperialistic and even warlike policies. They have worked through the Parliaments and National Assemblies in the countries in which the firms are situated to bring about increases of armaments. They have tried to bribe officials and have corrupted public life in many cases. They have spread false information about the naval and military programmes of other nations in order to cause a demand for insuring armaments in their own countries. The case of the firm of Krupp in Germany before the war, and its influence on the Press, extending even to the ownership of newspapers, is well known. But there have been other cases in other countries besides Germany. And, lastly, they have organised international trusts with the object of artificially raising prices and bleeding the peoples of the countries concerned.

I must here take note of the statements made by responsible newspaper correspondents, many of whom are known to me personally as thoroughly trustworthy men, as to representations of the American and British armament-making firms and steel corporations at the

Coolidge Conference at Geneva. There would appear to have been a good deal of lobbying going on at the expense of, and on behalf of, the shipbuilding and armour plate rolling companies. No doubt the directors and shareholders of armament-making companies throughout the world have a vested interest in war and preparations for war. But we have a parallel example of self-interest in the vested interests of the officials and workmen dependent on the employment given in Government dockyards, national arsenals, etc., and the tradesmen and shopkeepers who cater for them. Let me give a recent and vivid example. After years of effort, the British Admiralty at last persuaded the Government to allow them to close down the redundant dockyards of Pembroke and Rosyth. There was an immediate agitation organised all over Wales and Scotland. No doubt the lead was taken by those dependent on the dockyards either for work or trade, or dependent on the workers in these dockyards as a means of livelihood. But they succeeded in arousing a good deal of national indignation because Rosyth is the one dockyard in Scotland, and Pembroke the only one in Wales ; and the mere suggestion of closing down these yards, no longer wanted by the Navy, was taken as an insult to Scotland and Wales respectively. It was disheartening to find avowed pacifists in the House of Commons, and advocates of both economy and disarmament, raging against the Government for their perfectly proper decision, taken on the advice of the Admiralty. In fact, during a good many years now in which I have watched the proceedings of Parliament, I have found the strongest agitation for an increase in armaments coming, not from the representatives of the private armament-making commercial centres—like Sheffield, Birmingham, and Glasgow—but

from the national dockyard Members of Parliament. Lady Astor, the sprightly but sentimental Member of Parliament for the dockyard city of Plymouth, is all for peace. She welcomes reductions of armaments, but, in her own words, "Hands off the British Navy!"

Nevertheless, this pressure is open. The pressure exercised by the private armament firms is secret and underground. Every little helps, and *it would undoubtedly be a good thing for the world if the private manufacture of munitions could be abolished.*

Two main objections are put forward. The first comes from those nations who do not possess an armament-making industry. They claim the right to be able to purchase in the open market. And they are secretly supported by the nations who supply them. An example often quoted is that of the independent and warlike tribes and peoples on the farther side of the north-west frontier of India. The British Government succeeded in preventing its own nationals from selling arms to these peoples, only to find certain of our dear friends and allies doing a "roaring" trade to these customers through other channels. Nevertheless, if the armament-making nations can agree, the armament-buying nations will have to do without weapons; which will be excellent for the peace of the world.

The other objection is economic. It is stated that armaments can be manufactured more cheaply by private enterprise than in national factories. This is not altogether true. For example, the British royal dockyards have built ships as cheaply as the private shipbuilding firms, and it is a solemn fact that, although not costing more, the ships last better, the workmanship is sounder, and they are better constructed generally. The real answer is, however, that even if the armaments cost a

little more, there will be advantages in other directions, as indicated above, and everyone will be treated alike.

Many other difficulties will be put forward. But there are signs that public opinion is coming round to the view that to make money out of the manufacture of the implements of war is immoral. But when war is made illegal and warmongers are viewed with abhorrence it will be considered as improper to provide arms to would-be breakers of the peace as knowingly to provide the burglar with his safe-breaking tools and acetylene blow-lamps, or his automatic pistol to a professional gangster or highwayman.

Since the war the idea that organised Labour in the countries concerned can prevent further wars has received an impetus from the general disgust and disillusionment of all people not necessarily belonging to any one class, and the increase in strength of the Labour and Socialist movement. The strongest Labour party in Europe is to be found in Britain, and it is in Britain that the chief hope is placed in the influence of organised Labour to prevent further warfare. Certainly organised Labour has created a new factor, and its theoretical opposition to war must be taken into account. Organised Labour, especially in Europe, has entered the field as a political force. There is a new democratic conception unknown a hundred years ago at the close of the Napoleonic wars. It was during the nineteenth century that the industrial revolution took place. The populations of all the European countries increased roughly fourfold, and the increase was due to the invention of the steam-engine and its application to manufacture, presently to be reinforced by the scientific utilisation of electricity, chemistry, the petrol motor, and other inventions. The peace of exhaustion following the Napoleonic wars was broken, it

is true, by colonial expeditions and colonial wars ; but these were waged by small professional armies and colonial troops or by native armies recruited on the spot.

Europe drifted into the Crimean War after thirty years, but that struggle was not an unlimited war of nations, using the word "unlimited" in the sense employed by Clausewitz and other students of strategy. Even at the date of the outbreak of the Crimean War there was no organised working class, no Labour and Socialist opinion worthy of consideration, in any of the countries concerned. In England and France the great middle class were still the dictators of national politics. Russia was still ruled by an aristocracy. The wars of Prussia against Denmark, Austria, and France still found Labour unorganised and unprepared.

It needed the Great War itself, following on the later developments of the industrial revolution, to create the democratic movement which to-day furnishes an additional guarantee for peace. For the industrial developments of the nineteenth century brought into being a great class of wage-earning factory and mine workers which has become the new political factor. The Second International broke down hopelessly under the excitement and strain of the weeks immediately preceding August, 1914. Liberalism flourished before the World War in all countries, and led to a division of working-class opinion. But just as the World War of 1914 to 1918 was the most terrific struggle in which mankind had yet engaged, and caused the greatest amount of misery and suffering, so the corresponding reaction from it has been greater and more powerful.

The British Labour party, for example, owes its origin and present strength and formation, enabling it even to form a Government some years ago, to the events of the

war. Yet, although the majority of British Labour supported the Governments in power during the war in the waging of it, on the first real threat of war on a great scale afterwards in August, 1920, when in the course of fighting between Poland and Russia the Red armies invaded Poland and there was some talk of British aid being sent to the Poles, it was British Labour which caused an actual reversal of policy on the part of the Government at Westminster by a threat of direct action to hold up munitions and troops. This action was unconstitutional. But the House of Commons was on the point of adjourning for three months, and the British trade unions were the only other organised body in the country capable of acting. And organised Labour certainly put into deeds what the great majority of the British people wished to see done, and, indeed, tacitly supported at the time.

This is the classic example of organised Labour in Britain exerting its power directly to prevent a war in which it did not believe and refused to support, and it will remain on record as a practical example of democracy's peaceful intentions put into practice. That the Coalition Government at Westminster secretly welcomed the excuse to remain neutral does not affect the precedent. In Germany, again, the republic has been maintained by the German working classes largely because of the belief of the German workers that a monarchist restoration would mean a new war of revenge.

But it would be rash to count too much on the help of organised Labour in preventing war. In the conscription countries, for example, every workman is a Reservist and is called automatically to the Colours on mobilisation. In England the trade union organisation

has been weakened by the so-called General Strike of 1926. The workman is a citizen as well as a trade unionist. And as a citizen he is a member of the national mob, liable to mob psychology and mass suggestion with the rest of the people. The workmen are economically the weakest in the community. It is too much to ask them to bear the brunt of direct action against warfare, if a war is threatened, as well as to provide the "cannon fodder" as soon as the fighting begins.

We cannot divide nations into sections and classes and hope to accomplish very much. The propaganda that will precede the next outbreak of war will be subtle but efficient. The warmongers will feel their way gingerly. Europe has enjoyed a nine years' respite from war, except for small outbreaks, because the peoples would not fight nor the armies march. Foreign policy was adjusted accordingly. But memories are fading, the suggestion of war continues, the arming goes on. We approach the danger period. The next few years will decide the fate of the nations.

CHAPTER XIX

THE ONLY ROAD

Evolution in human mentality—France's approach to the United States of America—Borah and the outlawry of war—Ambassador Houghton—Dr. Murray Butler—British Foreign Secretary on the outlawry of war—Financial and economic power of Britain and America—Viscount Rothermere—W. R. Hearst—Position of Japan—Germany's sores—Her former colonies—The future functions of the League of Nations—The treatment of predatory powers—The strength of the peace-makers.

GREAT changes in the institutions of the world are brought about by the gradual development of the human mind. Slavery, the tribal blood-feud, the vendetta, the wars of religion, the feudal system with its private armies and private wars, the personal duel, were all firmly established and looked upon as perfectly legitimate and respectable at certain stages of the mental development of humanity. They have all been swept into the limbo of forgotten or discredited institutions by the evolution of public opinion. After the Thirty Years' War in Germany and the feudal Wars of the Roses in England, public opinion supported the suppression of religious and private wars because they had become an intolerable nuisance. Under modern conditions warfare has become an intolerable nuisance to the whole world. I am convinced that the vast majority of civilised people would welcome the necessary action to implement the revolution in outlook outlawing war. This will need a bold, dramatic step, but that step can now be taken if only we rouse ourselves, shake off our inertia and our prejudices, and conduct ourselves like men.

Two communities lead the world by reason of their wealth, their population, their natural resources, their engineering and scientific skill and development, their mighty potentialities and their control of raw materials. These two communities are the United States of America and the British Empire. Neither is in immediate or direct danger of war, though both will suffer greatly by any large-scale war in the world.

Monsieur Briand, Foreign Minister of France, on April 6th, 1927, gave a statement to the Associated Press in which he said, speaking of France and America :

“ If there were need for these two great democracies to give high testimony to their desire for peace and to furnish to other peoples an example, more solemn still, France would be willing to subscribe publicly with the United States to any mutual engagement tending to outlaw war, to use an American expression, as between these two countries.”

In December, 1926, my friend Senator Borah, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate, submitted to the Senate a resolution advocating the outlawry of war. The Senator defines this outlawry as—

“ the substitution of law and judicial tribunals for politics and force in international affairs.”

The idea is an old one, and was propounded before the entry of the United States into the last war. Mr. Levinson, the lawyer, and Mr. John Dewey, the philosopher, are well-known supporters. Senator Borah claims three conditions to achieve this object :

“1. International law must be codified and amplified so as to bring *all* international relationships under its control.

“2. An independent judicial tribunal must be established with jurisdiction and power to determine all controversies involving a construction of international law and treaties.

“3. War must be declared a crime and be no longer recognised, in any way or at any time, as a legitimate method of settling international disputes.”

I submit that the third is by far the most important, and that if adopted by the most powerful group of nations, everything else would follow automatically. In June, 1926, Mr. Houghton, the American Ambassador in England, speaking, it is true, in his private capacity as a citizen, in an address to the students of Harvard University, made the following proposals :

Firstly, that it was time that self-governing peoples should themselves undertake direct responsibility for those decisions on peace and war that up to now have been delegated to Governments.

Secondly, that a conference of the representatives of those peoples who are most alike in race, ancestry, language, and literature, and who respond and react most fully to the same appeals and emotions, should be convened to draft a plan whereby war could only be declared after a national referendum.

Thirdly, that this plan should be followed by an agreement for a century of peace, and that compacts thus made should be confirmed by national referenda to be held, on the same day in all countries, so that by simultaneous action of the individual electors of all the great

nations involved, full responsibility for that agreement should be dramatically brought home to each.

Fourthly, that a hundred years' peace agreement should be signed between the United States and Great Britain, and perhaps other Powers.

My friend Dr. Murray Butler, Principal of Columbia University, and a great savant in foreign affairs, is working along the same lines.

Speaking in the House of Commons on a debate on disarmament initiated by the Labour Party, Sir Austen Chamberlain, the British Foreign Secretary, on Monday, July 11th, 1927, hinted that such a declaration was unnecessary as in their hearts and souls all British people considered war with America already outlawed. But he then went on to support his colleague, Mr. Bridgeman, First Lord of the Admiralty, in his attitude at Geneva, by which attitude the possibility of war between England and America was clearly envisaged. Something more is required, and I suggest that Sir Austen Chamberlain should be taken at his word, and Monsieur Briand likewise. Let the English and American nations in the most solemn manner draw up the shortest and simplest treaty possible, in the clearest language, understood by the common people, definitely outlawing war, indicting it as a crime and undertaking to boycott any future breakers of the peace and indulgers in war. And let us invite Monsieur Briand and his Government to associate themselves with such a treaty, which, of course, would cover Germany, Italy, and other potential and even likely enemies of the French. And let us invite all other nations of good will to join us. We could certainly rely on the immediate adhesion of Holland, Switzerland and the Scandinavian States of Denmark, Sweden, and Norway. These are little countries, but they have a

high moral position in the world, and Holland and Switzerland are powerful financially.

Now let us see the effect. America, Britain, Holland, and Switzerland between them control the finance of the whole world. No nations breaking the peace could hope for any financial help against their combined boycott. England, America, and Holland between them control the greater part of the world's supplies of petroleum, Russia being the only large scale producer of oil in an independent position. England and Holland between them control the whole world's supplies of rubber. England and America between them control the greater part of the world's supplies of cotton and copper, Russia again producing comparatively small quantities of cotton and copper independently. England and France and Belgium, if she adhered, as is highly probable, control the greater part of the tropically produced edible fats. Most of the wool and jute is controlled by the British Empire.

Without money, oil, cotton, wool, rubber, copper, zinc, jute, tin, or edible fats, no war on the modern scale could be waged for very long. A very large proportion of the meat and wheat of the world would also be controlled by this group of peace-keepers. Do not let us involve ourselves in complications about aggressive Powers or who is to blame in any war. To do so would simply be to cloud the issue. Germany was compelled to sign a Treaty of Peace after the last war acknowledging her sole responsibility for it. What informed man or woman anywhere in the world to-day believes that Germany was alone to blame?

The aggressor can always plead provocation, and there is no end to the argument. There was much to be said on the side of the slave-owners and slave-traders

in the days of slavery, and for the feudal barons with their private armies of retainers in the period of the Civil Wars.

War must be recognised for what it is, a stupid, useless, and indefensible crime. With regard to the financial power of England and America, I will fortify myself with the statement of Viscount Rothermere, the great British newspaper proprietor, who visited Hungary in June, 1927, and was much shocked by the portents of war he witnessed. His Lordship also realised that Hungary was suffering certain injustices which must be put right if the peace is to be preserved. Dealing with remedies and writing from Budapest on June 11th, 1927, Lord Rothermere delivered himself, in the largest circulation daily newspaper in the world, as follows :

“ For stabilising and pacific effect, however, no influence is more important in Central Europe than that of the great financial houses of London and New York. They have this matter in their own hands. If they refuse to make money advances to the states which are responsible for maintaining the present precarious situation there, it will not be long before the result of that policy begins to show itself in the adoption of adjustments and understandings which will greatly reduce the potential causes of war.”

I suppose Mr. W. R. Hearst in America corresponds very closely to Lord Rothermere in England. Mr. Hearst has also been advocating an Anglo-American understanding for the preservation of the peace of the world. After referring to London's danger from air raids from the Continent, Mr. Hearst says :

“ English statesmen might logically conclude, I

think, that the best preventative of air raids on England would be a coalition of peace-loving, English-speaking peoples so powerful that even the most quarrelsome of European nations would hesitate to attack it."

Such an alliance or understanding need not mean more armaments; rather it would lead to the rapid diminution of armaments. The strength of America and England does not lie in their armaments. It lies in their inherent power and wealth and latent strength, and these could be immensely strengthened by the moral position they would occupy by adopting the plan I suggest.

The Japanese delegates at the Coolidge Conference in 1927 are reported to have proposed an understanding between the Japanese, British, and American peoples for the safeguarding of each others seaborne trade.

There is no reason why Japan should not adhere.

But something more is needed. There are certain injustices in the post-war world that cannot stand. Some recent injustices have been removed, though their removal, when first proposed, was hailed with cries of dismay and forebodings of disaster.

One danger spot for the peace of the world has been eradicated, by the granting of self-government to Ireland. This removes one of the greatest obstacles to Anglo-American understanding. The peace-keeping nations must be careful not to use their economic power to strangle poorer peoples. For the English-American-Dutch combination to use its economic power to exploit its virtual monopoly of oil and rubber in peace-time would be an injustice. The territorial settlements in Europe must be revised. Viscount Rothermere puts his finger on one of these settlements, the Hungarian parti-

tion, which I have dealt with at length earlier in this book.

Germany has grievances which must be remedied, and all far-seeing statesmen in Europe realise that this must be so. The Polish Corridor, Upper Silesia, and the mutually injurious reparation payments are amongst these. But there will be far more chance of a peaceful solution of these problems if war has been outlawed by nations powerful enough to outlaw it and to enforce the outlawry.

Another of Germany's grievances could be removed without much suffering or loss to anyone. I refer here to the annexation of all Germany's colonies by the victorious Allies, in spite of their solemn declarations during the war that they were not fighting to annex a yard of territory. The excuse for the annexations was that Germany was not fitted to have the care of backward and primitive peoples. Presumably not even the most brazen-faced Die-Hards in France or England would dare to advance that reason to-day after recent events, especially in Damascus. And the French might well retort with a citation of the laws for compulsory labour in British East Africa. The argument of Germany's depravity in her colonial practice has gone the way of most propaganda of the war period.

There have been black chapters in the dealings of all European Powers with their colonial territories. In any case the mandate system is supposed to prevent abuses and oppressions, and should finally dispose of that argument against the return of any of her former colonial territories to Germany as a Mandatory Power.

A more valid, though perhaps at the time not so powerful, argument used by the British to cover the thinly disguised annexation was that Germany could not

be trusted in the future with potential oversea naval bases from which, presumably, her submarines would issue in some future naval war for the destruction of the world's merchant shipping. This argument no longer holds good, as Germany is forbidden to build or possess submarines, and her Navy is strictly limited to the most essential needs of coastal defence at home. The naval strategical argument may therefore be placed on the shelf, together with the argument of Germany's moral delinquencies in Africa and elsewhere.

The most powerful and practical reason against the transfer of a mandate to Germany is that all her former territories are under mandates of England, France, Belgium, Japan, or the British Dominions. It would be difficult to force the present Mandatory Powers to disgorge territory so firmly in their possession. This last is a substantial argument that we may expect to be advanced; and, being founded on human greed and selfishness, will be the most potent in the Council Chamber.

Now, what are the reasons that might be advanced in favour of the transfer of a mandate to Germany? In the first place, it would really designate Germany as once more fitted to enter the community of nations, even if her seat on the Council of the League of Nations has not already so designated her. It would raise her again to the same moral level as Portugal. If it is really desired to attach Germany to the Western Group of European Powers and to detach her from the Eastern Group—in other words, from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—no more astute move could be made. From the point of view of encouraging Germany to keep the peace and to carry out to the best of her endeavours the Dawes scheme, or the successors to the Dawes scheme,

there could be no higher act of statesmanship. If the French, in particular, were wise, they would take a leaf out of the book of the first Prince Bismarck, who, after the defeat of France in the Franco-Prussian War, deliberately encouraged the colonial extension of his late enemy in order to distract her attention from the soreness of defeat.

If the principle of the granting of a mandate to Germany is accepted, it is necessary to examine what territories might be made over to her care. It is hardly likely that any of the Powers concerned could be persuaded to surrender mandates for territories not former German Colonies. The possible exception is the British mandate over 'Iraq, but no German statesman in his senses could be persuaded to take it. France could not surrender her mandate over Syria without terrible loss of prestige. Nor can any of the Powers be expected to surrender mandates for their own older colonies.

Remain the ex-German colonies. German South-West Africa is now a portion of the Union of South Africa. It would be unreasonable to expect the South African Government to return these territories. In any case, they are unsuitable for European settlement, and were run at a dead loss before the war. It was calculated by critics of the German administration that it would be cheaper to bring the German farmers home from South Africa and settle them in the suburbs of Berlin on a yearly pension of £500 each. There are diamond mines in the territory, but it is usually understood that De Beers pay a substantial sum annually to prevent their being opened up. The only exports of any importance from German "South-West" in pre-war days were empty beer bottles.

The German Pacific colonies are unsuitable for white

settlers. German New Guinea is a plantation colony under the mandate of Great Britain, as also is Samoa under mandate to New Zealand. The Marshall Islands, the Caroline Islands, and other small possessions would be of no interest to the Germans themselves. Togoland is a paying proposition as a plantation colony, and German estate owners and merchants did well there before the war. It is now divided between England and France, and is apparently the one most favoured in those Allied circles which advocate the granting of a mandate to Germany. But the Germans are not very enthusiastic about it themselves. The Cameroons is large in area, and is also a paying proposition, the greater part being under French mandate, and the smaller portion being under British mandate. There would be difficulties with France, and presumably with Britain also. But the Cameroons might be very suitable for the purpose in view.

By far the most suitable territory is the former German colony of East Africa, now known as Tanganyika. With the exception of small territories ceded to Belgium, the greater part is under British mandate, and has been fairly closely settled by British estate holders. There are, therefore, strong vested interests to overcome. A solution might be found by the surrender of part of the Cameroons by France and part of Tanganyika by Britain, compensation being given in the part not surrendered to French and British nationals who had taken up property as *bona fide* colonists or plantation owners.

The granting of a mandate to Germany for one of her former colonies would do much for the future peace of the world, at trifling cost. Britain is satiated with tropical colonies and is hard put to it to find the capital to develop them. She could spare Tanganyika. It would be cheap at the price to compensate handsomely all the

British settlers in Tanganyika who refused to come under German rule and to pension them off for life. It could be done at the cost of a couple of modern cruisers ! It may be objected that the "natives" have not been consulted. Neither were they when the territory was annexed. In any case a plebiscite in such a territory would be a farce.

The territorial injustices in Europe can be settled by the already existing machinery. The League of Nations has its World Court, but the trouble is that no one will use it. Outlaw war, and the would-be combatants will turn to the courts, as they do to-day in civil cases in civilised countries where the duel has been abolished.

The United States need not become a party to the World Court nor to the League of Nations. Nor is this proposal an "entangling alliance." If chattel slavery was rife in Europe, and England invited America to join her in declaring such slavery illegal and outlawed, America would not hesitate for a moment, and she would refuse to have any dealings with a country which recognised slavery. We can in the same way boycott and refuse to have any dealings with a country that recognises war, prepares for it, or proposes to wage it.

It may be said that the peace-keeping Powers would be liable to attack. Who would attack them ? And what chance of success would they have ? England and other countries, too, will find trouble in the future if they attempt to continue their domination over other peoples fitted for self-government. So will America find trouble if she looks for it in Mexico. But the outlawry of war will make the surrender of such domination easier even where such domination is not directly caused by the fear of war. The late Theodore Roosevelt knew his Europe, and he had a marvellous grasp of the inner matters of

importance in foreign politics. Writing during the early years of the last war, he diagnosed its causes in a published essay. The chief reason for the war was *fear*, in the opinion of this master statesman. He continued :

“ It is idle merely to make speeches and write essays against this fear, because at present the fear has a real basis. At present each nation has cause for the fear it feels. Each nation has cause to believe that its national life is in peril unless it is able to take the national life of one or more of its foes or at least hopelessly to cripple that foe. The causes of fear must be removed or, no matter what peace may be patched up to-day or what new treaties may be negotiated to-morrow, these causes will at some future day bring about the same results, bring about a repetition of this same awful tragedy.”

To-day this same fear emasculates the League of Nations, leads to the piling up of armaments by insolvent Governments, and even embitters relations between the British Empire and the United States. This fear certainly actuates France in her policy in North Africa, where she looks to her colonies to provide her with cannon fodder for the army.

What is the alternative? Every other plan has been tried during the years following the end of the last war, and we stand on the brink of another. Europe will blaze up again into another war for an absolute certainty if the present condition of things continues. Nor does the danger alone threaten the Old World. Failing some such plan, I believe a terrible conflict directly involving the British Empire, America, and Japan will break out during the next twenty years, and that it will spread and involve

half the rest of the world. The seeds of this and other conflicts have been sown and are germinating. Such conflicts will utterly destroy the civilisation and the culture that we have developed. It will ruin all three nations and impoverish their peoples as the last war impoverished Germany, France, Italy, and Russia. What will become of the boasted American standard of living? It will be reduced to the level of the Poles and Austrians after the last Great War. The last war used up the savings and accumulated wealth of a hundred years of European progress, work, and culture. All the combatants in that war, except Britain and America, are insolvent to-day. They cannot pay their debts, or a tenth part of them, and have only been kept from complete anarchy by the credit of England, America, and the few neutrals, notably Holland and Switzerland. League of Nations guaranteed loans and credits alone have saved Hungary and Austria from utter ruin, and, in the case of Austria, from actual starvation. Germany has only been saved from ruin and famine by the loans made to her by London and New York and the money raised for her under the Dawes scheme. Italy would not have weathered the storm but for American loans. As for Russia, she, a food-producing country with a vast majority of peasant farmers, has passed through appalling famines and plagues as the result of the war and the revolutions. And the revolutions followed the war and were, in fact, its results. For Russia's credit has been destroyed. During the years from August, 1914, onwards Europe has been living on its fat, like a bear in winter hibernation. But so has most of the rest of the trading world. Now the fat has been consumed. Modern civilisation depends on trading credit, internal and external. Destroy that credit, and what becomes of the crowded city popula-

tions? They will starve amid plenty, and the land workers will live in rags and misery.

Another world war will destroy the trading credit of the whole world. For there are no reserves now to use up. America's gold will be as useless as the gold banded and buried and hoarded by the Indian ryots. Destroy our trading credit, and we destroy our civilisation.

Such a war will be followed by general Bolshevism, complete anarchy, and the disappearance of credit.

The best simile I can find of the present-day posture of the inhabitants of the civilised states of the world, faced ever with the danger of war, is that of the captive rowers in opposing war galleys. The poor rowers toil at the oars of their Nationalist sentiments, chained to the benches by their prejudices and their fears. Presently the galleys will be joined in battle ramming and sinking each other, the poor rowers tugging at their oars between decks and encompassing their own destruction.

Have we workaday people no more say in the matter than the poor captives in the galleys? Can we never break our chains and heave away our oars? Or must we toil to our doom like the 10,000,000 dead of the last war? If so, we do it with our eyes open and with full knowledge of the uselessness and barbarity of our self-chained devotion.

The contest is between intelligence and sentiment.

I see no other road out. And I will end with one verse from the "Biglow Papers":

" Ez fer war, I call it murder—
There you hev it plain an' flat;
I don't want to go no furdur
Than my Testymint fer that."

Let us adhere to old Biglow's sentiment, and this plague of war will be removed from the world.

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